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INTRODUCTION 
Protecting the safety of food has been a core function of government 
officials for more than two millennia.1  It became a responsibility of the 
United States government in 1906, when Congress enacted the Meat 
Inspection Act (MIA)2 and the Pure Food and Drugs Act (PFDA).3  That 
responsibility has grown in both importance and controversy throughout 
this century.4 
The importance of safe food is obvious.5  Every individual is exposed 
to whatever risks the food supply holds on a daily basis for her entire 
lifetime.  Although estimates of the incidence of foodborne illness are 
imprecise, there is agreement that it is significant and possibly growing.6  
However, most foodborne illnesses are either transitory,7 and thus unlikely 
to be the basis for legal claims that would force suppliers to internalize 
their costs, or difficult to trace to their source.8  Consumers can protect 
themselves against some hazards through careful selection and preparation 
of food, but others are impossible to control at the site of preparation.9 
 
 1 See Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of Government Regulation of 
Adulteration and Misbranding of Food, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 2 (1984) (detailing food 
safety codes from biblical times). 
 2 Act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2907, 34 Stat. 1260, amended by Wholesome Meat Act, Pub. 
L. No. 90-201, 81 Stat. 584 (1967). 
 3 Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, repealed by 21 U.S.C. § 392(a), Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). 
 4 See PETER BARTON HUTT & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 4-14 (2d ed. 
1991) (summarizing the bureaucratic and statutory development of federal food safety 
regulation).  See also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., M ILESTONES IN U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
LAW HISTORY (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles/html 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2000) (summarizing the history of the FDA’s involvement in federal 
food safety regulation) [hereinafter FDA M ILESTONES]. 
 5 See, e.g., President William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks Supporting Food Safety 
Legislation, 34 WEEKLY COMP . PRES. DOC. 374, 375 (Mar. 4, 1998) (“Food safety really is 
part of the basic contract now between the consumers of our country and their 
Government.”).  See also Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman, Remarks at the Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University (Feb. 11, 1998) (transcript available at United 
States Department of Agriculture, National News Releases, at 
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1998/02/0071) (“Food safety is one area where people 
want strong government.  It’s the same with airplane safety, bank solvency and national 
security; people look to government to protect them in ways they cannot protect themselves, 
and cannot rely exclusively on the private sector to do it either.”). 
 6 See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF M ED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENSURING SAFE FOOD 
FROM PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION 1 (1998) (“Although estimates vary widely, there is 
agreement that foodborne illness is a serious problem.”) [hereinafter ENSURING SAFE FOOD]. 
 7 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 8 See, e.g., Sharlene W. Lassiter, From Hoof to Hamburger: The Fiction of a Safe Meat 
Supply, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 411, 417-44 (1997) (arguing that civil remedies do not 
provide meat processors with proper incentives to minimize the risks of foodborne illness). 
 9 See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
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We make no attempt to define the proper scope of government in 
reducing foodborne risks.  We take as given that government has many 
important roles to play, that federal authorities are important actors in 
fulfilling those roles, and that significant federal resources will, and should, 
continue to be devoted to these activities.  Our interest is in the 
management and, in particular, the organization of these governmental 
activities, a subject to which attention has once again been drawn by a 
series of food poisoning episodes and the criticisms of thoughtful observers 
of the regulatory process.  The critics’ central claim, whose implications we 
seek to explore, is that the organization of federal food protection functions 
is seriously flawed.  To state it baldly, their claim is that there is no 
“organization” worthy of the name.  Instead, responsibility for what should 
be a holistic task—assuring that marketed foods do not contain harmful 
microorganisms or toxic materials—is dispersed among several agencies 
that lack central direction and administer diverse, sometimes inconsistent, 
statutes.10  The “reform” implied by this critique is consolidation of federal 
food safety functions in a single organization, under the direction of an 
identifiable leader and advocate. 
This, in substance, is the message of a recent report from the National 
Academy of Sciences (NAS), produced by a committee of which one of us 
was a member.11 The report, Ensuring Safe Food From Production to 
Consumption, was released in August 1998.12  It depicted a large 
problem—the risk of foodborne illness—that may well be growing as 
eating habits and food preparation practices change and food sources 
proliferate.  The report described the several federal programs that share 
responsibility for food safety, and it highlighted the puzzling allocation of 
federal resources among them.13  The NAS committee recommended: 
Congress should establish, by statute, a unified and central framework 
for managing federal food safety programs, one that is headed by a 
single official and which has the responsibility and control of resources 
 
 10 See, e.g., ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 8-9 (arguing that federal food safety 
statutes are “inconsistent, uneven, and at times archaic”; finding a “lack of coordination” 
among federal food safety agencies; and noting the fragmentation of food safety agencies 
and statutes). 
 11 See id. at iii. 
 12 See id.  The 1998 NAS report was funded by Congress through the FY 1998 
Agriculture Department appropriations bill.  See 143 Cong. Rec. H7518 – H7519 (daily ed. 
Sept. 17, 1997) (describing the House and Senate conference agreement calling for the NAS 
to “examine the current mechanisms in place for assuring a safe food supply and the extent 
to which they are effective in addressing food safety issues from the farm to the table,” and 
directing the agency “to analyze the extent to which current functions . . . should be 
assigned or reassigned to existing food safety agencies or an independent food safety 
agency”) [hereinafter NAS Panel Appropriation]. 
 13 See summary infra Part IV.A.4. 
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for all federal food safety activities, including outbreak management, 
standard-setting, inspection, monitoring, surveillance, risk assessment, 
enforcement, research, and education.14 
This is not the first time that a respected official body has endorsed 
reorganization of federal food safety functions.  In the last fifty years, more 
than a dozen expert panels inside and outside government have called for the 
consolidation of the federal agencies that exercise and share food safety 
responsibilities.15  Reiteration of these proposals, however, has so far proved 
impotent.  For example, the current federal food safety structure closely 
resembles the one described a generation ago by the Senate Government 
Affairs Committee Study on Federal Regulation.16  Reactions to the NAS 
Report inspire little confidence that its renewal of a now-familiar 
prescription will be any more influential.17  To be sure, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) has supported the principle of consolidation,18 
and a few bills have been introduced to achieve it.19  The New York Times, 
along with several other papers, has repeatedly endorsed efforts to 
“streamline” federal food safety regulation.20  But press accounts have 
 
 14 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 12. 
 15 “Consolidation” can mean many things in regard to federal agencies.  Consolidation 
may include organizational mergers, combinations of statutory responsibilities, creation of 
new statutory obligations, and transfer of current responsibilities to new organizations.  
Thus, part of the difficulty that policy makers address in evaluating the concept of 
consolidation is to pinpoint precisely what proposals for consolidation actually entail. See 
DONNA U. VOGT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE , FOOD SAFETY : RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY RESPONSIBILITIES, 1949-
1997 (1998), reprinted in ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 115-59 (summarizing 
twenty-one sets of recommendations for consolidating most federal food safety 
responsibilities into a single federal agency). 
 16 See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95th CONG., 5 STUDY ON 
FEDERAL REGULATION: REGULATORY ORGANIZATION 113 (Comm. Print 1977) [hereinafter 
STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION]. 
 17 See, e.g., infra notes 414-18 and accompanying text (indicating that President 
Clinton’s Council on Food Safety supports the “goal” of achieving “a fully integrated food 
safety system,” but stops short of endorsing the NAS Panel’s call for unified food safety 
framework headed by a single government official). 
 18 See LAWRENCE J. DYCKMAN, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/T-
RCED-99-256, FOOD SAFETY : U.S. NEEDS A SINGLE AGENCY TO ADMINISTER A UNIFIED, 
RISK-BASED INSPECTION SYSTEM 6-9 (1999) (“The most effective solution to the current 
fragmentation of the federal food safety system is consolidating food safety programs under 
a single agency with uniform authority.”). 
 19 See Safe Food Act of 1999, S. 1281, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2345 106th Cong. 
(1999) [hereinafter the Safe Food Act].  An identical bill was introduced in 1997 as S. 1465, 
105th Cong. (1997) and H.R. 2801, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 20 See The Food Poisoning Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999, at A16 (“The current 
system for protecting the public from unsafe food is a dangerously inefficient jumble 
administered by a dozen different agencies.  A promising measure pending in the Senate 
would create a streamlined system under the authority of a new independent Federal agency.  
The latest C.D.C. findings make it seem all the more timely.”); Food Safety Confusion, N.Y. 
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described a tepid reaction in Congress, which would have to authorize any 
major restructuring.21  Moreover, the Clinton Administration conspicuously 
refrained from endorsing this NAS recommendation. 
These varied reactions to the NAS Reports are the stimulus for our 
inquiry.  Our primary interest is not in the explanations for the past lack of 
congressional enthusiasm for consolidation, or in whether consolidation 
would make sense if one were designing a federal food safety system from 
scratch.  Rather, we are interested in understanding the obstacles that 
consolidation would face if undertaken seriously and discovering what past 
reorganization efforts suggest could be the effects of combining the 
existing programs in a single organization. 
Although we conclude that the obstacles to consolidation are 
formidable, we do not reject the NAS proposal.  Rather, this Article is an 
effort to explore questions that the NAS committee did not address, such 
as: What programs should be consolidated?  What would be the 
institutional consequences of combining the Department of Agriculture’s 
(USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) with the Food and 
Drug Administration’s (FDA) Center for Food Safety and Applied 
Nutrition (CFSAN)?  Or of removing the FSIS from the USDA?  Does 
experience with similar reorganization efforts suggest consolidation would 
be successful?  We also explore a more fundamental question: To what 
extent are the indisputably serious challenges confronted by officials 
charged with protecting food a function of, or aggravated by, the current 
dispersal of regulatory responsibilities? 
Part I of this article surveys the nature and sources of foodborne risks 
in the United States.  Part II reviews the origins of the current 
governmental structure through an historical examination of the enactment 
of federal food safety laws and successive proposals for reorganization.  
Part III describes in more detail the current set of agencies that are 
responsible for controlling foodborne risks.  Part IV summarizes the major 
proposals for reorganizing federal food safety regulation and examines the 
reasons offered to support reform of the current regime. Part V examines a 
recent experiment in regulatory consolidation, the creation and operation of 
the Environmental Protection agency.  Part VI outlines the practical 
challenges in constructing a plan for food safety consolidation.  Finally, 
Part VII describes the political obstacles to consolidation of federal food 
 
TIMES, Aug. 10, 1999, at A16 (“The Clinton Administration has done much to improve food 
safety inspection.  But further streamlining is clearly in order.”). 
 21 See, e.g., Clif Wiens, Single Food Safety Agency Proposed by Durbin, FOOD CHEM. 
NEWS, June 28, 1999 (“Broad support is lacking for the measure, with the Clinton 
administration thus far calling only for better coordination among the respective food safety 
agencies.  Republican backing is limited to one co-sponsor . . . .”). 
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safety assets. 
I.  FOODBORNE ILLNESS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Americans face real—even if difficult to quantify—hazards in the 
foods they consume.  The 1998 NAS panel reported that food-related 
hazards cause thousands of deaths and millions of illnesses each year.22 
A.  Incidence of Foodborne Illness 
Government officials regularly claim that the U.S. food supply is the 
safest in the world,23 a claim we have no basis for disputing.  Even so, an 
estimated 5,000 people,24 or nearly 0.002% of the nation’s populace,25 die 
each year due to illness caused by foodborne pathogens.  Though food 
poisoning is notoriously underreported, the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) has estimated that foodborne pathogens cause approximately 76 
million illnesses and 325,000 hospitalizations annually.26  One prominent 
epidemiologist has estimated that upwards of 300,000,000 cases of foodborne 
illness occur each year.27  The broad category of “foodborne illnesses” 
encompasses a variety of medical conditions that together rank second in 
 
 22 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 1.  The CDC is quick to point out that the 
oft-quoted figure of 9,000 annual food-related mortalities is merely an estimate due to 
significant underreporting of foodborne illness.  See Sensible Talk About Food Safety, FOOD 
INSIGHT, Jul.-Aug. 1998, at 1, 4.  Moreover, the CDC has recently updated its estimates of 
morbidities and mortalities caused by foodborne illness.  See Mead et al., infra note 24, at 
607. 
 23 While announcing the largest meat recall in U.S. history during the summer of 1997, 
Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman stated, “Today, America has the safest food in the 
world.”  Several countries do have lower reported rates of foodborne illness than the United 
States, however CDC officials put little faith in international food safety comparisons due to 
differing dietary consumption patterns and reporting requirements for food-related illnesses.  
See Jake Thompson & Paul Hammel, Is U.S. Food Safer?  Ag Secretary Lacks Evidence to 
Support His Statement, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Dec. 18, 1997, at 12, available at 1997 
WL 6324884. 
 24 See Paul S. Mead et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States, 5 
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 607, 607 (1999).  Significantly, these estimates include only 
morbidities and mortalities caused by foodborne pathogens, not long-term illnesses—such as 
cancer—that may also be caused by food intake. 
 25 See U.S. Bureau of the Census, POPClocks, at http://www.census.gov/main/www/ 
popclock.html (last visited Aug. 1, 1999) (listing current population as 273,138,186).  
Foodborne illness thus accounts for nearly 0.2% of all deaths in the United States.  See 
Donna L. Hoyert et al., Deaths: Final Data for 1997, 47 NAT’L VITAL STAT.  REP. 1, 1 
(1999) (reporting 2,314,245 total deaths in 1997). 
 26 See Mead et al., supra note 24, at 607. 
 27 See Chryssa V. Deliganis, Death by Apple Juice: The Problem of Foodborne Illness, 
the Regulatory Response, and Further Suggestions for Reform, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 681, 
694 (1998) (citing an estimate by Dr. Michael Osterholm of the Minnesota State Department 
of Health). 
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prevalence only to respiratory disease.28 
While popular reporting on foodborne illness outbreaks has increased in 
recent years, the actual trend in incidence is unknown.29  The Clinton 
Administration has recently taken steps to improve the government’s ability 
to monitor foodborne illness, but it is difficult to determine whether higher 
reported rates of food-related morbidity and mortality reflect increased risk or 
more sensitive monitoring. 
B.  Nature of Foodborne Risks 
Consumers face several types of foodborne hazards.  They include 
microbiological pathogens, intentional and unintentional food additives, 
naturally occurring toxins, allergens, modified food components, agricultural 
chemicals, environmental contaminants, animal drug residues, and inordinate 
consumption of certain dietary supplements.30  Foodborne pathogens mainly 
cause gastrointestinal symptoms such as diarrhea, vomiting, and sometimes 
dysentery.31  In as many as 3% of cases, however, foodborne illnesses—
including those induced by such common pathogens as Salmonella and E. coli 
bacteria—may cause more severe symptoms, such as autoimmune thyroid 
disease, inflammatory bowel disease, neuromuscular disorders, and heart 
damage.32  The CDC estimates that 5% of E. coli 0157:H7 infections result in 
renal failure, which can lead to stroke and death.33 
1.  Sources of Foodborne Hazards 
Though the magnitudes of different foodborne risks are difficult to 
measure, their general sources are better understood.  They include: (1) 
contaminated, diseased, or otherwise harmful materials that are not 
detected and excluded or cleansed; (2) inadequate storage, handling, or 
processing, which fails to detect and exclude harmful food materials or 
contaminants of food materials; and (3) purposeful introduction into the 
 
 28 See James A. Lindsay, Chronic Sequelae of Foodborne Disease, 3 EMERGING 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 443, 443 (1997). 
 29 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 51. 
 30 See id. at 21. 
 31 See Lindsay, supra note 28, at 443. 
 32 See id. at 443-50.  See also David Barstow, A Deadly Germ Taints a Tradition; E. 
Coli Devastates Families and Leaves a Fair in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1999, at B1 
(detailing the symptoms associated with a child’s death due to a recent outbreak of E. coli 
0157:H7). 
 33 See Food Safety: Oversight of the Centers for Disease Control Monitoring of 
Foodborne Pathogens—Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Human Resources and 
Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Government Reform and Oversight, 
104th Cong. 27 (1996) (statement of David Satcher, Director of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention) [hereinafter David Satcher Congressional Testimony]. 
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food supply of potentially harmful materials (including pesticides, 
fertilizers, animal drugs, packaging materials, and food ingredients). 
Many risks stem from bacteria and parasites that live on or near 
animals or contact crops during food production, processing, or storage.34  
Because there is a tendency for bacteria to contaminate entire flocks or 
herds, one contaminant can incubate in a farm or processing plant and 
eventually contaminate food across wide areas.  The effective methods of 
reducing bacterial risk include basic sanitation (both on the farm and in 
processing), use of antibacterial agents, application of radiation (for meat 
and poultry), and pasteurization.35 
The sources of non-bacterial risk are similarly diverse.  Pesticides can 
contaminate food through agricultural run-off into the water supply and by 
forming residues on raw agricultural commodities and in prepared foods.36  
Drugs administered to livestock can leave residues in human food.  Insect and 
rodent pests can infect foods in processing and storage plants.  Natural 
contaminants, such as aflatoxin, occur naturally in some foods and may pose 
risks greater than any chemicals that require regulatory safety approval.37  
Food allergens are ubiquitous and some pose serious risks to sensitive 
consumers.38  More recently, federal agencies have become concerned about 
possible bioterrorist attacks on the food supply.39 
The dietary choices that consumers make can also affect their risk of 
disease.  Certain foods, such as red meat, are correlated with higher incidence 
of certain cancers, while others, such as fruits and vegetables, are believed to 
be linked to lower cancer risks.40  As Americans have come to rely more 
heavily on restaurants and processed foods, they have relinquished control 
over risks inherent in food preparation and storage.41  And, because consumer 
 
 34 See Natalie Pargas, Food Safety Initiative to Move Beyond Microbiological Issues, 
FDA Official Says, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Jul. 5, 1999, at 10 (noting ability of E. coli 0157:H7 
from manure to survive in soil and cross-contaminate food products). 
 35 See id. 
 36 See generally Shelia Hoar Zahm & Mary H. Ward, Pesticides and Childhood Cancer, 
106 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP . 893 (1998) (discussing pesticide health risks). 
 37 See Bruce N. Ames et al., Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards, 236 SCIENCE  271, 
276-77 (Apr. 17, 1987). 
 38 See Marion Nestle, Allergies to Transgenic Foods—Questions of Policy, 334 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 726, 726 (1996). 
 39 See Judith Miller, Long Island Lab May Do Studies of Bioterrorism, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 22, 1999, at A1. 
 40 See Fabio Levi et al., Food Groups and Risk of Oral and Pharyngeal Cancer , 77 
INT’L.  J .  CANCER 705-09 (1998) (finding positive and negative correlations of dietary 
choices and cancer incidence based on a case-control study of 156 cancer patients and 284 
control subjects). 
 41 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 53; Biing-Hwan Lin et al., Nutrient 
Contribution of Food Away From Home, in AMERICA’S EATING HABITS: CHANGES AND 
CONSEQUENCES 213, 213 (Elizabeth Frazao ed., 1999) (finding that consumer spending on 
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demand for fresh agricultural commodities has surpassed domestic supply,42 
supermarkets are now stocked with imported fresh foods on a year-round 
basis.  Imported foods may present greater risks than domestically-produced 
foods because of less rigorous food safety controls or production factors, such 
as spoilage through shipping. 
2.  Foodborne Pathogens 
According to the CDC, bacterial pathogens such as Campylobacter, 
Salmonella, and E. coli 0157:H7 are the most common causes of foodborne 
morbidity and mortality in the United States.43  The CDC considers 
Campylobacter the most common bacterial cause of diarrhea in the United 
States, affecting approximately 1% of the population annually.44  These three 
bacteria are most commonly found in red meat (especially Salmonella and E. 
coli 0157:H7) and poultry (especially Campylobacter and Salmonella).45  
However, they and other bacteria can also grow on many other types of food, 
including fruits, vegetables, fish, and juices.46  The risk of cross-
contamination among products regulated by separate federal agencies presents 
regulators with growing challenges.47 
Many of the largest outbreaks of bacterial foodborne disease have been 
caused by consumption of undercooked animal-based foods or foods prepared 
under unsanitary conditions.48  Meat and poultry are believed to be the most 
common sources of these pathogens.49  Because food preparation conditions 
 
food away from home has increased from about 25% of the food budget in 1970 to about 
40% in 1995). 
 42 See discussion infra Part III.G. 
 43 See Incidence of Foodborne Illnesses: Preliminary Data from the Foodborne 
Diseases Active Surveillance Network (FoodNet)—United States, 1998, 48 M ORBIDITY & 
M ORTALITY WKLY.  REP. 189, 191 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 FoodNet Report].  For a 
comprehensive discussion of the major foodborne pathogens and several recent outbreaks, 
see Deliganis, supra note 27, at 681-701. 
 44 See Mead et al., supra note 24, at 610 tbl. 2. 
 45 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 53. 
 46 See FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ,  SALMONELLA 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (1998), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/background/ 
bksalmon.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2000). 
 47 Pathogens such as E. coli do not obey the product-based boundaries established by 
the federal government.  See, e.g., Amy Waldman, A Summer Fair, a Deadly Germ, and a 
Family Mourns the Loss of a Young Child, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1999, at B5 (describing an 
E. coli outbreak at a New York county fair believed to be caused by water contaminated by 
farm runoff). 
 48 For example, a 1995 outbreak of Salmonella which led to more than 850 illnesses 
was caused by the presence of raw meat on a cutting board with vegetables.  See Janet E. 
Collins, Impact of Changing Consumer Lifestyles on the Emergence/Reemergence of 
Foodborne Pathogens, 3 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 471, 473 tbl. 1 (1997). 
 49 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-96-96, FOOD SAFETY—
INFORMATION ON FOODBORNE ILLNESSES 29 (1996). 
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play so significant a role in the spread of bacterial foodborne pathogens, 
increasing consumer reliance on commercially prepared foods is likely to take 
on special importance in the battle against foodborne illness.50 
The Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service (ERS) 
has estimated that illnesses caused by the seven most common foodborne 
pathogens result in $6.5 billion to $13.3 billion of lost wages and health 
costs annually (1995 dollars).51  The ERS has also estimated that the total 
cost of illness plus the implied value of lives lost due to these pathogens is 
between $19.7 billion to $34.9 billion per year.52  Table 1.1 below provides 
the ERS estimates of incidence as well as illness and death costs caused by 
six common infectious foodborne agents. 
 
Table 1.153 
Selected Foodborne Pathogens: Estimated Incidence and 
Illness / Death Costs  
 
Pathogen Morbidities Mortalities Cost ($ billion) 
Campylobacter  1,375,000   -  1,750,000   110   -  511   $0.6   -  $1.0 
Clostridium   10,000    100    $0.1 
E. coli 0157:H7  8,000   -  16,000   160   -  400   $0.2   -  $0.6 
Listeria  1,526   -  1,767   378   -  485   $0.2   -  $0.3 
Salmonella  696,000   -  3,840,000   696   -  3,840   $0.6   -  $3.5 
Staph. Aureus  1,513,000    1,210    $1.2 
TOTAL 
RANGE 
 2,080,526  -  7,130,767  1,344  -  6,546  $1.6  -  $6.7 
 
In a 1996 study, the CDC analyzed 77,373 cases of foodborne disease 
reported between 1988 and 1992—a small fraction of the estimated 
outbreaks.54  Of these cases, bacterial pathogens caused 90% of cases and 
79% of outbreaks.  Salmonella caused the largest number of illnesses and 
 
 50 Restaurants now take in 43% of consumer spending on food, and the average 
American over age eight consumed more than four restaurant meals per week in 1996.  See 
Collins, supra note 48, at 473. 
 51 See Jean C. Buzby & Tanya Roberts, ERS Updates U.S. Foodborne Disease Costs for 
Seven Pathogens, FOODREVIEW, Sept.-Dec. 1996, at 20, 24. 
 52 See id.  ERS used a value of $5 million per life, which has been adopted by OMB as a 
midpoint of several hedonic wage valuations.  See W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Risks to 
Life and Health, 31 J. ECON. LIT. 1912 (1993) 
 53  See JEAN C. BUZBY ET AL., BACTERIAL FOODBORNE DISEASE :  MEDICAL COSTS & 
PRODUCTIVITY LOSSES 70 (1996). 
 54 See Nancy H. Bean et. al., Surveillance for Foodborne-Disease Outbreaks—United 
States, 1988-1992, M ORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Oct. 25, 1996, at 1. 
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deaths (most due to eating undercooked, infected eggs).55  The most common 
practices that led to disease outbreaks were food storage at improper holding 
temperatures and poor personal hygiene of food handlers.56 
While researchers are developing more accurate models of the various 
causes of foodborne illness, public health officials are still struggling to 
produce good estimates of disease incidence.  Table 1.2 summarizes 
laboratory-confirmed cases of the CDC’s seven targeted foodborne pathogens 
for a sample population of 20.5 million. 
 
Table 1.2  
1997 FoodNet Pathogen Detection57 
 
Pathogen Rate per 
100,000 
Total 
Cases 
Deaths 
 Campylobacter 27.9 3,974 1 
 Salmonella 14.2 2,207 12 
 Shigella 8.3 1,263 1 
 E. coli 0157 2.1 340 4 
 Yersinia 0.8 139 0 
 Listeria  0.5 77 15 
 Vibrio 0.4 51 0 
 Total   8,051 33 
 
As Table 1.2 illustrates, even the most common foodborne pathogens do 
not seem to present large individual risks.  For example, based on the 1997 
data above, which may or may not be representative, the risk of dying from 
Salmonella (12 deaths / 15.9 million) was less than one in a million.  The 
occurrence of morbidity from microbial contamination, however, is far more 
common and can be prolonged and costly for both victims and care-givers.  
Thus, the population burden of microbial infection seems significant, given 
the numbers of individuals exposed and the ability to reduce the risk through 
 
 55 See id. 
 56 See id. at 4. 
 57 See FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE , U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE , 
REPORT TO CONGRESS—FOODNET: AN ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM FOR BACTERIAL 
FOODBORNE DISEASES IN THE UNITED STATES  (1998).  Cases reported to FoodNet represent 
only a fraction of the number of total illnesses, since FoodNet monitors only those patients 
who seek medical attention and submit stool cultures.  The actual rates and number of cases 
are likely to be much higher due to patient underreporting, medical misdiagnosis, and failure 
to send bacterial samples to a lab that would report the pathogen to CDC.  See generally 
FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ,  REPORT TO CONGRESS—
FOODNET: AN ACTIVE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM FOR BACTERIAL FOODBORNE DISEASES IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1998). 
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low-cost activities such as proper food refrigeration, washing, and cooking.58 
3.  Food-Use Chemicals 
While pathogenic bacteria present the most common food-related risks, 
other substances, such as pesticides, food additives, and naturally occurring 
toxins in food, are also potential causes of disease.  In the CDC’s 1996 study, 
non-bacterial sources were responsible for nearly 10 percent of foodborne 
illnesses in the following proportions: chemical agents (2%), parasites (1%), 
and viruses (6%).59  Because these hazards are likely to produce illness, if at 
all, principally through long-term exposure the risks they present are more 
difficult to measure. 
Man-made chemicals—pesticides, additives, animal drug residues—
have frequently been characterized as major hazards in food, and they receive 
close regulatory scrutiny.  But the evidence that any of them contribute 
significantly to morbidity or death is at best ambiguous.  In a famous study 
conducted at the request of Congress, British epidemiologists Sir Richard Doll 
and Richard Peto estimated that 35% of all fatal cancers among Americans 
might be attributable to diet.60  But they emphasized that the dietary 
constituents of concern were “natural” nutrients, such as fat, which is 
consumed in excessive amounts, and fiber, which has become less plentiful in 
American diets.  Doll and Peto concluded that food additives could not be 
responsible for more than 1% of cancer deaths and that pesticides, though 
probably more toxic as a class, were responsible for an “unimportant 
fraction.”61  Although some authorities have questioned the Doll and Peto 
estimates,62 later reports have failed to demonstrate that man-made additives 
to food contribute significantly to human morbidity or death. 
These substances are, nonetheless, subject to close regulatory oversight, 
and among them pesticides engender the greatest controversy and attract the 
greatest attention.  Herbicides and insecticides are widely used to increase 
crop yields and enhance quality and appearance, but they commonly leave 
residues—albeit at low levels—on the treated raw crops and even in 
 
 58 See FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ,  FOOD SAFETY 
EDUCATION:  MAKING A DIFFERENCE IN IMPROVING PUBLIC HEALTH (1998), available at 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/background/fsed.htm visited Nov. 10, 2000). 
 59 See Bean et al., supra note 54. 
 60 See RICHARD DOLL & RICHARD PETO, THE CAUSES OF CANCER 1256 (1981). 
 61 See id. at 1250 (finding that there has been “no general increase in the incidence of 
liver tumors in developed countries since the long-lasting pesticides were introduced, 
despite the fact that hepatomas are the principal type of cancer to have been reported in 
laboratory animals under experimental conditions”). 
 62 See, e.g., D. Schmahl et al., Causes of Cancer—An Alternative View to Doll and Peto 
(1981), 67 KLINISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1169, 1172-73 (1989) (concluding that the causes of 
less than half of all cancers are known and avoidable). 
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processed foods.  Because they are designed to be toxic in order to target 
pests, pesticides may pose special risks for humans.  Consequently, major 
regulatory efforts are made to minimize pesticide residues in food.  Monitored 
residues are generally within government-prescribed limits, but debate 
continues over whether these limits are sufficiently protective, particularly of 
children and other vulnerable segments of the population.63 
While episodes of acute poisoning from pesticide residues occasionally 
occur, the more serious risks associated with pesticide use are likely to be the 
result of long-term exposure.  Unfortunately, there are no reliable estimates of 
these risks.  In its 1987 report, Unfinished Business: A Comparative 
Assessment of Environmental Problems, the EPA concluded that pesticide 
residue exposure posed a high risk to human health.64 The agency estimated 
that the one-third of the pesticides now in use cause 6,000 cases of cancer 
annually.65  Other groups (including the FDA) have questioned the EPA’s 
estimate, and many argue that in any case the cancer prevention benefits of a 
diet rich in fruits and vegetables far outweigh the cancer risks associated with 
pesticides.66 
We have found no good estimates of the incidence of disease attributable 
to other potential toxins in food, such as purposeful ingredients (i.e., so-called 
“direct food additives”), incidental additives (such as carryover residues of 
veterinary drugs and migrating packaging materials), and inherent or 
“natural” contaminants of agricultural commodities (such as aflatoxin on 
peanuts and certain grains).  Yet each of these categories of foodborne 
chemicals is assumed by Congress and the regulatory apparatus to present 
potential health risks significant enough to justify special prophylactic 
controls.67 
 
 63 See Zahm & Ward, supra note 36.  Residues on food are not the only source of 
human exposure to pesticides.  They can also contaminate drinking water and areas of the 
home and yard where they are applied.  See id. 
 64 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY , UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987), available at  http://www.epa.gov/opperspd/history7/ 
unfinish/toc/htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2000). 
 65 See id.  See also U.S. ENVTL.  PROT.  AGENCY , COMPARING RISKS AND SETTING  
ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES (1989), available at http://www.epa.gov/opperspd/history7/ 
bluebook/toc.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2000). 
 66 See Review the Implementation of the Food Quality Protection Act: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Dep’t Operations, Oversight, Nutrition, and Forestry of the House Comm. 
on Agric., 106th Cong. 88-89 (1999) (statement of Frances B. Smith, Executive Director of 
Consumer Alert) (citing an American Cancer Society panel that “did not believe that any 
increased intake of pesticide residues associated with increased intake of fruits and 
vegetables poses any risk of cancer”) [hereinafter 1999 FQPA Oversight Hearing]. 
 67 See, e.g., Aldicarb as a Cause of Food Poisoning—Louisiana 1998, 48 M ORBIDITY & 
M ORTALITY WLY. REP. 269 (1999); Allison Wright, CDC Supports FDA’s Draft Guidance 
for Evaluating Human Health Effects of Food Animal Drug Use, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Jul. 5, 
1999, at 4 (summarizing FDA’s efforts to limit antimicrobial resistance in humans through 
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4.  Innovative Food Technologies 
U.S. regulators also concern themselves with the potential risks 
associated with new food production technologies.  Though rarely used 
until very recently, irradiation has been declared a safe and effective 
method for killing foodborne pathogens by the NAS, the American Medical 
Association, and the World Health Organization, as well as the FDA.68  
Ironically, the food industry has been slow to adopt this technology 
because of consumer worries about its safety.  Few other technologies have 
any risk-reducing pedigree, and indeed some are claimed to be the source 
of new hazards.  The controversy between the European Union (EU) and 
the United States and Canada over hormone-treated beef is but one 
example.69 
The reliance of American agriculture on genetically engineered crops 
has attracted even greater notoriety.70  The use of genetic techniques to 
increase crop yields, enhance pest-resistance, and improve the nutritional 
content of agricultural commodities has raised fears over “Frankenstein 
foods” in Europe, and similar popular uneasiness seems to be mounting in 
the United States.71  Despite controversy, especially in Europe, U.S. 
regulators have generally affirmed the safety of genetically modified 
foods.72  Likewise, the United Kingdom’s Chief Medical Officer and Chief 
 
regulation of therapeutic animal drugs); Kevin Adler, FDA Studies Creating Fumonisin 
Advisory Levels, But Scientists Believe Far More Research Needs to be Done, FOOD CHEM. 
NEWS, Jul. 5, 1999, at 4 (noting the agency’s efforts to mitigate the risk of a naturally 
occurring corn toxin). 
 68 See Charles W. Schmidt, Safe Food: An All-Consuming Issue, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH 
PERSP . A144, A147 (1999). 
 69 See, e.g., Helene Cooper, U.S. Imposes 100% Tariffs on Slew of Gourmet Imports in 
War over Beef, WALL ST. J., Jul. 20, 1999, at A6. 
 70 See generally Jeffrey Kluger et al., Food Fight: The Battle Heats Up Between the 
U.S. and Europe Over Genetically Engineered Crops, TIME, Sept. 13, 1999, at 42 (noting 
that in 1998, 26% of the U.S. corn crop and 35% of the soybean crop was grown from 
genetically modified seeds). 
 71 See Schmidt, supra note 68, at A148; Seeds of Discontent, ECONOMIST, Feb. 20, 
1999, at 75. 
 72 See Declan Butler et al., Long-term Effect of GM Crops Serves Up Food for Thought, 
398 NATURE  651, 651 (1999) (quoting Robert McKinney, director of the National Institutes 
of Health safety division: “I don’t see any problems at all for genetically modified plants in 
terms of human health.”).  But see Jeffrey K. Francer, Frankenstein Food or Flavor Savers?  
Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology in the United States and European Union, 7 VA. J. 
SOC.  POL’Y & L. 257, 258 n.10 (2000) (citing Sheldon Krimsky, Simple and Complex 
Models of Genomics and Their Impact on Risk Assessment and Regulation of Bioengineered 
Food Products 2 (Oct. 1999) (forthcoming manuscript, presented at the Colloquium on the 
Risks and Regulation of GMO Food Products, New York University School of Law) 
(“Rarely, if ever, in the modern history of technological risk, has there been a global debate 
of such intensity and polarization on a subject for which there is so little definitive 
knowledge, so much conjecture, and so little mutual understanding”))). 
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Scientific Advisor recently concluded: “There is no current evidence to 
suggest that . . . [genetic modification] technologies used to produce food 
are inherently harmful.”73  Yet there remains a concern that genetic 
techniques can transfer the alle rgenic traits of one crop to another and put 
at risk a subset of consumers who may unwittingly be exposed to 
allergens.74  The uncertainty surrounding the risks of genetically modified 
foods has caused the EU to mandate special labeling of foods derived from 
genetic modification.75 U.S. regulators, on the other hand, have thus far 
deemed such labeling to be unnecessary unless specific foods present 
safety risks or exhibit properties that are not substantially equivalent to 
current foods.76 
The controversy over foods derived from genetically modified 
organisms provides a window on the fragmented nature of food safety 
regulation in the United States.  Under the government’s “Coordinated 
Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology,” foods, drugs, medical 
devices, biologics, and pesticides developed through modern biotechnology 
are regulated within the same statutory framework as comparable products 
made using traditional techniques.77  Thus, the FDA has primary 
jurisdiction under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) over 
the regulation of foods developed by biotechnology.78  The EPA retains 
jurisdiction over the creation and environmental release of foods with 
pesticide qualities that are manufactured using biotechnology through the 
Toxic Substances Control Act79 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act.80  Meanwhile, the USDA regulates the release of new 
plants into the environment, including those produced by modern 
biotechnology.81 
 
 73 LIAM DONALDSON & SIR ROBERT M AY,  HEALTH IMPLICATIONS OF GENETICALLY 
M ODIFIED FOODS 2 (1999), available at  http://www.doh.gov.uk/gmfood.htm (last visited 
Nov. 10, 2000). 
 74 See, e.g., Nestle, supra note 38. 
 75 See Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 1 (providing for mandatory labeling 
of genetically modified products in the European Union). 
 76 See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 
22,984, 22,991 (1992) (declaring that FDA would not require specialized labeling of 
genetically modified foods as a class). 
 77 See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 
23,304 (1986). 
 78 Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-
395 (1994)). 
 79 Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2692 (1994)). 
 80 Act of Oct. 30, 1947, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-
136y (1994)). 
 81 See, e.g., Genetically Engineered Organisms and Products; Simplification of 
Requirements and Procedures for Genetically Engineered Organisms, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,567 
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II.  HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY BUREAUCRACY 
Though nearly a century old and now widely dispersed, today’s 
federal food safety bureaucracy originated in a single cabinet department, 
the USDA.  The job of assuring that food is safe, however, has sometimes 
seemed an uncomfortable fit with the Department’s primary mission of 
assisting and promoting U.S. agriculture.  As a result of this perception, the 
formal dispersal of food safety functions began in 1940, when the FDA was 
removed from the Department of Agriculture.  Long before this formal 
restructuring, however, administrative separation was encouraged by 
statute.  In 1906, Congress created separate legal regimes for regulating 
meat products and non-meat foods, and responsibility for administering 
these two laws fell to separate departmental units.   
A.  Foundations of Federal Food Safety Regulation 
Established in 1862, the Department of Agriculture’s primary mission 
has always been to aid and promote American agriculture.  In creating the 
Department, Congress specified that its “general design and duties” were “to 
acquire and to diffuse among the people of the United States useful 
information on subjects connected with agriculture . . . and to procure, 
propagate, and distribute among the people new and valuable seeds and 
plants.”82  The Department’s original legislation did not mention food safety, 
but the USDA was the logical place to lodge responsibility when Congress 
decided that the federal government had a role in assuring the purity of food. 
The earliest federal food law, enacted in 1883, sought to prevent 
importation of adulterated tea.83  In 1886, Congress passed the first statute 
aimed at the adulteration of domestic food.84  This statute taxed margarine and 
sought to regulate butter and cheese imitations.  The legislation was, of 
course, designed to protect dairy farmers from the growing threat of 
competition from margarine as much as to protect consumers.85 Three years 
later, Congress appropriated funds for a “Chemical Division,” whose purpose 
was to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to extend and continue the 
investigation of “the adulteration of foods, drugs, and liquors.86  Thus, the 
 
(1995) (amending USDA regulations requiring notification and permitting of field testing of 
genetically engineered organisms under authority of the Federal Plant Pest Act and the 
Federal Noxious Weed Act). 
 82 7 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994). 
 83 See STEPHEN WILSON, FOOD & DRUG REGULATION 10 (1942). 
 84 See id. at 13-14. 
 85 See id.  Significantly, this first federal regulation of dairy safety, which was justified 
on food purity grounds, was also a form of economic protectionism.  The use of food safety 
and wholesomeness standards to mask economic exclusion remains one of the significant 
barriers in contemporary international trade. 
 86 See id. at 12. 
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Bureau of Chemistry, the precursor of today’s FDA, was based in a 
department whose primary mission at the time was to assist American food 
producers. 
1.  Passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Meat 
Inspection Act 
Congress prohibited food adulteration in the District of Columbia in 
1879, but it took nearly thirty more years and the defeat of 190 bills before 
legislation was passed to prohibit the marketing of adulterated food in 
interstate commerce.87  A coalition that included the American Medical 
Association, the American Public Health Association, labor unions, and 
consumer groups formed to support the legislation, and to overcome the 
opposition of food producers.88  The publication of Upton Sinclair’s The 
Jungle  helped persuade President Theodore Roosevelt to support, and 
Congress to pass, the PFDA and the MIA on the same day in 1906.89  The 
PFDA made it a misdemeanor to introduce adulterated food into interstate 
commerce.  It granted the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to examine 
food specimens for possible adulteration and directed the Secretary to report 
potential violations to the Department of Justice.90  The MIA established the 
program of continuous examination by resident federal inspectors in meat 
processing facilities that persists to this day.91  Implementation of the PFDA 
was assigned to the new Bureau of Chemistry, and the Department’s Bureau 
of Animal Industry assumed responsibility for administering the MIA.92 
2.  Friction Within the USDA 
During the period between the passage of the PFDA in 1906 and the 
transfer of what was to become the FDA to the Federal Security Agency in 
1940, relations within the USDA were often turbulent.  Dr. Harvey Wiley, 
Chief of the Bureau of Chemistry from 1883 until 1912, had long been an 
advocate for the federal government’s responsibility for food safety, and had 
actively advised the congressional committees that drafted the PFDA.93  
 
 87 See id.  See also HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 6-9 (summarizing early state and 
federal food and drug laws). 
 88 See HARVEY WILEY, THE HISTORY OF A CRIME AGAINST THE FOOD LAW 52 (1929). 
 89 See WILSON, supra note 83, at 36 (describing Roosevelt’s active role in the passage 
of the Meat Inspection Act after reading The Jungle);  see also id. at 401. 
 90 See 21 U.S.C. § 11 (1906), repealed by 21 U.S.C. § 392(a), Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). 
 91 See infra note 247. 
 92 See ARTHUR D. HERRICK , FOOD REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE  35 (1944). 
 93 See WILEY, supra note 88, at 51 (revealing that Dr. Wiley accompanied the House 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee in executive session as the PFDA was 
finalized). 
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According to several accounts, Agriculture Secretarie s under whom Wiley 
served often attempted to dampen his vigorous approach to regulation.  
Between 1907 and 1911, the Department declined to publish at least a dozen 
of the Bureau’s scientific reports on such topics as the use of sulfur dioxide in 
fruits, corn syrup as a synonym for glucose, the use of glycerin in meat 
preparation, and the bacterial content of shell eggs.94  Only a year after the 
PFDA was signed, the Secretary created a new Board of Food and Drug 
Inspection, whose official role was to advise the Secretary on issues of food 
and drug enforcement but whose objective, Wiley believed, was to 
counterbalance the influence of the Bureau of Chemistry.95 
The Bureau of Chemistry suffered an important defeat in 1908.  
President Roosevelt, who took saccharin every day on the advice of his 
doctor, became enraged when he learned that the Bureau was considering 
banning the sweetener as an adulterant.96  Roosevelt had previously 
appointed Dr. Ira Remsen, the discoverer of saccharin, to chair a new 
Board of Consulting Scientific Experts to help resolve issues of food and 
drug safety.97  After the Board advised that saccharin was safe, and the 
industry engaged in heavy lobbying, Secretary of Agriculture James 
Wilson kept the product on the market.98  A critical House committee later 
charged: “Thus the administration of the [PFDA] began with a policy of 
compromise between the Secretary and the purveyors of our national food 
supplies.”99 
Because of the perceived conflict between the Bureau of Chemistry’s 
production research duties and its enforcement responsibilities, pressure 
grew to separate the Bureau’s two functions.100 Even Secretary of 
 
 94 See id. at 63-64. 
 95 See id. at 158.  The effect of this Board was to dilute the power of Dr. Wiley.  Prior to 
the establishment of the Board of Food and Drug Inspection, the Bureau of Chemistry alone 
advised the Secretary on enforcement matters, as the Bureau was the only USDA agency 
mentioned in the PFDA.  When the Secretary of Agriculture placed two of his allies in 
positions on the new three-person Board with Dr. Wiley, the chief of the Bureau of 
Chemistry called the situation “a complete paralysis of the law.”  See id. 
 96 See generally Richard A. Merrill & Michael R. Taylor, Saccharin: A Case Study of 
Government Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 5 VA. NAT. RESOURCES L.J, 25-26 
(1985). 
 97 See id. at 163.  According to another account, Roosevelt had appointed the Remsen 
Board to help the Bureau address the controversial issue of the safety of food preservatives, 
such as benzoate of soda.  See CLAYTON A. COPPIN & JACK HIGH, THE POLITICS OF PURITY  
125-27 (1999). 
 98 See Merrill & Taylor, supra note 96, at 26-27.  Seventy years later, the Bureau of 
Chemistry’s successor agency, the FDA, would once again be rebuffed—this time by 
Congress—in an attempt to ban saccharin as a carcinogenic food additive.  See id. at 49-57. 
 99 Report of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Department of Agriculture, as 
quoted in WILEY, supra note 88, at 180. 
 100 See VOGT, supra note 15, at 3 (quoting Michael Brannon, Organizing and 
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Agriculture Wilson acknowledged what Wiley had characterized as “the 
antagonism between research and practical chemistry.”101  Dr. Walter 
Campbell, who succeeded Wiley as Chief of the Bureau, proposed 
separating the Bureau’s research and enforcement responsibilities, 
suggesting that the latter be assigned to a new Food, Drug, and Insecticide 
Administration (FDIA) still within the USDA.102 In 1927, Congress 
adopted Campbell’s proposal and created the FDIA, assigning it 
responsibility for enforcement of the PFDA.103  Three years later the USDA 
deleted the “I” from the agency’s name, leaving the title that we use 
today.104 
3.  The 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
The next major overhaul of federal food safety law occurred in 1938 
with the passage of the FDCA,105 which, with the Fair Labor Standards 
Act106 passed the same year, was one of the last two domestic legislative 
achievements of the New Deal.107  In a pattern later repeated many times, 
Congress acted in response to public outrage over the government’s 
apparent inability to assure product safety.  The immediate catalyst was the 
death of 107 people who ingested an untested drug, elixir of 
sulfanilamide.108  The FDCA’s most significant innovation was the 
requirement that new drugs be shown to be safe before marketing,109 but it 
also enlarged the FDA’s food safety authority.110  The Act authorized the 
 
Reorganizing FDA, in SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATIVE VOLUME OF FOOD 
AND DRUG LAW 142 (1984)). 
 101 The Secretary of Agriculture testified at hearings before the split of food safety 
research and regulatory responsibilities within USDA that “[r]esearch work and regulatory 
work do not mix any more than water and oil.”  WILEY, supra note 88, at 369.  Dr. Wiley, 
whose early “poison squad” had conducted some of the earliest applied food safety research 
in the U.S. government called this split “a regrettable mistake.”  See id. at 370.  Wiley’s 
position has been substantially vindicated, as the FDA currently spends approximately $25 
million per year on food safety research apart from its more traditional regulatory activities.  
See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 183. 
 102 See id. 
 103 See VOGT, supra note 15, at 3-4. 
 104 See id. 
 105 Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified at 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-397 
(West Supp. 1999)). 
 106 Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 
(West Supp. 1999)). 
 107 See CHARLES O. JACKSON,  FOOD AND DRUG LEGISLATION IN THE NEW DEAL vii 
(1970). 
 108 See FDA M ILESTONES, supra note 4. 
 109 See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1994) (providing for pre-market approval of new drugs). 
 110 See WILSON, supra note 83, at 137-48.  For a brief comparison of the 1906 PFDA to 
the 1938 FDCA see also JACKSON, supra note 107, at 195-96. 
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agency to inspect factories,111 establish safety tole rances for unavoidable 
poisons,112 and create identity and quality standards.113 It also required 
manufacturers to label food ingredients.114 
Passage of the 1938 Act was protracted.115  When new food and drug 
legislation was first proposed in 1933, public attention was focused 
elsewhere.  In addition, the bill faced strong opposition from food and drug 
trade groups.116  President Franklin Roosevelt wrote in 1933, “I hope we 
can get . . . [the FDCA] through in spite of the lobbies.”117 
One of the battles in the struggle  to enact the FDCA revolved around 
which agency should have authority to regulate the advertising of foods, 
drugs, and cosmetics.  While many in the food and advertising industries 
favored FDA regulation—based on the agency’s presumed scientific 
expertise—the Proprietary Association and the Institute of Medicine 
Manufacturers argued that jurisdiction should rest with the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC).118  Some manufacturers saw FTC regulation as less 
threatening.119  In particular, they appreciated that the FTC could only issue 
orders to cease advertising that it found false in formal proceedings, 
whereas the FDA had, or would be given, power to seek criminal penalties 
for past violations.120 In the end, the FTC was given exclusive jurisdiction 
to regulate the advertising of food, drugs, medical devices and cosmetics by 
the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938.121  Only much later was the FDA given 
limited authority over the advertising of prescription drugs and, later still, 
of restricted medical devices. 
B.  The FDA’s Removal from the USDA 
President Roosevelt moved the FDA out of the USDA in 1940.  While 
the agency had never represented a significant financial responsibility for the 
 
 111 See 21 U.S.C. § 374 (1994) (providing FDA with inspection authority of food, drug, 
medical device, and cosmetic production facilities). 
 112 See 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1994) (allowing FDA to promulgate tolerances for substances 
that “cannot be avoided” in food production). 
 113 See 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1994) (authorizing FDA to promulgate food identity and quality 
standards to promote “honesty and fair dealing”). 
 114 See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q) (1994) (establishing nutritional labeling standards). 
 115 See HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 4. 
 116 See JACKSON, supra note 107, at 26-27. 
 117 Id. at 27 (quoting personal letter from President Roosevelt to Harvey Cushing (Apr. 
21, 1933)). 
 118 See id. at 90-92. 
 119 See id. at 90 (citing Beware of the Medicine Man, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 6, 1935, at 
90). 
 120 See JACKSON, supra note 107, at 90. 
 121 Act of Mar. 21, 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111.  See also JACKSON, supra note 107, at 171-
74. 
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Department, claiming substantially less than 1% of its total budget in 1933, 
many saw a conflict between the agency’s food safety mission and the 
Department’s primary goals.122  By the 1930’s, groups such as Consumer’s 
Research, the predecessor of Consumer’s Union, were calling for the FDA’s 
removal from the USDA.123  They envisioned a new agency that “would be 
staffed with men disposed to take as prompt and effective steps in a food and 
drug and health emergency as the Department of Agriculture now does on the 
Mexican bean beetle, the corn-borer, a grasshopper plague, or an epidemic of 
hog cholera.”124 
The USDA fought to retain the FDA.  Surprisingly, it offered instead 
to trade away its meat inspection responsibilities.  In 1939, Henry Wallace 
wrote to Roosevelt: “[Meat inspection] might be associated with other 
health or public-welfare work.  Meat inspection is of course a technical job 
and it seems logical to have the technical inspectors attached to the bureau 
most competent in this field.”125  Arguing that the FDA would fit better in 
the new Federal Security Agency (FSA), however, a Bureau of the Budget 
staff member advised the President: 
It is true that most food traces back to the soil, and hence to agriculture, 
but it is not to be believed that the activities of the Department of 
Agriculture in tomato culture, for example, vests it with any legitimate 
interest in canned tomatoes where the problem becomes one of toxicity, 
under measure, adulteration, or deceptive labeling.126 
The latter argument apparently carried the day.  On April 11, 1940, 
Roosevelt proposed to transfer the FDA into the FSA, explaining in his 
message to Congress: 
The work of the Food and Drug Administration is unrelated to the basic 
functions of the Department of Agriculture.  There was, however, no 
other agency to which these functions more appropriately belonged 
until the Federal Security Agency was created last year.  I now believe 
that the opportunity for the Food and Drug Administration to develop 
along increasingly constructive lines lies in this new Agency.127 
 
 122 See ARTHUR KALLET & F.J. SCHLINK, 100,000,000 GUINEA PIGS—DANGERS IN 
EVERYDAY FOODS,  DRUGS, AND COSMETICS 254 (1933) (stating that the food and drug 
budget of the USDA was $1 million out of the $300 million total Department budget in 
1933). 
 123 See id at 276.  Kallet and Schlink were writers for Consumer’s Research. 
 124 Id. at 277. 
 125 Memo from Henry Wallace to Franklin D. Roosevelt (April 20, 1939), quoted in 
STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 16, at 140. 
 126 M emorandum from the Bureau of the Budget to Franklin D. Roosevelt (undated), 
quoted in STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 16, at 140. 
 127 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (April 11,1940), quoted in WILSON, 
supra note 83, at 150. 
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A new unit in the executive branch, the FSA had only been in 
existence since 1939.128  At the time of the FDA’s transfer, the Federal 
Security Administrator oversaw the Public Health Service, the Civilian 
Conservation Corps, the Office of Education, and the Social Security 
Administration.129  A decade after World War II, these and additional 
functions were aggregated in a new cabinet Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW).130 
The FDA’s transfer from the USDA was effected by Roosevelt’s 
“Reorganization Plan Number Four,”131 issued pursuant to the 
Reorganization Act of 1939,132 which had called on the President to 
recommend consolidation within the rapidly growing New Deal executive 
branch.133  Roosevelt’s Plan stated in part: “The Food and Drug 
Administration in the Department of Agriculture and its functions, except 
those functions relating to the administration of the Insecticide Act of 1910 
and the Naval Stores Act, are transferred to the Federal Security Agency . . 
. .”134 
Thus, by the end of 1940, the Roosevelt Administration had attempted 
to resolve the apparent conflict in federal food regulation that had frustrated 
Dr. Wiley while in the service of the President’s older cousin.  But the 
separation of regulation from promotion was not complete.  Meat and 
poultry inspection remained the responsibilities of the USDA’s Bureau of 
Animal Husbandry, later renamed the FSIS.  Regulation and market 
surveillance of non-meat products were performed by the FDA, part of the 
FSA and much later the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS).135 
 
 
 
 128 See VOGT, supra note14, at 4. 
 129 See id. 
 130 See HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 5. 
 131 See Reorganization Plan No. IV § 12, reprinted in 54 Stat. 1237 (1940). 
 132 Act of Apr. 3, 1939, ch. 36, 53 Stat. 561, amended by Reorganization Act of 1966, 
Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 394 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. § 901 (West Supp. 1999)). 
 133 The Reorganization Act directed the President to investigate the organization of 
federal agencies to determine changes that would (1) decrease expenditure; (2) enhance 
efficiency; (3) consolidate agencies by their major goals; (4) decrease the number of federal 
agencies by consolidating ones with similar functions, and; (5) eliminate overlapping and 
duplicative efforts.  See id. 
 134 See Reorganization Plan No. IV § 12, reprinted in 54 Stat. 1237 (1940). 
 135 The FSA became the HEW in 1953.  HEW became HHS in 1979, after the creation of 
the separate Department of Education.  For a chronology of the relationship between FDA 
and its parent agencies, see HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 4-5. 
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C.  Origins of Administrative Fragmentation 
The jurisdictional boundaries that divide federal food safety functions 
are anchored in the bifurcated statutory framework that Congress created in 
1906.  In addition to enacting separate laws for meat and non-meat foods, 
Congress divided authority to make rules implementing the PFDA among 
three entities.  The 1906 Act provided that “the Secretary of the Treasury, 
the Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of Commerce . . . shall make 
uniform rules and regulations” for implementing the statute.136  This led 
Wiley to complain that the Bureau of Chemistry actually served three 
masters based in three separate cabinet departments.137 
The original dispersal of regulatory authority over food established 
the pattern that is evident today.  By 1949, as the Hoover Commission 
noted, the FDA regulated food labeling while the FTC oversaw food 
advertising; the FDA set limits for and monitored pesticide residues on 
food while the USDA was responsible for approving the marketing of pest 
control agents used by farmers; the FSA regulated human drugs while the 
USDA monitored drugs used in livestock; and the Department of the 
Treasury administered the tax on margarine and imitation cheeses and 
regulated the labeling of alcoholic beverages.138 
Two generations later, the federal food safety “organization chart” had 
become even more complex.  In 1970, President Nixon reassigned 
responsibility for pesticide regulation from the USDA to the new EPA.139  
The EPA was also assigned the FDA’s responsibility (and personnel) for 
setting and enforcing pesticide tolerances on food.140  Research on food, 
nutrition, and health became divided among several units within the USDA 
and shared with the CDC and the National Institutes of Health.141  The 
Commerce Department was for many years responsible for regulating the 
harvesting, processing, and shipment of seafood—a function that the 
USDA and the FDA both believed they could perform better.142  In 
 
 136 21 U.S.C. § 3 (1906), repealed by 21 U.S.C. § 392(a), Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). 
 137 See WILEY, supra note 88, at 89 (describing a regulation signed by the Secretaries of 
Agriculture, Treasury, and Commerce that overruled the Bureau of Chemistry’s labeling 
requirements for corn syrup). 
 138 See U.S. COMM’N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE 
GOVERNMENT, THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT (McGraw-Hill ed., 1949) 250-51 
[hereinafter THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT]. 
 139 See discussion infra Part VI.A. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 182-83. 
 142 See Daniel P. Puzo, Seafood Faces Inspections; Consumers: Congress Is Considering 
Mandatory Regulation to Replace Current Voluntary Efforts, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 26, 1990, at 
H42. 
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addition, during the decades following the EPA’s creation, Congress 
enacted several new laws or amendments to existing laws that enlarged the 
duties of the several agencies that exercised food safety responsibilities.143  
One result of this proliferation, ironically, was to embed the oldest 
programs even more firmly in the organizations where they were first 
rooted. 
D.  Pesticide Regulation and the Birth of the EPA 
Since World War II the federal government has administered 
companion legal regimes for regulating the marketing of agricultural 
pesticides and protecting consumers from unsafe residues on food.  These 
programs are governed by two separate statutes, which are currently 
administered by another governmental entity—the EPA.  Unlike the FDA 
and the USDA, which hold more generalized food safety responsibilities, 
the EPA’s involvement in food safety is focused on one class of products: 
pesticides.144 
Congress passed the first federal pesticide law, the Insecticide Act,145 
in 1910 to regulate the labeling of pesticides.  The Bureau of Chemistry, 
later the FDA, performed the testing necessary to set allowable levels for 
pesticide residues on food.  During the early part of the century, one third 
of the Bureau’s staff was involved in pesticide regulation.146  This role 
sharpened the tension implicit in the Bureau’s location within the USDA, 
and it was not long before critics of the agency were warning the public 
about the conflict between its public health responsibilities and the 
Department’s responsibility to assist producers of food.  The authors of the 
famous 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs wrote in 1933: 
[W]ith numerous fruit growers completely unequipped for removing 
the spray residue, with the staff of Government inspectors available for 
fruit inspection far too small to exercise more than a fraction of the 
necessary supervision, and with the Food and Drug Administration, in 
its usual fashion far more concerned about the economic interests of the 
 
 143 See, e.g., Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1513 
(1996); Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 
111 Stat. 2296 (1997); Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 
104 Stat. 2353 (1990). 
 144 This is not completely accurate.  The EPA is responsible for administering the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”), pursuant to which it regulates systems that supply potable 
water to homes and businesses, including food processors.  Water is a “food” when intended 
for ingestion.  By memorandum of understanding, The FDA and the EPA have divided 
responsibility for assuring the safety of water.  Under the SDWA, the EPA regulates public 
drinking water supplies—and the agents they use to purify or filter them—while the FDA 
confines itself to bottled water. 
 145 Act of Apr. 26, 1910, ch. 191, 36 Stat. 331. 
 146 See WILSON, supra note 83, at 63; KALLET & SCHLINK, supra note 122, at 48-49. 
 2000]  ORGANIZING FOOD SAFETY  87 
growers than about the health of the public, one must be blind to 
suppose that a large part of the supply of apples and pears and many 
other fruits and vegetables is not contaminated with far more arsenic 
than is legally permitted.147 
Indeed, while the Bureau reduced the allowable level of arsenic on 
apples for export in order to avoid a British boycott, the Secretary of 
Agriculture, under pressure from U.S. growers, set the level for domestic 
apples two and one-half times higher.148  Despite claims that industry had 
captured the pesticide program, however, when the FDA was removed 
from the USDA, responsibility for administering the Insecticide Act was 
left with the Department. 
In 1947, Congress passed the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),149 replacing the outdated Insecticide Act.  The 
FIFRA required pesticide manufacturers to obtain federal (then USDA) 
approval before shipping any pesticide for use on food crops.150  
Responsibility for setting permissible residue levels on food, however, 
remained with the FDA, operating under the FDCA.151  Congress amended 
the FDCA in 1954152 and again in 1958153 to confirm the FDA’s authority 
to set safe “tole rances” for pesticides on food and place on industry the 
responsibility of conducting the tests necessary to set limits that would 
protect consumers.154  Thus, until 1970, the FDA and the USDA divided 
responsibility for pesticide regulation.155 
In 1970, President Nixon transferred the responsibility for 
administering the FIFRA to the newly created EPA.156  At the same time, 
Nixon also assigned to the EPA the tolerance-setting function that the FDA 
had been performing.157  With these changes, the administration could be 
said at last to have addressed the charges of agricultural industry “capture” 
of pesticide regulation expressed in 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs.  The EPA 
now registers pesticides under the FIFRA and establishes safe tolerances 
 
 147 KALLET & SCHLINK, supra note 122, at 48 (footnote omitted). 
 148 See WILSON, supra note 83, at 64. 
 149 Act of Oct. 30, 1947, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163. 
 150 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a (1994). 
 151 See 21 U.S.C. § 346a (1994). 
 152 See Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 559, 68 Stat. 511. 
 153 See Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784 (1958). 
 154 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a (West Supp. 1999) (providing EPA Administrator with 
authority to promulgate tolerances). 
 155 See HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 306-07. 
 156 See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970), reprinted in 42 
U.S.C.A. § 4321 (West 1999), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) [hereinafter Reorganization Plan 
No. 3] (establishing the EPA). 
 157 See id. 
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for food-use pesticides under the FDCA.158 It also recommends “action 
levels” for the FDA to apply to pesticide residues that accidentally appear 
on foods for which they are not approved.159  The FDA and the USDA 
enforce the limits on pesticide residues prescribed for their respective 
product categories.160 
E.  Geographic Dispersal 
The fragmentation of federal food safety programs is not only 
statutory and administrative, it is physical as well.  The major 
participants—the USDA, the FDA, and the EPA—are based in several 
different locations in and around the nation’s capitol.  The FDA occupies 
forty buildings in more than eighteen locations around Washington, D.C.161  
The Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition has field personnel in 
five regional offices, twenty-one district offices, sixteen laboratories, and 
120 resident posts that serve as bases for its investigators.162  The USDA’s 
several programs with food safety-related functions are equally widely 
distributed.163  In contrast, the EPA’s pesticide program is large, but 
physically centralized.164 
This snapshot of the bureaucratic  landscape does not reflect the even 
more obvious dispersal of personnel and facilities that is the inevitable 
result of a system that depends, critically, on physical examination of 
facilities and of products.  The USDA’s meat and poultry inspectors are 
based in approximately 6,000 establishments.165  The FDA’s field 
inspection force is officed in fewer locations but is responsible for 
monitoring nearly ten times as many business establishments.166  Nor does 
this account address the administrative structure or operating locations of 
 
 158 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a (West Supp. 1999). 
 159 See HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 307. 
 160 See 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1994). 
 161 See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES, at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/budget/faclegres.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2000). 
 162 See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DESCRIPTION OF FIELD ACTIVITIES, in FY 2000 
BUDGET REQUEST (1999), available at http://fda.gov/pc/oms/ofm/budget/fieldfoods.htm 
[hereinafter FDA FIELD ACTIVITIES]. 
 163 FSIS alone has eighteen district offices and a technical center.  See 9 C.F.R. § 
300.3(c) (1999). 
 164 See Interview with Jon Cannon, Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of 
Law (October 23, 2000).  Until 1998, Professor Cannon served as General Counsel to the 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
 165 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ,  FOOD SAFETY , in USDA BUDGET SUMMARY  (1999), 
available at http://www.usda.gov/agency/obpa/Budget Summary/2000/text.html#fs (last 
visited Nov. 10, 2000). 
 166 In 1998, FDA performed 5,013 direct inspections on food establishments and 
contracted to the states for an additional 4,279 inspections.  See FDA FIELD ACTIVITIES, 
supra note 162. 
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other governmental entities, most notably fifty state and many more local 
bodies that have important roles in assuring safe food or in investigating 
outbreaks of foodborne disease. 
 
Table 2.1167 
Selected Food Safety and Quality Statutes and Relevant 
Implementing Federal Agencies 
 
Legislation Relevant Implementing 
Food Safety Agencies 
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 AMS, FSIS 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 AMS 
Egg Products Inspection Act FDA, AMS 
Federal Anti-Tampering Act FDA, AMS, FSIS 
Federal Food Drug, and Cosmetic Act FDA, EPA 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act EPA 
Federal Meat Inspection Act FSIS 
Federal Import Milk Act FDA 
Infant Formula Act of 1980 FDA 
Lacey Act NMFS 
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act NMFS 
National Ocean Pollution Research and Development and   
Monitoring Planning Act 
NMFS 
Pesticide Monitoring Improvements Act FDA 
Poultry Products Inspection Act FSIS 
Public Health Service Act FDA 
Safe Drinking Water Act FDA, EPA 
Toxic Substances Control Act EPA 
U.S. Grain Standards Act GIPSA 
 
 
 167 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-91-19A, FOOD SAFETY 
AND QUALITY—WHO DOES WHAT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 16 (1990). 
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III.  THE CONTEMPORARY  STRUCTURE OF FOOD SAFETY REGULATION 
The current federal food safety bureaucracy is multi-layered and 
separated by statutory boundaries defined either by product category or 
regulatory function. 
A.  Overview 
Four federal agencies share primary responsibility for federal food 
safety.  The largest of these, the USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS), regulates meat168 and poultry169 through the continuous inspection of 
processing operations and review and approval of product labels.170  The 
FDA, through its Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN), 
monitors the safety and labeling of most non-meat and processed foods, and 
licenses food-use chemicals other than pesticides.171  The EPA Office of 
Pesticide Programs (OPP) registers pesticides and sets pesticide tolerances 
that are enforced by the FDA or the FSIS.172  Finally, the CDC is the federal 
government’s primary clearinghouse for disease morbidity and mortality 
surveillance data, and its chief resource for epidemiological investigations.173 
In addition to the four major organizations, at least a dozen other federal 
agencies play ancillary or supporting roles in the government’s regulatory 
efforts.  They include the USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service; the 
USDA’s Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA); 
the USDA’s Office of Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Analysis; the 
Commerce Department’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS); the 
USDA’s Agricultural Research Service (ARS); the USDA’s Animal and Plant 
Inspection Service (APHIS); the USDA’s Cooperative State Research, 
Education, and Extension Service (CSREES); the USDA’s Economic 
Research Service (ERS); the Treasury Department’s Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); the Federal Trade Commission (FTC); and the 
U.S. Customs Service.174 
 
 168 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (1994). 
 169 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 451-471 (1994). 
 170 The FSIS also regulates the safety and labeling of egg products and enforces EPA 
pesticide tolerances in meat, poultry, and egg products.  See 7 U.S.C.A. § 138a (West 1999) 
(establishing a laboratory accreditation program for monitoring pesticide residues in 
agricultural products); 9 C.F.R. § 590 (1999) (providing egg product standards). 
 171 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-397 (1994). 
 172 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1994); 21 U.S.C § 342(a)(2)(B) (1994). 
 173 See U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NCID SURVEILLANCE 
ACTIVITIES, at http:/www.cdc.gov/ncidod/ncidsurv.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2000) 
[hereinafter NCID SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES]. 
 174 See generally  U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-91-19A, 
FOOD SAFETY AND QUALITY—WHO DOES WHAT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1990).  For a 
 2000]  ORGANIZING FOOD SAFETY  91 
Table 3.1 
Federal Safety Responsibilities for Selected Food Products 
 
Food Regulator(s) Comments 
Alcoholic 
Beverages 
ATF, FDA ATF licenses and inspects 
breweries/distilleries.  FDA oversees 
wine coolers. 
Eggs FDA, AMS,  
FSIS, APHIS 
FDA has lead jurisdiction over shell 
eggs.  FSIS continuously inspects 
egg products.  AMS operates a 
voluntary grading program.  APHIS 
monitors animal health. 
Fruits and 
Vegetables  
(includes 
genetically  
enhanced 
varieties) 
FDA, EPA, USDA EPA and USDA share pesticide 
regulation responsibilities.  FDA 
enforces standards for pesticide 
residues on processed food. 
Grain FDA, GIPSA, EPA GIPSA establishes and enforces 
identity standards through inspection. 
FDA enforces standards for pesticide 
residues on processed food. 
Meat and Poultry FSIS, FDA FSIS inspects meat during 
processing.  FDA holds regulatory 
authority once meat leaves the 
slaughtering or manufacturing plant. 
Processed Foods FDA FDA is responsible for most non-
meat products. 
Seafood FDA, NMFS FDA oversees seafood safety 
generally.  NMFS runs a voluntary 
inspection service. 
Water FDA, EPA EPA regulates tap water, FDA 
bottled water. 
 
 
 
 
 
more recent, but less detailed, overview of the respective agencies with federal food safety 
responsibilities, see also U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., FOOD SAFETY : A TEAM APPROACH , 
available at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/foodteam.html (last visited Nov. 9, 
2000) [hereinafter FOOD SAFETY : A TEAM APPROACH ]. 
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As Table 3.1 indicates, several classes of food are subject to regulation 
by more than one agency.  For example, grain, the paradigmatic American 
commodity, has many overseers.  Identity standards for grain are established 
and enforced by the GIPSA,175 pesticide residues on grains are regulated by 
the EPA176 and enforced by the FDA,177 and grains that become ingredients in 
processed food are potentially subject to FDA regulation as food additives.178  
Seafood and eggs are both subject to regulation by two agencies, the FDA and 
the USDA for eggs, and the NMFS and the FDA for seafood.179  And while 
the USDA traditionally inspects meat processors, the FDA shares with the 
USDA authority to carry out surveillance and enforcement of meat 
adulteration standards once products have left USDA-regulated processing 
plants.180  Further overlap is occasioned by the FDA’s responsibility for 
approving additives to meat and poultry products.181  Such fragmentation can 
be confusing to consumers who often address complaints to the wrong 
agency.182 
B.  The Food and Drug Administration 
1.  The FDA’s Food Safety Responsibilities 
The FDA may have the most diverse set of food safety duties.  The 
agency bears some responsibility for the safety and wholesomeness of most 
food sold in interstate commerce other than meat or poultry.183  Yet, both 
its food safety budget and workforce are much smaller than those available 
to the FSIS.  Food safety is not the FDA’s only, and certainly no longer its 
major, responsibility.  The agency is also supposed to assure the safety and 
 
 175 See 7 C.F.R. § 2.81 (1998) (delegating grain standard-setting and inspection 
responsibilities to the Administrator of GIPSA). 
 176 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1994) (establishing that no pesticide may be distributed that 
is not registered by the EPA). 
 177 See id. § 342(a)(2). 
 178 See id. § 321(s) (defining regulated food additives). 
 179 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 102.54 (1998) (establishing FDA standard for seafood 
cocktails).  But see 50 C.F.R. § 261.101 (1994) (defining standards for NMFS voluntary 
seafood inspection service).  See also 7 C.F.R. § 2.79 (1998) (delegating egg grading 
authority to the Administrator of AMS).  But see 7 C.F.R. § 59.411 (1998) (authorizing 
FDA review of egg product nutritional labels). 
 180 See 21 U.S.C. § 679(b) (1994) (providing the FDA with statutory authority—in the 
Meat Inspection Act—to regulate meat products that have left the manufacturing plant). 
 181 See 9 C.F.R. § 318.7 (1999) (describing FSIS authority to approve substances used in 
the preparation of meat and poultry products). 
 182 Interview with FSIS field personnel (Feb. 17, 1998). 
 183 See CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, FDA ALMANAC (1998), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/ 
~lrd/almcfsan.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2000) [hereinafter FDA ALMANAC]. 
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clinical effectiveness of all drugs and medical devices.184  In addition, it 
regulates cosmetics, blood products, radiation-emitting products, veterinary 
drugs, and a host of exotic medical technologies, such as gene therapy, 
tissue transplants, and human cloning.185 
The FDA uses a variety of means to protect the safety of food.  The 
agency performs pre-market safety reviews of food and color additives and 
animal drugs.186  It periodically inspects food processing and storage 
operations.187  It establishes and enforces regulations governing food 
labels.188  Though federal law does not demand their pre-market approval, 
the FDA monitors the safety of dietary supplements,189 infant formulas,190 
and medical foods.191  It also has formal authority to police sanitation in 
supermarkets and restaurants, but it relies on state and local officials to 
inspect and oversee such establishments.192  Finally, the FDA conducts 
research—although on a much smaller scale than the USDA—to improve 
its understanding of the health risks posed by foodborne chemicals and 
microbiological contaminants.193  The FDA’s authority stems chiefly from 
the frequently amended FDCA, but it is also authorized to implement parts 
of some thirty other statutes, including the Public Health Service Act194 and 
the Egg Products Inspection Act.195 
 
 184 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 393(b)(2) (West 1998)  The FDA’s broad mission requires the 
agency to: 
protect  the public health by ensuring that foods are safe, wholesome, 
sanitary, and properly labeled; human and veterinary drugs are safe and 
effective; there is reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of 
devices intended for human use; cosmetics are safe and properly labeled; and 
public health and safety are protected from electronic product radiation. 
Id.  
 185 See id. 
 186 See id. § 348. 
 187 See id. § 374 (providing inspection authority). 
 188 See 21 U.S.C. § 331(b) (1994) (prohibiting the misbranding of any food in interstate 
commerce). 
 189 See id. § 321(ff) (deeming dietary supplements to be foods and therefore exempt from 
FDA premarket approval requirements for drugs). 
 190 See id. § 350a. 
 191 See HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 39. 
 192 See  21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(4) (categorizing foods that have been “prepared, packed, or 
held under insanitary conditions” and may have become contaminated or injurious to health 
as adulterated). 
 193 See, e.g., Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 62 
Fed. Reg. 2,674 (1997) (referring to certain FDA databases on toxicology and 
carcinogenicity). 
 194 Act of July 1, 1944, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201-300qq-
91(1994)). 
 195 Pub. L. No. 91-597, 84 Stat. 1620 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 1031-1056 (1994)).  
FDA also implements portions of the Controlled Substances Act, the Lead Based Paint 
Poisoning Prevention Act, the Sanitary Food Transportation Act, the Filled Milk Act, the 
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The FDA’s main food safety functions are divided between its 
headquarters Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) and 
sizable force of field inspectors and laboratories.  Roughly speaking, the 
Center establishes the standards, and the agency’s field personnel are 
largely responsible for assuring that they are met.  Together these units 
oversee a vast industry that includes more than 30,000 domestic food 
manufacturers and some 20,000 food warehouses.196 
Another facet of the FDA’s food safety responsibility is its regulation 
of animal drugs and feeds.  Some animal drugs can reduce or prevent 
foodborne illness in humans by controlling animal pathogens, but others 
may leave harmful residues that could enter the human food supply.197  
Approximately 80% of U.S. livestock and poultry are given drugs during 
their lifetime.198  The FDA’s Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) is the 
unit responsible for pre-market approval of new animal drugs and, in 
cooperation with the agency’s field inspectors (and the USDA), for 
surveillance of animal drug use to minimize any risk posed by drug 
residues.199 
2.  The FDA’s Approach to Food Safety 
The FDA’s food safety functions fall under two broad headings.  The 
agency is concerned with threats of acute poisoning caused by the presence 
of harmful microorganisms that may contaminate or grow in food.  It is 
also responsible, in cooperation with the EPA, for controlling potentially 
toxic materials that get into food through human activity.  In confronting 
the first challenge, the FDA’s primary instruments are the establishment 
and enforcement of standards for the selection, preparation, storage, and 
 
Federal Import Milk Act, the Trademark Act of 1946, the Federal Anti-Tampering Act, the 
Federal Meat Inspection Act, the Poultry Products Inspection Act, the Controlled 
Substances Import and Export Act, the 1997 Modernization Act, the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, and the Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1988.  
Moreover, FDA operates under several general procedural statutes such as the 
Administrative Procedures Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act, the Government in 
the Sunshine Act, the Congressional Reports Elimination Act of 1982, federal fines and 
sentencing guidelines, and the GATT Uruguay Round Patent Provisions.  See U.S. FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMIN., COMPILATION OF LAWS ENFORCED BY THE U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. 
AND RELATED STATUTES, available at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/laws/lawtoc.htm (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2000). 
 196 See FDA ALMANAC, supra note 183. 
 197 See Food Safety: Oversight of the FDA Center for Veterinary Medicine: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the House 
Comm. on Gov’t Reform and Oversight, 104th Cong. 19 (1996) (statement of Dr. Michael 
Friedman, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, U.S. Food and Drug Administration) 
[hereinafter CVM Hearing Testimony]. 
 198 See id. at 20. 
 199 See id. at 19. 
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handling of ingredients and finished foods.  The agency has promulgated 
regulations prescribing general “good manufacturing practices” covering 
all food processors as well as categorical standards for specific classes of 
products, such as low-acid canned foods.200 
Two categories of food within the FDA’s jurisdiction present 
significant risks of microbial contamination.  One is seafood, for which the 
FDA shares responsibility with the Department of Commerce through the 
NMFS.201  In 1995, the FDA promulgated regulations that mandate Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) regulation of seafood 
products.202 HACCP is a quality assurance strategy that requires producers 
and transporters to: (1) identify significant food risks (e.g., bacterial 
contamination) that can occur at every stage of production, transport, and 
storage; (2) specify validated processes to control such risks (e.g., 
refrigeration); and (3) establish record-keeping and monitoring procedures to 
verify effectiveness and detect errors.203  Some observers have criticized the 
FDA’s largely voluntary seafood HACCP plan for failure to assure adequate 
oversight of seafood producers.204 
The FDA also shares with the USDA jurisdiction over shelled eggs, 
one of the greatest Salmonella risks, with the USDA.205  In a May 1998 
advance notice of proposed rulemaking, the FDA and the FSIS announced 
that they intended to propose regulations to improve the safety of eggs.  
The regulations would require eggs packed for consumer use to be 
refrigerated during distribution and mandate a label on packages that 
refrigeration is needed.206  Debate continues over the future of the FDA’s 
continued oversight of eggs.207 
Monitoring compliance with food processing standards is a labor-
intensive activity, but the FDA lacks the resources to inspect more than a 
 
 200 See HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 269-83. 
 201 See 50 C.F.R. § 260 (1999) (describing the Commerce Department’s voluntary 
seafood inspection program); Michael Friedman, M.D., FDA Deputy Commissioner for 
Operations, Statement before the Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry, 
Committee on Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives (May 22, 1996), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ola/1996/cfood.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2000) (summarizing 
responsibilities of the FDA and other agencies in seafood inspection). 
 202 See Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Fish and 
Fishery Products; Final Rule, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,095 (1995) [hereinafter Seafood Rule]. 
 203 See id. at 65,097; see also Lee-Ann Jaykus, The Application of Quantitative Risk 
Assessment to Microbial Food Safety Risks, 22 CRITICAL REVS. IN M ICROBIOLOGY 279 (1996) 
(describing the methodology and implementation challenges of quantitative risk assessment 
protocols for foodborne hazards). 
 204 See, e.g., Daniel P. Puzo, Unsafe at Any Meal?, L.A. T IMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at H1. 
 205 See notes 443-447 infra and accompanying text. 
 206 See Salmonella Enteritidis in Eggs, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,502, 27,509 (1998). 
 207 See note 447 infra and accompanying text. 
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small percentage of food processors.208  The FDA’s regulatory approach 
thus differs significantly from that employed by the FSIS for meat and 
poultry. FDA inspectors typically visit any of the approximately 50,000 
regulated food processors or warehouses only once every few years.209 
Rather than attempting to inspect all of the producers under its purview, the 
FDA relies heavily on prescribed performance standards and the good faith 
of food manufacturers to implement them.210  This does not mean that the 
FDA’s standards are ignored, for firms have significant incentives to self-
monitor for quality and cleanliness.  The fact remains, however, that the 
FDA’s inspection resources are stretched thin and indeed have declined in 
relation to the number of domestic and foreign firms subject to inspection.  
The growing share of the U.S. food supply made up of imported foods is a 
source of concern among some members of Congress and public health 
groups.  A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report asserted that 
“The FDA’s inspections have not kept pace with the growing volume of 
imported foods.”211  The 1998 NAS Report came to a similar conclusion.212 
3.  Pre-market Licensure of Food Use Chemicals 
The second major focus of the FDA’s food safety responsibilities is 
reflected in its regulation of chemicals that are added to, or likely to appear 
in, food.  The agency is responsible for evaluating—and, often, for 
approving—the safety of ingredients added to processed foods, including 
foods subject to USDA inspection.213  This responsibility is imposed by the 
1958 Food Additives Amendment214 to the FDCA, which requires that any 
“food additive” be found by the FDA to be safe.215  The 1960 Color 
Additive Amendments216 establish a similar requirement for colors added 
to food (or drugs or cosmetics).217  The FDA devotes significant resources 
to these licensing programs because the FDCA not only mandates that it 
 
 208 See, e.g., ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 87 (“FDA’s shrunken inspection 
force is seriously over-extended, and FDA appears to have insufficient resources to meet its 
statutory obligations.”). 
 209 See Michael R. Taylor, Preparing America’s Food Safety System for the Twenty-First 
Century—Who is Responsible for What When it Comes to Meeting the Food Safety 
Challenges of the Consumer-Driven Global Economy?, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 13, 16 
(1997). 
 210 See id. 
 211 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED 94-192, FOOD SAFETY : 
CHANGES NEEDED TO M INIMIZE UNSAFE CHEMICALS IN FOOD 51 (1994). 
 212 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 89-90. 
 213 See HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 284-86. 
 214 Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784. 
 215 See 21 U.S.C. § 348 (1994). 
 216 Pub. L. No. 86-618, 74 Stat. 397. 
 217 See 21 U.S.C. § 379e (1994). 
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review new ingredients, but obligates it to act within a prescribed time 
limit, an obligation the agency often fails to meet, despite its best efforts.218 
The CFSAN’s Office of Premarket Approval has responsibility for 
monitoring the safety of two classes of ingredients that do not meet the 
technical definition of a “food additive”: Substances sanctioned by the 
FDA or the USDA before 1958 and substances that are claimed or have 
been found to be “generally recognized as safe.”219  In addition, the 
statutory definition includes food-contact materials that might contaminate 
food.220  The FDA’s responsibility for reviewing petitions for the latter 
class of chemicals has caused a major drain on the Center’s resources.  The 
Office of Premarket Approval currently employs over fifty reviewers and 
in 1999, claimed $11.4 million, representing about 12% of the Center’s 
1999 budget and 5% of the agency’s total spending on food safety.221 
The agency scientists who review petitions for food and color 
additives are also responsible for another facet of the FDA’s food safety 
program targeted at environmental contaminants of food.  Substances like 
mercury, PCBs, and aflatoxin contaminate several foods, and can pose 
serious potential health risks.  Industrial accidents and other surprise 
discoveries may suddenly add to the program’s workload, demanding 
analysis by headquarters scientists and enforcement efforts by field 
personnel. 
4.  The FDA’s Food Safety Budget 
With a fiscal 1998 budget exceeding $1 billion and nearly 9,000 full-
time-equivalent employees (FTEs), the FDA has grown dramatically since 
its removal from the USDA in 1940, but so have its responsibilities.222  
Furthermore, in recent years the budget for food regulation has shrunk to 
less than one quarter of the agency total,223 or less than one-third of the 
 
 218 See id. § 348(c)(2) (providing a 180-day limit on the FDA’s review of new food 
additive petitions); § 379e(d)(1) (providing similar time restrictions on FDA review of color 
additive petitions). 
 219 See id. § 321(s) (defining food additives requiring pre-market approval and 
exceptions). 
 220 See id. 
 221 See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION,  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF FY 2000 
BUDGET REQUEST, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/finalcj.html (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2000) (detailing staffing and spending on pre-market review activities) 
[hereinafter FDA FY 2000 BUDGET SUMMARY]; U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
ALL PURPOSE TABLE, available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/netapt25.htm 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2000) (detailing FDA total budget by spending category) [hereinafter 
FDA FY 2000 BUDGET TABLE]. 
 222 See FDA FY 2000 BUDGET SUMMARY , supra note 221.  See also FDA M ILESTONES, 
supra note 4. 
 223 In 1999, FDA’s appropriated food budget was $231.6 million (23%) of the FDA’s 
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USDA’s food safety budget.224  Before it received increased appropriations 
through the President’s Food Safety Initiative for fiscal 1999, the FDA 
employed approximately 250 food inspectors to monitor the nation’s more 
than 50,000 food production, processing, and storage establishments—only 
enough to inspect approximately 5,000 facilities per year.225 
The NAS panel and the GAO have both concluded that the FDA’s 
food safety budget has not kept pace with its responsibilities.226  The 
agency’s 1998 food inspection budget of $161.4 million was actually $1.8 
million lower than it was in 1995.227  These constraints are more troubling 
in light of evidence that a majority of recent disease outbreaks have been 
caused by foods subject to regulation by the FDA.228 
C.  The Department of Agriculture 
The USDA plays a central role in the government’s regulation of food 
safety chiefly through its continuous inspection of meat and poultry 
products.  The USDA’s food safety budget is large—over $746 million in 
1998229—but of course the Department has many other tasks as well.  Its 
original mission of discovering new seeds and plants for farmers has grown 
to include helping fund land-grant colleges, rural development projects, the 
nationwide Extension Service, support for and regulation of agricultural 
marketing arrangements, and provision of farm loans, to list just a few.230  
 
total budget of $1.0 billion.  This was split between CFSAN ($98.5 million) and field 
activities ($133.0 million).  Congress appropriated the animal drugs and feeds programs 
$42.0 million that was split between the Center for Veterinary Medicine ($29.4 million) and 
field activities ($12.6 million).  Combined, food programs and veterinary programs were 
budgeted $273.6 million or 27% of the total FDA budget.  This was an increase of almost 
$26 million compared to 1998.  See FDA FY 2000 BUDGET TABLE, supra note 221. 
 224 Based on staff communications with six major food safety agencies—FDA, USDA, 
EPA, CDC, NIH, and NMFS—the National Academy of Sciences compiled perhaps the 
most precise summary of federal food safety spending from fiscal years 1995 through 1998.  
The FY 1998 food safety budgets of these agencies were: FDA—$222.6 million; USDA 
(combined agencies)—$746.4 million; EPA (total pesticide spending)—$181.9 million; 
CDC—$14.5 million; NIH—$52.9 million; and NMFS—$18.5 million.  See ENSURING 
SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 182-83. 
 225 See Taylor, supra note 209, at 16. 
 226 See supra notes 208-211. 
 227 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 182. 
 228 See Caroline Smith DeWaal, et al., Outbreak Alert! Closing the Gaps in Our Federal 
Food-Safety Net (2000) (finding that 682 of 865 publicized foodborne outbreaks between 
1990 and 1998 were caused by FDA-regulated foods), available at 
http://www.cspinet.org/reports/outbreak alert/index.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2000). 
 229 See id. 
 230 See OFFICE OF M ANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES APPENDIX 59-184 (1998) (detailing the USDA’s complete appropriations for 
1998 and the President’s requests for 1998) [hereinafter FY1999 FEDERAL BUDGET 
APPENDIX]. 
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Thus, the $746 million devoted to food safety represents less than 2% of 
the USDA’s total 1998 budget of over $55 billion.231 
1.  The USDA’s Food Safety Activities 
Over a half dozen different USDA units have food safety 
responsibilities.  Many of these activities are overseen by the Under 
Secretary for Food Safety,232 a new position created in 1994 specifically to 
address claims that the USDA’s agricultural promotion activities would 
always dominate food safety efforts.233  The most important of these units, 
the FSIS, is responsible for inspecting on a continuous basis each plant that 
processes meat or poultry, and food containing meat or poultry intended for 
interstate distribution.234  Another unit, the Agricultural Marketing Service 
(AMS), operates a large voluntary inspection system for the grading of 
eggs,235 and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
oversees programs to prevent animal and plant disease,236 a function the 
Department has performed for well over a century.237  The APHIS is also 
responsible for the USDA’s regulation of agricultural biotechnology 
products.238  The Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration 
(GIPSA) inspects grains for safety as well as quality.239  And the 
Agricultural Research Service (ARS),240 Cooperative State Research, 
 
 231 See OFFICE OF M ANAGEMENT AND BUDGET,  FISCAL YEAR 1999 BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES 69 (1998) (comparing the complete outlays of the federal government by 
department). 
 232 See 7 C.F.R. § 2.18 (1998) (detailing the delegated authorities of the Under Secretary 
for Food Safety). 
 233 In 1994, then-Congressman Robert Torricelli had proposed moving the USDA’s meat 
and poultry inspection responsibilities to FDA.  While the democratic leadership of the 
House Agriculture Committee opposed this move, Congress created the USDA’s Under 
Secretary for Food Safety as a means of “elevating and keeping completely separate all food 
safety activities within the Department.”  140 CONG. REC. H9967 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1994) 
(colloquy of Reps. Torricelli and Stenholm). 
 234 See 7 C.F.R. § 2.53 (1998) (describing various FSIS responsibilities).  
 235 See id. § 2.79 (1998) (describing the delegated authorities of the AMS).  This service 
is provided for grading purposes; the inspection of shell eggs for safety purposes is 
undertaken primarily by FDA. 
 236 See id. § 2.80 (1998) (describing the delegated authorities of APHIS). 
 237 HERRICK , supra note 92, at 35. 
 238 Under its authority to protect crops and animals from disease, APHIS issues permits 
that govern the release of genetically modified pesticides.  Both EPA and FDA also regulate 
genetically modified organisms under their traditional statutes.  See ANIMAL AND PLANT 
HEALTH INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., UNITED STATES REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech/OECD/usregs.htm (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2000). 
 239 See 7 C.F.R. § 2.81 (1998) (describing the delegated authorities of GIPSA). 
 240 See id. § 2.65 (describing the delegated authorities of the ARS). 
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Education, and Extension Service (CSREES),241 and Economic Research 
Service (ERS),242 each undertakes or funds agricultural research, including 
some food safety-related research.  The ARS, for example, is spearheading 
research relating to the federal government’s response to potential 
bioterrorist attacks on the food supply.243 Together, the several USDA units 
expended over $60 million in 1998 on food safety research—far more than 
any other federal agency.244 
2.  The Food Safety and Inspection Service 
In its oversight of meat and poultry processing, the FSIS plays a critical 
role in federal food safety regulation.245  In contrast to the FDA’s unstructured 
authority to police commerce for adulterated food,246 Congress imposed on 
the Secretary of Agriculture statutory obligations to examine every meat and 
poultry carcass intended for food sold in interstate commerce.247  Any meat or 
poultry product that has not undergone inspection is considered adulterated.248 
This continuous inspection activity claims a larger share of federal food 
safety resources than any other activity.  The FSIS devotes approximately 
 
 241 See id. § 2.66 (describing the delegated authorities of CSREES). 
 242 See id. § 2.67 (describing the delegated authorities of the ERS). 
 243 See Miller, supra note 39, at 1. 
 244 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 182 (showing the USDA food safety 
research budget to be over $60 million). 
 245 See 21 U.S.C. § 603-05 (1994) (mandating that the Secretary of Agriculture perform 
ante- and post-mortem inspection of meat); id. § 455 (mandating that the Secretary of 
Agriculture perform ante- and post-mortem inspection of poultry); id. § 606 (West 1998) 
(mandating continuous inspection of meat processing facilities). 
 246 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1994) (prohibiting the introduction into interstate 
commerce of any adulterated food). 
 247 See 21 U.S.C. § 604 (1994).  The statute requires that:  
[T]he Secretary [of Agriculture] shall cause to be made by inspectors 
appointed for that purpose a post mortem examination and inspection of the 
carcasses and parts thereof of all cattle, sheep, swine, goats, horses, mules, 
and other equines to be prepared at any slaughtering, meat-canning, salting, 
packing, rendering, or similar establishment in any State, Territory, or the 
District of Columbia as articles of commerce which are capable of use as 
human food . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added).  In addition: 
The Secretary, whenever processing operations are being conducted, shall 
cause to be made by inspectors post mortem inspection of the carcass of each 
bird processed, and at any time such quarantine, segregation, and 
reinspection as he deems necessary of poultry and poultry products capable 
of use as human food in each official establishment processing such poultry 
or poultry products for commerce or otherwise subject to inspection under 
this chapter [21 U.S.C. §§ 451-470]. 
Id. at § 455(b) (emphasis added). 
 248 See 21 U.S.C. § 604 (1994). 
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88% of its personnel budget249—$327 million in 1998250—to in-plant 
inspection.  Of this total, $271 million was spent on post-slaughter, carcass-
by-carcass inspection of meat and poultry.251  The MIA’s and the PPIA’s 
continuous inspection mandates have thus become “resource anchors” for the 
FSIS and for the USDA.  While the FDA relies on approximately 250 field 
inspectors to oversee some 53,000 food establishments, the FSIS employs 
more than 7,300 full-time, residential inspectors in roughly 6,200 meat and 
poultry plants.252  Over 90% of the FSIS’ full-time employees reside in the 
field.253 
The FSIS also administers the labeling requirements of the MIA and the  
PPIA.  The agency is responsible for pre-market approval of the formulas and 
labeling of most meat and poultry products.254  It is also responsible for 
monitoring meat and poultry for chemical residues, including directly added 
chemicals, animal drugs, and pesticide residues.255  The FDA, or the EPA in 
the case of pesticides, is responsible for establishing safe limits on such 
residues.256 
The FSIS has by far the largest budget of any federal food safety 
agency—$590 million in 1998.257  Of this total, the FSIS spent $494 million 
regulating domestic meat and poultry.  It spent $35 million on in-house 
laboratory services alone.258  In contrast, only $12 million was budgeted for 
inspection of imports and exports.259 
A controversial feature of the FSIS’ continuous inspection program has 
been its traditional reliance on organoleptic (sight, touch, and smell) 
 
 249 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB.  NO. GAO/T-RCED-94-110, Food 
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 252 See Taylor, supra note 209, at 16-17. 
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FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES AS OF 10/5/99, at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OM/hrd/stats/stats.htm 
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 255 See 9 C.F.R. § 309.16 (1999). 
 256 See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 346, 346a (West Supp. 1999). 
 257 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., USDA 2000 BUDGET SUMMARY (2000), available at 
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2000). 
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examination of each carcass or bird.260  The MIA and the PPIA mandates 
appear strict, for example: 
[T]he Secretary shall cause to be made by inspectors appointed for that 
purpose a post mortem examination and inspection of the carcasses and 
parts thereof of all cattle, sheep, swine, goats, horses, mules, and other 
equines to be prepared at any slaughtering, meat-canning, salting, 
packing, rendering, or similar establishment in any State, Territory, or 
the District of Columbia as articles of commerce which are capable of 
use as human food . . . .261 
The PPIA imposes a similar obligation to conduct a “post mortem 
inspection of the carcass of each bird processed.”262  This is important but 
also resource-intensive work, and as other methods have been devised to 
monitor product safety, the FSIS has come under pressure to modernize its 
inspection methods.  For example, in a 1987 report, the NAS concluded that 
“the present system of inspection does very little to protect the public against 
microbial hazards in young chickens.”263  As microbial pathogens appear to 
present increasing risks, the FSIS’ traditional inspection methods have also 
come under criticism from the GAO and consumer groups such as the Center 
for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI).264 
The FSIS has responded to this criticism in several ways.  Not only has 
it continued sight and smell inspection of each carcass and bird, but it has also 
adopted requirements for bacterial testing of products.  Further, it has taken 
the first steps toward mandating HACCP protocols in meat and poultry 
processing plants.265  New USDA regulations will eventually require all meat 
and poultry plants to implement a HACCP program that specifically addresses 
 
 260 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-92-152, FOOD 
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all major hazards and includes testing for microbial pathogens.266 
The FSIS’ endorsement of HACCP has likewise been controversial in 
some quarters.  The agency’s unionized inspectors have opposed any USDA 
move away from carcass-by-carcass inspection and have resisted the 
implementation of HACCP regulations.267  One union official stated that 
“organoleptic inspection methods are the only proven methods to remove 
[tainted] products from the food supply.”268  With strong support from the 
Clinton administration, however, the USDA has embraced implementation of 
HACCP as a major priority in the national food safety agenda.269  The FSIS 
has responded to public criticism by publishing preliminary data indicating 
significant decreases in Salmonella contamination in 300 large meat and 
poultry plants that implemented HACCP protocols.270 
The USDA has disputed the claim that it is legally bound to continue its 
traditional organoleptic inspections.271  Both its inspectors and some external 
critics, like the GAO, have argued that carcass-by-carcass inspections are 
statutorily mandated.272  The Department’s official position is more nuanced.  
In response to a recent GAO report on the allocation of food safety resources, 
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Enforcement of Salmonella Performance Standard, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Jan. 25, 1999, at 17-18 
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 267 See Allison Beers, Inspectors Lobby Lawmakers to Support Continuous Inspection, 
FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Jan. 25, 1999, at 14-16. 
 268 Id. at 14. 
 269 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2000 241 (1999) (stating the Clinton Administration’s goal to 
have 99% compliance in federally-inspected meat and poultry plants by 2000) [hereinafter 
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 270 See FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NEW M EAT AND 
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 271 See infra note 273 and accompanying text. 
 272 See OPPORTUNITIES TO REDIRECT FEDERAL RESOURCES, supra note 251, at  5 (“M ost of 
the $271 million—over one-fourth of the food safety budget—spent annually on FSIS’ 
organoleptic, carcass-by-carcass slaughter inspections could be spent more effectively on 
other food safety activities that better address food safety risks.  Once HACCP is fully 
implemented, [food safety] funds could become available through the Congress’s . . . 
eliminating the legislatively mandated requirement for these federal inspections . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
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the USDA Under Secretary for Food Safety has stated: 
[W]hile the Federal Meat Inspection Act states that there is to be post 
mortem inspection of the carcasses of all animals prepared at a 
slaughtering or similar establishment, and the PPIA states that there is 
to be post mortem inspection of the carcasses of each bird processed, 
neither statute states how these inspections are to be conducted.  There 
is no statutory requirement that the inspections be accomplished as 
currently conducted under the FSIS’ inspection program and 
regulations.273 
The FSIS’ interpretation appears defensible.  The statutes surely do not 
mandate the form of organoleptic inspection of meat and poultry products that 
is currently practiced, but they do seem to require more than a sampling of all 
carcasses.  For meat products, the law mandates an “examination and 
inspection” of all “carcasses and parts thereof,” and for poultry products, the 
PPIA prescribes “inspection” of “each” bird.274  At the very least, this 
language would seem to require that an agent of the USDA visually, if only 
briefly, examine each carcass, as the Department has required for meat since 
1906.275 
D.  The Environmental Protection Agency 
The EPA’s primary food safety responsibilities are licensing 
pesticides for on-farm use and establishing tolerance levels for residues on 
food.  Both functions are performed by the agency’s Office of Pesticide 
Programs (OPP) pursuant to the FIFRA and the FDCA, respectively.  In 
1998, the EPA’s total budget for these activities was $181.9 million, nearly 
four-fifths of the FDA’s total food safety budget of $222.6 million.276  This 
is somewhat misleading, however, because the EPA’s pesticide registration 
 
 273 Letter from Dr. Catherine E. Woteki, Under Secretary for Food Safety, to Mr. 
Lawrence J. Dyckman, U.S. General Accounting Office 2 (Jul. 7, 1998) (citations omitted 
and emphasis added), reprinted in OPPORTUNITIES TO REDIRECT FEDERAL RESOURCES, supra 
note 272, at 36-37. 
 274 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 455(b), 604 (1994). 
 275 An analogy can be made to the Supreme Court’s recent rejection of the Department 
of Commerce’s proposal to use statistical sampling to conduct the census for purposes of 
political reapportionment.  In Dep’t of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 
119 S. Ct. 765 (1999), the Court held that an ambiguous statute that “might reasonably be 
read as either permissive or prohibitive” of sampling nevertheless prevented the 
Department’s use of the statistical technique for reapportionment purposes.  Id. at 777.  
Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, reasoned that “the interpretation of the . . . 
[statute’s] structure depends primarily on the broader context in which that structure 
appears.  Here, the context is provided by over 200 years during which federal statutes have 
prohibited the use of statistical sampling where apportionment is concerned.”  Id.  Similarly, 
in the case of meat and poultry inspection, the Court’s contextual reading of the MIA and 
PPIA would have to take account of the 100-year history of carcass-by-carcass inspection. 
 276 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 182. 
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function also embraces efforts to control non-dietary risks to applicators, 
farm workers, and wildlife.277 Of this funding, the EPA spent $19.7 million 
on activities to reduce the risk of agricultural pesticides and $36.8 million 
on reducing the use of pesticides that do not meet current safety 
standards.278  Pursuant to the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996 (FQPA), 
the agency is currently engaged in reviewing the safety of nearly 10,000 
previously established tolerances.279 
The statutory scheme for controlling dietary pesticide risks is 
complex.  Under the FIFRA, a pesticide may not be sold in the United 
States unless it has been registered by the EPA.280  The FIFRA requires the 
manufacturer of a new pesticide to conduct tests and issue reports, which 
the EPA uses to evaluate the risks and benefits of the use of the 
chemical.281  A pesticide may not be introduced into interstate commerce 
unless the Administrator of the EPA determines that the pesticide “will not 
generally cause unreasonable adverse effects on the environment.”282 
To control dietary exposure to pesticides, the EPA also establishes 
formal, binding upper limits, or tolerances, for residues left on food.  This 
function is governed by the FDCA, as recently amended by the FQPA.283  
Pesticide tolerances are approved under a recently revised health-based 
safety standard that specifically requires consideration of aggregate 
pesticide exposure and the special sensitivities of children.284  The EPA 
may grant a tolerance for a pesticide residue on raw or processed food only 
if it finds there is a “reasonable certainty” that no harm will result from 
 
 277 See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY , EPA OFFICE OF PESTICIDE 
PROGRAMS BIENNIAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 1998 AND 1999 31 (1999), available at 
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 278 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY , SAFE FOOD, available at 
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 279 Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489.  See also 1999 FQPA Oversight Hearing, supra 
note 66, at 67 (statement of James V. Aidala, Associate Assistant, Office of Prevention, 
Pesticides and Toxic Substances, EPA, and Keith Pitts, Special Assistant of the Deputy 
Secretary, USDA). 
 280 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1994). 
 281 See id. § 136d. 
 282 See id. § 136a(5)(D). 
 283 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a (West Supp. 1999). 
 284 See id. § 346a(b).  See generally U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY , OFFICE 
OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, SUMMARY OF FQPA AMENDMENTS TO FIFRA AND FFDCA (1998), 
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aggregate exposure to the residue.285  This activity requires elaborate risk 
assessments for each approved use, including analyses of individual 
exposure through diet, drinking water, and residence.286  The EPA then 
consults with the USDA to develop risk management strategies that take 
into account the pesticide’s value to farmers.287 
The EPA also contributes indirectly to food safety by seeking to limit 
chemical and microbial contaminants in the water and air,288 such as the 
pathogens E. coli or Cryptosporidium, which may infect food through local 
water supplies.289  These functions are governed by, inter alia, the Clean 
Air Act290 and the Safe Drinking Water Act.291 
If consolidation of federal food safety functions were seriously 
contemplated, the EPA’s pesticide residue program would seem a strong 
candidate for inclusion.  It is the largest single federal unit responsible for 
evaluating the safety of chemicals added to food.  Currently, approximately 
680 EPA employees are involved in this activity,292 but estimating the EPA 
resources devoted to assuring the safety of food residues is difficult 
because most of the same personnel are also involved in evaluating the 
underlying applications for FIFRA registration.293 This raises the question 
of whether the EPA’s pesticide registration function should also be 
encompassed by any consolidation.  Separating these two pesticide 
activities would create inefficiencies, but relocating the EPA’s entire 
pesticide program would disrupt important linkages with other EPA 
pollution control programs. 
While the EPA establishes the allowable limits, the FDA and the FSIS 
are responsible for monitoring food to assure compliance with those 
limits.294  These agencies also share responsibility for investigating on-farm 
compliance with EPA-prescribed limitations on pesticide use, limitations 
that are designed in part to assure that any residues on food are within safe 
limits.  Since FDA and USDA inspectors are already monitoring food for 
 
 285 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (West 1998). 
 286 See 1999 FQPA Oversight Hearing, supra note 66, at 64. 
 287 See id. at 65-66. 
 288 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 27 (summarizing EPA’s food safety 
responsibilities). 
 289 See Natalie Pargas, EPA’s Office of Water Has a Role in Food Safety, FOOD CHEM. 
NEWS, Jul. 5, 1999, at 10.  See also Barstow, supra note 32. 
 290 Act of July 14, 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q 
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 291 Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f – 300j-26 
(1994)). 
 292 See EPA FOOD SAFETY BUDGET, supra note 278. 
 293 See Interview with Jon Cannon, supra note 164. 
 294 See discussion supra Part III. 
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other chemical contaminants, it makes sense for them to be responsible for 
checking for pesticide residues as well. 
E.  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
The FDA, the FSIS, and the EPA each seek to control foodborne risks 
through inspection, production surveillance, and product approval, but none 
of them systematically investigates the prevalence or causes of foodborne 
disease.  At the federal level, this task falls to the CDC.  The CDC surveys 
morbidity and mortality by causes and undertakes epidemiological 
investigations of many diseases, including foodborne illnesses.295  The 
CDC has recently begun to devote more of its resources to food safety 
surveillance.  The agency’s spending in this area has risen from $2.9 
million in fiscal year 1995 to $14.5 million in fiscal year 1998.296  This rise 
is partially attributable to a new, more active surveillance of foodborne 
diseases via the FoodNet program, described below.297 
1.  The CDC’s Basic Functions 
The CDC obtains most of its data on disease incidence through the 
reporting of physicians nationwide.298  The CDC’s National Center for 
Infectious Diseases (NCID) maintains a list of “nationally notifiable” 
illnesses for which the agency maintains detailed records of reported 
morbidity and mortality.299  Among the food-related diseases that the CDC 
monitors on a continuing basis are Cholera, E. coli 0157:H7, Salmonella, 
and Shigella.300  The NCID analyzes data on specific diseases from state 
health agencies, laboratories, physician networks, hospitals, and national 
databases. 301  The reliability of this method of tabulation thus depends on 
patients seeking medical attention and on doctors making correct diagnoses 
 
 295 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-91-19B, FOOD 
SAFETY AND QUALITY—WHO DOES WHAT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 113-14 (1990). 
 296 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 183. 
 297 See Sue Binder, et al., The National Food Safety Initiative, 4 EMERGING INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 347 (1998). 
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 301 See id. 
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and reporting the illnesses and deaths they encounter.302 
In 1996, the CDC, in cooperation with the FDA and the USDA, 
established FoodNet, an active foodborne illness surveillance network in 
several locations around the country.303  FoodNet targets seven common 
foodborne pathogens that pose the greatest risks to public health: 
Campylobacter, E. coli 0157:H7, Salmonella, Listeria, Shigella, Vibrio, 
Yersinia, Cryptosporidium, and Cyclospora.304  By active sampling of 
physicians and medical laboratories in several representative states, the CDC 
hopes to improve its assessments of the incidence of foodborne illness.305 
The CDC has also conducted focused epidemiological investigations 
to determine the causes of morbidity and mortality in medical 
emergencies.306  During outbreaks of food-related disease, the CDC 
generally works with state and local agencies.307  Between 400 and 500 
such outbreaks are reported to the CDC each year, accounting for upwards 
of 10,000 individual cases of food-related illness.308  CDC personnel also 
work with the FDA or the USDA to determine the causes of large-scale 
cases of foodborne illnesses.309  Both regulatory agencies have their own 
emergency response units for investigating and containing outbreaks of 
foodborne disease.310 
2.  Improving Active Disease Surveillance 
The federal government’s ability to combat foodborne illness has been 
limited by lack of good information about disease incidence.  The CDC has 
recognized the limitations of relying on “passive” surveillance of reportable 
cases.311  A major goal of the Clinton Administration’s Food Safety 
Initiative was to enhance the government’s capacity to assess the risks of 
 
 302 See David Satcher Congressional Testimony, supra note 33, at 21. 
 303 FoodNet monitors clinical laboratories for specific foodborne pathogens in 
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 306 See NCID SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES, supra note 173. 
 307 See Binder, et al., supra note 297, at 347. 
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 310 See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., FOOD SAFETY FROM FARM TO TABLE: A 
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foodborne disease.  One result was the FoodNet system.  The Initiative also 
called on the CDC to help state health agencies better identify, investigate, 
and manage foodborne disease outbreaks.312  In response, the CDC has 
provided training for state and local health officials in the recognition of 
foodborne diseases with the aim of creating a national early warning 
system for disease outbreaks.313  The CDC is also involved in training 
epidemiologists in foreign countries, including several that are major 
exporters of food to the United States.314 
F.  Other Agencies with Food Safety Responsibilities 
1.  Federal Agencies 
Several other federal agencies play roles in the loosely coordinated 
effort to make food safe.  Each sits within an organization for which food 
safety is not a primary responsibility. 
Within HHS, a non-trivial amount of food safety research is funded by 
the National Institutes of Health (NIH).315 It is unclear, however, whether 
this research is coordinated with, or even complements, the research 
conducted by the USDA, the FDA, and the EPA.  The Clinton 
Administration has established the Council on Food Safety and the Joint 
Institute for Food Safety Research, charging both with the responsibility to 
coordinate the research efforts of the various federal agencies.316 
The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), part of the 
Department of Commerce, has for many years operated a fee-based 
voluntary seafood inspection and surveillance service, which had a total 
budget of $18.5 million in 1998.317  The Clinton Administration has 
proposed reassigning this program to the FDA,318 a shift that would 
centralize federal seafood regulation.  In anticipation of this relocation, the 
proposed Commerce Department budget for fiscal 1999 did not include 
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funding for the NMFS program.319  However, Congress has not approved 
this consolidation, and thus the FDA’s budget request for fiscal 2000 
repeated the request.320 
Two units of the Treasury Department, the U.S. Customs Service and 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), play important roles.  
Customs collaborates with several regulatory agencies, including the FDA 
and the USDA, to enforce federal laws at borders and ports.321  The ATF 
oversees the production and marketing of alcoholic beverages and 
investigates cases of possible adulteration of domestic and foreign 
spirits.322 
Finally, the FDA and FSIS share with the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) overlapping authorities to regulate food marketing practices.  
Oversimplified, the FTC has jurisdiction to prevent false or misleading 
advertising practices, while the FDA and FSIS retain authority over labels 
and labeling.323 
2.  State and Local Agencies 
No description of the country’s food safety “system” would be complete 
without at least a brief discussion of the state and local agencies that play 
important, and in some instances growing, roles in preventing or responding 
to foodborne illness.  State and local officials, based in public health units or 
agriculture departments (or sometimes both), play the lead role in regulating 
retail food service establishments, including grocery stores.324  As a 
consequence, the share of foodborne risk subject to state and local oversight is 
increasing.  The changing dietary habits of American consumers continue to 
increase the percentage of meals prepared (and often consumed) away from 
home.325  Simultaneously, as consumer demand for fresh fruits and vegetables 
has risen, local as well as federal officials have had to devote more attention 
to imported products.326 
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While federal officials focus on major food production facilities, literally 
hundreds of state and local agencies inspect restaurants and supermarkets, as 
well as local plants and slaughterhouses.  These state and local officials are 
the primary overseers of the approximately 750,000 restaurants, supermarkets, 
and other retail establishments nominally subject to FDA jurisdiction.327  
Twenty-five states now operate USDA-approved meat and poultry inspection 
programs that oversee about 3,000 slaughtering and processing plants and 7% 
of all domestically-produced meat and poultry.328 
The FDA and the USDA must coordinate at many levels with state and 
local officials.  The USDA’s jurisdiction over meat and poultry products does 
not extend to retail establishments such as meat markets, grocery stores, and 
restaurants.329  While meat and poultry are routinely processed in these 
facilities, the USDA depends on state inspection resources and the much more 
limited efforts of the FDA to monitor retail establishments.  The FDA, on the 
other hand, officially has jurisdiction over restaurants, food vendors, and retail 
establishments.330  The agency maintains and encourages state and local 
agencies to adopt a model food code.331  It also contracts with state and local 
officials who provide much of the nation’s milk and seafood inspection under 
federal authority.332  The FDA’s most ambitious reliance on local authority, 
however, involves the commissioning of state and local officials to conduct 
inspections and collect samples with the agency’s authority.333  Pursuant to 21 
U.S.C. § 372(a), the FDA has commissioned over 600 state and local officials 
to conduct inspections traditionally performed by the federal government.334 
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State and local regulatory structures reflect as much fragmentation as the 
federal apparatus.  For example, in a 1999 study, an Illinois Food Safety Task 
Force reported that more than 90 local health departments and 135 
municipalities in Illinois alone provide food safety services by inspecting 
restaurants, schools, food stores, and caterers.335  Indeed, the Illinois 
Department of Agriculture functions like a local USDA—preventing animal 
disease, monitoring slaughter, inspecting meat and poultry processing, and 
overseeing egg grading.336  And the Illinois State Department of Public Health 
mimics the FDA—inspecting food processing and warehousing of all non-
meat and poultry products, monitoring milk safety, and inspecting food 
retailers and restaurants.337  Some other states, such as Texas and New York, 
combine the regulation of meat, non-meat, processed food, and retail 
operations in a single agency,338 but this is by no means the universal pattern. 
Inspection of retail food establishments is a critical element of local 
regulation.  In New York, for example, the Division of Food Safety and 
Inspection has a budget of $6.3 million and is responsible for the regular 
inspection of over 28,000 establishments.339  In 1996-1997, the Division of 
Food Safety and Inspection’s 63 inspectors completed 17,918 inspections.340  
New York’s Department of Environmental Conservation is responsible for 
seafood inspection, and local agencies such as the New York City Health 
Department inspect many retail food establishments whose primary business 
is prepared food.341 
Some states spend comparable amounts on food safety.  For example, 
California’s Department of Food and Agriculture Division of Animal 
Industry (which encompasses responsibilities similar to the USDA’s FSIS 
and APHIS) has an annual personnel budget of over $10 million.342  Illinois 
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spends $1.7 million enforcing its state pesticide laws, $5 million on meat 
inspection, and $800,000 on non-meat food and drug regulation.343 
G.  The Challenge of Food Imports 
In addition to monitoring the domestic products and suppliers of food, 
U.S. regulators must respond to the even greater challenge of assuring the 
safety of food produced beyond the country’s borders.  This challenge has 
grown as American demand for imported agricultural products has risen.  
To illustrate, in 1980, U.S. food manufacturers imported only 9% of their 
broccoli for use in processed foods.  By 1995, 85% of broccoli for 
processing was imported.344  On a broader scale, by 1995 more than half of 
all fish and shellfish consumed in the United States was imported, as was 
one-third of all fresh fruit.345  In 1997, FDA inspectors physically examined 
just 1.7% of imported products under its jurisdiction; by contrast, FSIS 
inspectors visually inspected all of the products under its jurisdiction and 
performed physical inspections on 20% of them.346 
A lack of inspectional resources hampers federal, and particularly the 
FDA, efforts to control the risks of imported food.  Budgetary limits, 
however, are not the only constraint that the FDA faces.  The USDA is 
required by law to verify that any country from which the United States 
imports meat or poultry maintains an inspection system that is functionally 
equivalent to the U.S. system.347  Thus, the FSIS requires exporting 
countries to apply for meat and poultry importation eligibility, and FSIS 
personnel regularly visit these countries to verify the effectiveness of their 
respective meat and poultry safety regimes.348  The FDA has no similar 
statutory authority to require that exporting countries maintain controls 
comparable to those it enforces domestically.349  Moreover, even though 
 
 343 See ILLINOIS STATE COMPTROLLER, ILLINOIS DETAILED ANNUAL REPORT OF REVENUES 
AND EXPENDITURES 1998, 155, 156, 162 (1998) (detailing the budgets of the Illinois 
Departments of Agriculture and Public Health). 
 344 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-98-103, FOOD 
SAFETY—FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ENSURE THE SAFETY OF IMPORTED FOODS ARE INCONSISTENT 
AND UNRELIABLE 13 (1998). 
 345 See id. 
 346 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  PUB.  NO. GAO/TRCED-98-271, FOOD 
SAFETY—WEAK AND INCONSISTENTLY APPLIED CONTROLS ALLOW UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD 
TO ENTER U.S. COMMERCE  3 (1998) [hereinafter GAO UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT]. 
 347 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 46(d) (West Supp. 1998) (mandating that imported poultry “shall . 
. . be subject to the same inspection, sanitary, quality, species verification, and the residue 
standards applied to products produced in the United States; and . . . [shall] have been 
processed in facilities and under conditions that are the same as those under which similar 
products are processed in the United States”). 
 348 See GAO UNSAFE IMPORTED FOOD REPORT, supra note 346, at 21-22. 
 349 See id. at 22. 
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the FDA has authority to negotiate voluntary equivalency agreements with 
foreign countries, it lacks the resources to confirm the effectiveness of their 
regulatory systems.350 
The interdependence of the FDA, the USDA, and the U.S. Customs 
Service, presents another challenge to federal efforts to assure the safety of 
imported food.  Because Customs, at the request of either agency, has the 
power to refuse entry of a product, coordination at ports is essential.  A 
recent GAO report charges that due to lack of communication, Customs has 
been unaware of the FDA’s refusal to accept certain shipments of food.  
Consequently, food that was refused entry by the FDA may have been 
allowed into commerce by the Customs Service.351 
Finally, the participation of the United States in global efforts to 
harmonize food safety standards through the Codex Alimentarius (and 
derivatively through the World Trade Organization) requires that the 
various federal food safety agencies reach agreement on such controversial 
issues as the labeling of genetically modified foods and the use of 
hormones in raising beef.352  Codex standards are especially significant, as 
they are considered by the World Trade Organization as a measure of 
international scientific consensus in its jurisdiction over trade cases 
involving food safety issues.353  Thus, the movement toward international 
harmonization of food safety standards puts pressure on domestic 
regulators to coordinate in order to present a unified front in negotiations 
with other nations. 
The foregoing sections make clear that the United States is far from 
operating an “integrated food safety system.”  Rather, Congress has 
allocated tasks among several agencies with discrete, though sometimes 
interfaced, authorities and responsibilities.  These boundaries and 
connections are largely the result of legislative decisions made decades 
ago, when food production was almost exclusively domestic and the 
distinctions among producer sectors were much easier to discern.  
However, this fragmentation is not only embedded in statute; it is anchored 
in institutional traditions and political alliances that go back several 
decades.  Any proposal to consolidate the federal food safety bureaucracy 
must take into account the statutory and institutional histories of the 
existing agencies, as well as the impact of such change at the federal level 
on domestic local governments and emerging international regimes. 
 
 350 See id. at 22-23. 
 351 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 344, at 7-8. 
 352 See generally, FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CODEX 
ALIMENTARIUS (1999), available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/background/codex.htm 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2000). 
 353 See id. 
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IV.  REORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY REGULATION:  
AN OLD IDEA 
Less than a decade after the FDA was moved out of the USDA, a 
commission chaired by former President Herbert Hoover recommended that 
food regulatory functions should be consolidated in a single agency—the 
USDA.354  The Hoover Commission’s report proved to be the first of more 
than twenty studies urging reorganization of federal food regulation.  The 
following table lists the most prominent proposals. 
 
Table 4.1355 
Major Proposals for Reorganizing the Federal Food Safety 
Regulators Since 1949 
 
Proposal Year Summary of Reorganization Recommendations 
The Hoover 
Commission 
 
1949 Transfer all food safety responsibilities to USDA.356 
Department of 
Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) 
Reorganization 
Directive 
 
1968 FDA placed in the Public Health Service of HEW. 
White House 
Conference on Food, 
Nutrition, and Health 
 
1969 Create an interdepartmental committee to coordinate 
policy and consider the establishment of a single 
food safety agency. 
Malek Report (House 
Commerce and 
Finance 
Subcommittee) 
 
 
1969 Reorganize FDA into bureau for foods, pesticides, 
and product safety and bureau for drugs. 
 
 354 See THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 138, at 250. 
 355 See DONNA U. VOGT, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE , FOOD SAFETY : 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF FEDERAL FOOD SAFETY 
RESPONSIBILITIES, 1949-1997 (1998); INST. OF M ED. & NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
ENSURING SAFE FOOD FROM PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION 12-14 (1998). 
 356 Two of the twelve Hoover Commission members, James K. Pollack and James H. 
Rowe, Jr., dissented from the majority and advocated a unification of all food safety 
responsibilities within FDA, which would have remained a part of the FSA.  See VOGT, 
supra note 15, at 137-38. 
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GAO (Need to 
Reassess Food 
Inspection Roles of 
Federal 
Organizations) 
1970 Bureau of the Budget should undertake a detailed 
evaluation of the overlapping inspection activities of 
FDA, USDA, and other agencies to determine 
whether consolidation of some inspections would be 
feasible. 
 
Ralph Nader (Sowing 
the Wind) 
1972 Transfer USDA’s meat inspection and chemical 
monitoring responsibilities and FDA’s food 
inspection activities to a new, independent 
“consumer safety agency.” 
 
Consumer Safety Act 
(S. 3419) 
1972 Create an independent Consumer Safety Agency that 
encompassed FDA’s authority to regulate food and 
drugs; the CDC’s licensing of certain clinical labs; 
and USDA’s authority over meat and poultry 
inspection.357 
 
Senate Government 
Affairs Committee 
Study on Federal 
Regulation 
 
1977 Transfer USDA food safety activities to FDA. 
President Carter’s 
Government 
Reorganization 
Project (never 
released) 
 
1978 Consolidation of all food safety activities.  Final 
report did not resolve where this new organization 
would be located. 
Lester Crawford 1980 Consolidation of all food safety functions within 
HHS; or transfer FDA’s CFSAN and CVM to 
USDA; or merge CFSAN with CVM. 
 
 357 See id. at 15-16.  While S. 3419 passed in the Senate, the House was unwilling to 
transfer the FDA’s responsibilities to an independent agency.  See id.  HEW Secretary Eliot 
Richardson opposed the bill, stating:  
I think . . . that if the Food and Drug Administration is going to have any 
problems of digestion of new responsibilities, the problems would be 
multiplied several fold by the effort to create a new agency duplicating 
administrative authorities and having to seek scientific capabilities and 
resources that are already within the Food and Drug Administration . . . .  It is 
. . . much greater if we build upon the experience and capabilities of the Food 
and Drug Administration, than if we start all over again through the creation 
of [a] comparatively small, isolated outside body. 
Id. 
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Sanford Miller 1989 Create special commission to recommend optimal 
food safety regulatory process (may include single 
agency). 
 
Edwards Committee 
Report 
 
 
 
1991 Remove FDA from PHS; FDA Commissioner would 
report directly to HHS Secretary. 
 
GAO (Risk-based 
Food Safety 
Inspection) 
1992 Congress should hold oversight hearings to examine 
options for reorganizing the federal food safety 
system, including creation of a single food safety 
agency that could administer a uniform set of 
statutes. 
 
Food Safety and 
Inspection Agency 
Act (S. 1349) 
1993 Place all federal food safety and inspection activities 
in a single, independent agency.  Would set uniform 
risk-based inspection standards under the guidance 
of a 15-person expert commission.  Introduced by 
Sen. Durenberger. 
 
National 
Performance Review 
(Reinventing 
Government) 
 
1993 Consolidate all federal food safety responsibilities 
under FDA. 
 
 
Carol Tucker 
Foreman and the Safe 
Food Coalition 
 
1993 Consolidate all federal food safety responsibilities 
under FDA. 
Food Safety Reform 
Act 
1993 Transfer to the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission all the food safety and inspection 
functions of USDA, FDA, EPA, Interior, and 
Commerce.  Introduced by Sen. Metzenbaum. 
 
Katie O’Connell Safe 
Food Act (H.R. 
3751) 
1994 Transfer USDA’s meat, poultry, and egg inspection 
responsibilities to an independent Meat, Poultry and 
Eggs Inspection Agency.  Introduced by Rep. 
Torricelli. 
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Safe Food Act 1997 
1999 
Consolidate all federal food safety, labeling, and 
inspection programs into a new independent Food 
Safety Administration. 
 
National Academy of 
Sciences (Ensuring 
Safe Food) 
1998 Presidentially-appointed leader would direct and 
coordinate federal activities, giving federal food 
safety efforts a single voice.  New structure controls 
resources appropriated by Congress, and the 
structure would have a statutory foundation.  
Rejected White House-based “czar” and 
coordinating committee. 
 
A.  Major Reorganization Proposals 
As Table 4.1 indicates, proposals to restructure federal food safety 
functions have embraced a wide spectrum of possible arrangements.  Some 
would have consolidated all food safety duties in the USDA, on one extreme; 
others would have assigned them all to the FDA, on the other.  Yet other 
proposals contemplated the transfer of current functions to a new 
“independent” unit or to an existing agency that currently exercises few food 
safety responsibilities.  Several proposals refrained from offering a specific 
plan and simply endorsed the principle of consolidation. 
1.  The Hoover Commission: Consolidation in the USDA 
One of the few government documents to become a best seller, the 
Hoover Commission Report of 1949 was remarkable in other ways as well.358  
The Commission’s prominent membership, led of course by its chair, 
included Dean Acheson, Arthur Flemming, James Forrestal, and Joseph P. 
Kennedy.359  Their report was a broad-ranging critique of the chaotic 
organization of a burgeoning bureaucracy and explored every major facet of 
the post-New Deal federal government. 
The Hoover Commission specifically, but without elaboration, 
recommended that the FDA again be made part of the USDA.  Finding that 
the statutory dispersal of food safety responsibilities among the USDA, the 
Federal Security Agency, the FTC, and the IRS “creates great overlap and 
also confuses the public,” the Commission concluded that all federal food 
safety responsibilities should be transferred to the USDA.360  Anticipating the 
criticism that the USDA’s agricultural promotion role would dominate its 
 
 358 See THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 138, at v-viii. 
 359 See id. at ii. 
 360 See id. at 250-51. 
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consumer protection mission, the Commission simply assured that “the 
Department of Agriculture will be vigorous in the protection of consumer 
interest.”361 
The formal allocation of food safety functions at the time the Hoover 
Commission was deliberating was not fundamentally different from the 
present structure.  In 1947, the USDA devoted significant resources to 
inspecting meat products, spending over $9 million and employing about 
3,000 field inspectors.362  It also allocated $262,500 and 66 workers to 
regulating pesticides.363  Overall, the USDA budgeted in excess of $20 
million to the Bureau of Animal Industry, the departmental agency then 
chiefly responsible for food safety and the health of livestock.364  The total 
FDA budget at the time was $4.2 million, which supported 1,000 employees, 
of whom nearly 700 were in the field.365  The FDA’s budget for regulating 
food sanitation, formulating food standards, and overseeing the safety of 
vitamin and dietetic products was approximately $2.5 million—less than one-
third of the amount the USDA spent on meat inspection alone.366 
2.  The 1977 Senate Study: Consolidation in the FDA 
Nearly thirty years after the Hoover Commission’s report, the Senate 
Government Affairs Committee, under the chairmanship of Connecticut 
Democrat Abe Ribicoff, undertook a major review of “federal regulation.” 
Over a two-year period, the committee staff studied a host of regulatory 
programs, including food safety regulation, and released their findings in 
December 1977.367  Perhaps surprisingly, the committee—made up of 
senators as diverse as Edmund Muskie and Ted Stevens—was unanimous in 
its conclusions.368  Among these was a recommendation that all federal food 
regulatory functions be consolidated in the FDA.369  While acknowledging 
that the jurisdictional boundaries seemed “clearly drawn,” the committee 
found that the relevant statutes—the FDCA, the MIA, and the PPIA—“form a 
patchwork of intricate inclusions, exclusions and interrelationships which 
frequently make a precise determination of where authority lies a most 
 
 361 See id. at 251. 
 362 See BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR 
THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1948, 288-89 (1947). 
 363 See id. at 355 (detailing the USDA budget to implement the Insecticide Act). 
 364 See id. at 257. 
 365 See id. at 159, 168-69. 
 366 See id. at 169. 
 367 See STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 16, at iii. 
 368 See id. (noting in the report’s transmittal letter that the committee had voted 16-0 to 
approve the report). 
 369 See id. at 140. 
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complicated matter.”370 
Portraying the FDA and the USDA as reflecting “two different worlds of 
inspection,” the Ribicoff Report recommended the establishment of a single, 
unified food inspection force.371  In an example chosen to support its finding 
that products were “falling through the cracks,” the committee described a 
then-recent Consumers Union petition questioning the safety of meat and 
chicken pot pies and asking the FDA to establish tolerance levels for filth in 
these products.372  The FDA had responded that it was forwarding the request 
to the USDA because pot pies were meat or poultry products and thus subject 
to the latter’s regulation.  A month later, the USDA wrote to Consumers 
Union stating that any filth in pot pies resulted from the pie shells and spices 
for whose regulation the FDA was responsible.373  Later still the FDA 
acknowledged its jurisdiction over the pie shells, but after an exchange of 
letters lasting 18 months, the agency ultimately refused to initiate a survey of 
pot pies to determine tolerance levels for filth.374 
The Ribicoff Report found similar problems of coordination in the 
USDA’s voluntary inspection services, such as shell egg grading,375 and in the 
two agencies’ shared responsibilities for food labeling376 and for chemical 
residues, and additives in meat and non-meat foods.377  The committee 
summarized its assessment: 
[T]he current food regulation system results in duplication and 
inconsistency.  As a result of the dual food inspection system, more 
than 2,000 plants [in 1977] are considered joint USDA-FDA 
responsibilities, and are subject to inspection by both agencies.  The 
waste which stems from these duplicative inspections is undoubtedly 
excessive.  Precious resources needed for effective food regulation are 
squandered.378 
In sum, the committee concluded, the food safety system was “often 
duplicative, sometimes contradictory, undeniably costly, and unduly 
complex.”379 
Acknowledging that “[c]onsolidation of food regulation has been 
recommended by virtually every study of this area in recent years,” the 
Committee nonetheless urged that this be achieved by transferring the 
 
 370 Id. at 144-45. 
 371 See id. at 118-25. 
 372 See id. at 123. 
 373 See STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 16, at 123. 
 374 See id. 
 375 See id. at 125-28. 
 376 See id. at 128-34. 
 377 See id. at 135-38. 
 378 Id. at 138. 
 379 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 16, at 139. 
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USDA’s regulatory responsibilities to the FDA.380  Its report addressed the 
familiar charge of conflict between the USDA’s missions of agricultural 
promotion and public health protection, saying381 “[w]hile recognizing that 
the USDA had remedied some of the practices which have subjected it to past 
criticism . . . .  Nevertheless, we think it appropriate to separate the meat and 
poultry regulatory functions from the same agency whose duty it is to provide 
production of those products.”382  The committee also urged that the FDA’s 
status within its parent Department be upgraded and that the FDA 
Commissioner be accorded greater independence.383 
3.  The National Performance Review: Consolidation in the FDA 
Just seven years ago, the Clinton Administration’s National Performance 
Review (NPR), headed by Vice President Gore, echoed the Ribicoff Report 
by proposing the transfer of the FSIS’ meat and poultry inspection functions 
to the FDA.384  Established to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
departments and agencies, the NPR was the centerpiece of President Clinton’s 
“reinvention” initiative.385  The NPR argued that “[w]ith no fewer than 21 
agencies engaged in research on food safety, often duplicating each other’s 
efforts, we aren’t progressing fast enough in understanding and overcoming 
life-threatening illness.”386  Finding that “[t]oo many items fall through the 
bureaucratic cracks” and that inter-agency referrals often failed to elicit 
cooperation, it proposed to give the FDA the dominant role in food safety.387 
Despite the NPR’s reformist rhetoric, the Clinton Administration never 
vigorously supported the transfer of the FSIS’ responsibility to the FDA.  
Immediately after the release of the 1993 report, members of Congress began 
criticizing the plan.388  By January 1996, the White House had jettisoned the 
 
 380 Id. at 139-40. 
 381 See id. at 141 (“Indeed, one of the Department’s primary missions is to promote 
agricultural production, and it properly does so.  Unfortunately, the USDA has, in the past, 
been reluctant to take action that would discourage consumption, and numerous reports have 
found that the USDA has done an inadequate job of protecting the public health.”). 
 382 Id. at 141.  In addition to recommending the consolidation of food safety responsibilities 
within the FDA, the Ribicoff Committee also urged upgrading the FDA’s status in its parent 
department (then HEW) and increasing the independence of the FDA Commissioner.  See id. at 
143. 
 383 See id. at 143. 
 384 See ALBERT GORE ,  FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT 
WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS:  REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 101 
(1993). 
 385 See id. at i. 
 386 Id. at 101. 
 387 Id. 
 388 See Kenneth J. Cooper, Hill Turf Fights May ‘Reinvent’ Gore Proposals; Long 
Loyalties, Parochial Politics Appear Likely to Reshape Recommended Changes, WASH . 
POST, Sept. 13, 1993, at A19 (quoting then-Senator Dale Bumpers as saying that “political 
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NPR’s  plans for organizational change in favor of more easily attained goals, 
such as more widespread adoption of HACCP protocols in meat and poultry 
inspection.389 
4.  The 1998 NAS Report: Consolidation . . . Somewhere? 
In the fall of 1997, Congress appropriated funds for the National 
Academy of Sciences  to examine the “scientific and organizational needs 
for an effective food safety system . . . .”390  In August 1998, the NAS 
panel formed to carry out this work released its report, Ensuring Safe Food 
From Production to Consumption (the NAS Report).391 
Predictably, the NAS Report complimented the several federal 
agencies currently exercising food safety responsibilities for developing 
“many of the attributes of an effective system.”392  However, the report also 
found that the responsible agencies faced growing challenges on several 
fronts, including emerging pathogens such as E. coli 0157:H7, inspection 
of imported foods, the adequacy of inspection resources for commercial 
food processing facilities and larger food processors, and the increasing 
population at risk of foodborne illness.393 
The NAS panel sought to define the attributes of an effective food 
safety system, stating that the government should have “one central voice 
at the federal level which is responsible for food safety and has the 
resources to implement science-based policy in all federal activities related 
to food safety.”394  According to the panel, an effective system should 
recognize the responsibilities of state and local regulators, and it should 
have adequate funding.395  The NAS panel went on to identify several areas 
in which federal efforts fell far short of the ideal.  It characterized federal 
food safety statutes as “[i]nconsistent, uneven and at times archaic . . . 
[that] inhibit use of science-based decision-making in activities related to 
food safety, including imported foods.”396  The panel found that “[a] lack of 
coordination on several levels seems to be one effect of the lack of strong 
focused leadership and the lack of a unified mission.  The lack of 
coordination has resulted in a lack of national standards and a lack of focus 
 
blood” would flow if the Clinton Administration attempted to close USDA field offices due 
to politicians’ “parochial interest in those field offices”). 
 389 See WILLIAM CLINTON & ALBERT GORE , REINVENTING FOOD REGULATIONS (1996). 
 390 See NAS Panel Appropriation, supra note 12, at H7518–H7519. 
 391 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6. 
 392 Id. at 2. 
 393 See id. at 4. 
 394 Id. at 7. 
 395 See id. 
 396 Id. at 9. 
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on food safety.”397  The NAS panel concluded that “[n]either routine 
surveillance programs, special projects, nor emerging issues are addressed 
in a coordinated interagency manner.”398  Coordination between federal and 
state officials was similarly lacking.399 
Based on these findings, the NAS panel made five recommendations.  
Of immediate relevance, it recommended: “Congress should change federal 
statutes so that inspection, enforcement, and research efforts can be based 
on scientifically supportable assessments of risks to public health.”400  
Consistent with this reasoning, the panel also recommended elimination of 
carcass-by-carcass inspection of meat and poultry, establishment of a single 
set of inspection regulations for all foods, and acceptance of food only from 
countries with food safety controls equivalent to those in the United 
States.401 
Most importantly, the NAS panel recommended that Congress 
restructure the federal food safety bureaucracy: 
Congress should establish, by statute, a unified and central framework 
for managing federal food safety programs, one that is headed by a 
single official and which has the responsibility and control of resources 
for all federal food safety activities, including outbreak management, 
standard-setting, inspection, monitoring, surveillance, risk assessment, 
enforcement, research, and education.402 
While it stopped short of recommending a single food safety agency, 
the panel emphasized that a successful food safety system requires unified 
leadership under a single official who can direct all federal food safety 
efforts and deploy resources as risks to food require.403 
The NAS panel briefly surveyed possible organizational structures 
that might assure accountability.  The options included: the creation of a 
food safety council with representatives from all responsible agencies 
under a presidentially-appointed chair; designation of one of the current 
federal agencies as the lead agency; creation of a single food safety agency 
reporting to a current cabinet-level secretary; and establishment of a new, 
 
 397 ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 87. 
 398 Id. at 88. 
 399 See id. (“Federal, state and local authorities must work with varied amounts of 
resources, skills, and legal authority.  Lack of coordination and consistency between federal 
and state governments is problematic.”). 
 400 Id. at 93. 
 401 See id. at 11. 
 402 Id. at 12. 
 403 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 12. (“The key recommendation in this 
regard is that in order for there to be successful structure, one official should be responsible 
for federal efforts in food safety and have control of resources allocated to food safety.”). 
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independent, cabinet-level food safety agency.404  The panel quickly 
rejected two variants: appointment of a White House-based food safety 
“czar” and the establishment of a coordinating committee without line 
authority over personnel and resources.405 
The NAS panel concluded by reemphasizing the impediments to 
effective regulation created by the “patchwork” of statutes and agencies 
that govern federal food safety efforts: “[R]egardless of the organizational 
structure chosen, a revamped federal food statute is critical to being able to 
reallocate resources toward risks that have or will have the greatest 
significance to the public’s health.”406 
5.  President Clinton’s Council on Food Safety: Coordination In 
Lieu of Consolidation 
Soon after publication of the NAS report, President Clinton established 
by Executive Order the Council on Food Safety.407  Jointly chaired by the 
Secretaries of Agriculture and HHS and the Assistant to the President for 
Science and Technology/Director of the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy,408 the Council’s main purpose is: 
[T]o develop a comprehensive strategic plan for Federal food safety 
activities, taking into consideration the findings and recommendations 
of the National Academy of Science report ‘Ensuring Safe Food from 
Production to Consumption’ and other input from the public on how to 
improve the effectiveness of the current food safety system.409 
The “principal goal” of the Council’s strategic plan “should be the 
establishment of a seamless, science-based food safety system.”410  The 
President also charged the Council with the responsibility of supervising the 
agencies’ creation of coordinated food safety budgets for submission to OMB 
and guiding federal food safety research.411 
The Food Safety Council has taken steps toward each of the tasks set out 
in the President’s Executive Order.  In 1998, it held a series of public 
meetings and sought comments on the creation of its strategic plan for federal 
food safety regulation.412  The principal agencies of HHS and the USDA have 
 
 404 See id. at 13 Box ES-4. 
 405 See id. 
 406 Id. at 15. 
 407 See Exec. Order No. 13,100, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,661 (1998) [hereinafter FOOD SAFETY 
COUNCIL EXECUTIVE ORDER]. 
 408 See id. 
 409 Id. 
 410 Id. 
 411 See id. 
 412 See Food Safety Initiative Strategic Plan, 63 Fed. Reg. 52,120 (1998) (announcing 
public meetings of the President’s Food Safety Council to discuss the Council’s strategic 
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created a unified presentation of federal food safety initiatives, though they 
have not yet produced a unified budget.413 
In March 1999, the Food Safety Council released its assessment of the 
NAS panel’s report.414  The Council supported all of the panel’s 
recommendations except the suggestion that Congress establish a unified 
structure for regulation with a single official in control of federal food safety 
resources.415  The Council said that it “agrees with the goal of the NAS 
recommendation—that there should be a fully integrated food safety system 
in the U.S.,”416 but it was not ready to endorse any politically treacherous 
institutional reorganization.  The Council cautioned that “if not done 
carefully, separating food safety from non-food safety activities in each 
agency could act to weaken consumer and environmental protection 
overall.”417  Instead, it promised that its strategic report would include an 
assessment of “structural models and other mechanisms that could strengthen 
the federal food safety system through better coordination, planning, and 
resource allocation.”418 
Though he charged the Council with producing a unified food safety 
budget, President Clinton did not give it authority to veto individual agency 
budget requests.419  Furthermore, the Council’s structure does not yield a clear 
leader who can serve as the government’s voice on federal food safety issues.  
As a result, the Council is basically a coordinating body.  While the current 
White House and the agencies that it oversees seem committed to 
cooperation, the recent coordination measures are non-statutory.  They do 
not respond to the NAS panel’s observation that  “[t]here appear to be no 
mechanisms to sustain expanding interagency coordination after the current 
national concern abates and the attention of Congress, the President, and 
agency leadership is directed to other issues.”420 
 
plan and seeking comment on the 1998 NAS report). 
 413 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., 
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B.  Arguments For and Against Consolidation 
Congressional hearings have furnished contemporary advocates of 
reform a platform for criticizing the current organization of food safety 
programs and proclaiming the benefits of consolidation.  In 1993 and 1994, 
subcommittees of the House Committee on Government Operations held 
hearings on the NPR recommendation that federal food safety 
responsibilities be consolidated within the FDA.421  And within the year the 
Subcommittee on Governmental Management, Restructuring, and the 
District of Columbia of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 
held a hearing on Senator Richard Durbin’s proposal422 to assign food 
safety functions to a new, non-cabinet agency. 
At the opening of the 1993 House hearings, Representative Mike 
Kreidler of Washington acknowledged the NPR reorganization 
recommendation but stated, “Frankly, getting the job done is more 
important to us than who does the job.”423  Testimony at the 1999 Senate 
hearing illustrates what some reform proponents now believe the “job” is 
and how consolidation might help “get it done.”  Caroline Smith DeWaal of 
the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) and former USDA 
Assistant Secretary Carol Tucker Foreman, speaking for the Consumer 
Federation of America, have led the call for consolidation.  Other supporters 
include Mark Silbergeld of Consumers’ Union and former FDA 
Commissioner David Kessler.424 
Critics of the government’s efforts to mitigate foodborne risks identify 
many problems and reorganization would respond to some better than 
others.  The chief criticisms focus on political accountability for major 
policy decisions, distribution of food safety resources, adequacy of safety 
standards and enforcement authority, and overlapping agency jurisdiction.   
 
 
 
 421 See Reinventing the Federal Food Safety System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations and Joint Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations and the Subcomm. on 
Info., Justice, Transp., and Agric. of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations, 103d 
Cong. (1994) [hereinafter Reinventing the Federal Food Safety System Hearings vol. 1 and 
Reinventing the Federal Food Safety System Hearings vol. 2]. 
 422 See The Safe Food Act, supra note 19. 
 423 Reinventing the Federal Food Safety System Hearings vol. 1, supra note 421, at 3-4 
(statement of Representative Mike Kriedler) (emphasis added). 
 424 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 173 (noting Silbergeld’s support for a 
single food safety agency in a presentation to the 1998 NAS panel); Malcolm D. MacArthur, 
Single Food Safety Agency is Debated But Unlikely to Pass, PAPER, FILM & FOIL 
CONVERTER, Aug. 1, 1998, at 20 (noting Kessler’s endorsement of a single food safety 
agency). 
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As Ms. Foreman elaborated at the 1999 hearing: 
The existing food regulatory system offends every rule of good 
organization and management.  There is no clear statement of mission 
for protecting the public.  Each agency operates under different 
statutes.  There are no clear lines of authority and responsibility.  
Resources are not allocated according to need and priority.  There is no 
clear standard for success.425 
1.  Diffuse Political Accountability 
The NAS panel, echoing other critics, contended that the balkanized 
bureaucratic structure dilutes political accountability.426  These critics point 
out that there is no executive officer—short of the President—whose 
responsibilities encompass all food products and the programs responsible 
for regulating them.  As the panel noted, 
The multi-faceted federal framework of the U.S. food safety system 
lacks direction from a single leader who can speak for the government 
when confronting food safety issues and providing answers to the 
public.  There is no single voice in the government to communicate 
with stakeholders regarding food safety issues.  The lack of clear 
leadership at the federal level impedes the federal role in the 
management of food safety.  Leadership is needed to set priorities, 
deploy resources, and integrate a consistent policy into all levels of the 
system.427 
This critique implicates the ability of the federal executive to “speak 
with one voice” both domestically and internationally,428 to allocate 
resources effectively, to direct responses to crises, and to accept 
responsibility for mistakes. 
Other authorities have emphasized that dispersed leadership is more 
than a symbolic problem.  Lack of official accountability, in their view, can 
obstruct vigorous management.  Former FSIS Administrator Michael 
 
 425 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Government Management, Restructuring and the 
District of Columbia, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 106th Cong. 81, 88 
(1999) (statement of Carol Tucker Foreman) [hereinafter 1999 Carol Tucker Foreman 
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 426 See, e.g., ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 8; CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST, COMBINE ALL U.S. FOOD SAFETY FUNCTIONS INTO A SINGLE AGENCY , THE 
FOOD SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, available at http://www.cspinet.org/reports/hr2801.htm 
(last visited Nov. 11, 2000)  [hereinafter CSPI SINGLE AGENCY POLICY STATEMENT]. 
 427 ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 8. 
 428 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Restructuring and the Dist. of 
Columbia, Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 131, 133 (1999) (statement 
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Taylor, who previously served as the FDA’s Deputy Commissioner, has 
observed: “There’s no question that organizational fragmentation and 
inconsistency in statutory requirements are major obstacles to having the 
best possible food safety system . . . .  Responsibility is widely diffused, 
making the system much more difficult to manage.”429 
Carol Foreman provided examples of the obstacles posed by the lack 
of unitary responsibility for food safety.  She recounted that in 1992 the 
FDA and FSIS staff had advocated very different approaches for nutritional 
labeling of fat in ground beef.  It took President Bush to break a deadlock 
over labeling format, which the USDA and HHS Secretaries and their 
respective staffs had been unable to resolve.430  She also noted that in 1999 
some FDA personnel had complained about Agriculture Secretary 
Glickman’s comments on the labeling of genetically modified foods, 
suggesting that the FDA was trying to protect its turf.431  According to 
Foreman, turf battles are a natural result of a regulatory system in which 
leadership is dispersed and “[p]rotecting the home turf will almost always 
outweigh all other considerations.”432  Former CFSAN Director Sanford 
Miller has noted that the absence of unitary leadership433 makes 
interagency cooperation dependent on good personal relationships among 
agency officials. 
Ms. Foreman also argues that lack of central authority, coupled with 
splintered jurisdiction, prevents the allocation of resources in accordance 
with risks.  Foreman noted that despite concerns that the FDA may lack the 
resources to assure adequate inspection of shellfish, the agency may not 
borrow money or inspectors from the USDA’s better-funded meat or 
poultry inspection programs.434  Thus, in her view, lack of central 
accountability, as well as ineffective program control, may increase health 
risks. 
The NAS panel argued that a reorganization that assigned accountability 
for federal food safety regulation in one agency, and ultimately one official, 
would provide communication as well as management benefits.  The panel’s 
 
 429 See Marian Burros, Safety in Numbers? Hardly; Debate Fires Up For Merger of U.S. 
Food Inspection Agencies, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 17, 1997, at F1. 
 430 See 1999 Carol Tucker Foreman Testimony, supra note 425, at 89.  This episode 
proves that there is one person with true accountability over federal food safety—albeit a 
very busy one—the President. 
 431 See id. at 90. 
 432 Id. 
 433 See 1999 Miller Testimony, supra note 428, at 133 (Aug. 4, 1999) (“In my 
experience, as long as the leadership has respect and good personal relations with each 
other, the system will work.  When there are professional and personal conflicts, it will 
not.”). 
 434 See 1999 Carol Tucker Foreman Testimony, supra note 425, at 85. 
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report stressed the importance of creating a “single federal voice for food 
safety,” a presidential appointee who will “speak to the nation, giving federal 
food safety efforts a single voice.”435 
We are persuaded that consolidation of responsibility for federal food 
safety functions would enhance political accountability.  Collecting dispersed 
functions under a single administrator would allow one official to speak with 
authority.  Central budgeting of food safety activities could enhance the 
ability of the administration, and perhaps of Congress, to allocate resources 
more rationally even if statutorily-driven inspection requirements remained 
unchanged.  However, these benefits would come at a price and must be 
balanced against the disruption consolidation would produce.  Indeed, this 
disruption, in our view, requires that the political feasibility of consolidation 
be assessed with skepticism. 
2.  Jurisdictional Overlaps and Gaps 
Food safety program jurisdictions are typically defined by product 
category, resulting in some foods being regulated by more than one 
agency.436  Critics of the current structure have charged that such 
jurisdictional overlap is inefficient.437  More importantly, they contend that 
divided responsibility allows some food hazards to escape regulatory 
control.  The National Performance Review’s endorsement of consolidation 
begins with the stark conclusion: “Sometimes duplication among federal 
programs can make us ill—even kill us.”438 Senator Torricelli, co-sponsor 
of the 1997 Safe Food Act, stated, “[l]ack of coordination among the 
various agencies has unnecessarily endangered the health of millions of 
Americans, and it cannot be permitted to continue.”439 
In several reports and testimony before Congress, the CSPI has sought 
to spotlight food safety problems that “fall through the cracks of agency 
jurisdiction.”440  It has pointed out, for example, that both the NMFS and the 
AMS, which operate voluntary inspection programs (for seafood plants and 
 
 435 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 13 (emphasis added). 
 436 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 437 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-97-249R, FOOD 
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efforts to minimize wasteful duplication of effort, prevent gaps in regulatory coverage, and 
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 438 GORE , supra note 384, at 101. 
 439 FDA and USDA Avoid Strong Stance on Single Food Agency Bill, FOOD CHEM. 
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 440 Natalie Pargas, Optimum Food Safety Forum at IFT Segues to Consumer Education 
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egg producers, respectively) have adopted policies to notify the FDA, which 
possesses formal regulatory authority, about unsanitary conditions found 
during inspections.441  However, the GAO has reported that because 
inspectors and managers are often unaware of these referral requirements, 
during the period from 1988 to 1991 the NMFS failed to notify the FDA 
about conditions at 198 seafood plants that failed sanitation inspection.442 
The CSPI has contended that miscommunication has similarly 
undermined the effectiveness of the FDA/USDA regulation of eggs.  Egg 
regulation is now the shared responsibility of the FDA (shell eggs), the FSIS 
(processed egg products), and the AMS (registration of major commercial egg 
producers).443  According to the CSPI, the USDA’s shell egg graders and 
inspectors (employed by the AMS through that agency’s voluntary egg 
grading service) often fail to notify the FDA of serious sanitation 
violations.444  In one example, the USDA’s APHIS (responsible for animal 
health) investigated a Salmonella-contaminated chicken flock but did not 
notify the FDA of its results for almost a month.  By then, the FDA was 
unable to locate the Salmonella-contaminated eggs to attempt a recall.445  
Acknowledging difficulties in the regulation of eggs, the FSIS and the FDA 
have jointly sought comments regarding “how best to address the food safety 
concerns associated with shell eggs in the context of their mutual, HACCP-
based, farm-to-table food safety strategy.”446  However, Senator Richard 
Durbin, claiming that the FDA’s egg safety efforts are “almost non-existent,” 
has called on the agency to relinquish its role in favor of exclusive USDA 
regulation.447 
The CSPI’s Caroline Smith DeWaal has presented examples of similar 
risks that are regulated inconsistently by different agencies.  Ms. DeWaal 
cited the classic example of continuously inspected (FSIS) frozen pepperoni 
pizza and infrequently inspected (FDA) cheese pizza.448  She also testified 
 
 441 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. NO. GAO/RCED-92-152, FOOD SAFETY 
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FOOD CHEM. NEWS, July 5, 1999, at 19. 
 448 See Caroline Smith DeWaal, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Government 
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that the FDA and the FSIS are implementing different versions of HACCP in 
their respective regulation of seafood and meat, products that present similar 
and significant risks: 
[B]oth frequent inspection and laboratory verification of product 
samples are essential to give the government appropriate oversight over 
plants utilizing HACCP.  Otherwise, the HACCP program is little more 
than an industry honor system.  While the USDA requires both on-site 
inspection by government inspectors and two levels of laboratory 
verification of meat and poultry products, the FDA requires neither for 
seafood products.  The FDA inspects seafood plants once every one to 
five years and made laboratory testing for HACCP verification optional 
for seafood processors.449 
Offering yet another example, DeWaal stated that the FDA and the EPA 
have implemented different limits on methylmercury in fish: The EPA has set 
a more stringent standard for recreationally caught fish than the FDA applies 
to commercially caught fish.450 
Ms. DeWaal has also called attention to interagency differences in 
enforcement techniques and testing methods.  Among her examples is the 
difference between the FDA’s and the USDA’s handling of imported foods: 
the USDA has the authority to investigate and approve as meeting U.S. 
requirements the standards and procedures followed by countries from which 
food is imported, a power the FDA lacks.451  Ms. DeWaal also reported 
complaints by state agencies that federal officials have refused to adopt 
uniform testing and reporting requirements.  Thus, local officials must often 
perform multiple tests on the same foods in order to report requested 
information to different federal agencies.452 
Though skeptical of consolidation, the Administration’s Council on 
Food Safety has acknowledged that the boundaries on agency jurisdiction 
have sometimes proved dysfunctional: 
There are numerous instances in the existing food safety system where 
the division of regulatory responsibility is not optimal.  For example, 
 
Governmental Affairs 106th Cong. 96, 104 (Aug. 4, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 DeWaal 
Testimony]. 
 449 Id. at 105-06.  Perhaps as a consequence of FDA’s method of HACCP 
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within the same plant, FSIS and FDA inspectors are often responsible 
for different foods.  The FDA and the FSIS also share regulatory 
responsibility of eggs and egg products.  Examples such as these create 
stakeholder confusion and inefficient allocation of resources.  Any 
reorganization must consider areas where there is significant 
jurisdictional overlap.453 
Advocates of consolidation emphasize the disadvantages of product-
defined statutory boundaries.  Such boundaries as the meat/non-meat 
distinction divide regulators along product rather than functional lines.  
Former FDA Commissioner David Kessler has argued that the current system 
fails to cover the “holes in the safety net.”454  The CSPI contends that the 
current bureaucratic organization, with its product-based distinction between 
inspectors, produces regulation that is “confusing, wasteful and highly 
ineffective.”455  Consolidation proponents argue that a consolidated system 
would improve food inspection by forcing currently separate inspection 
groups to work together. 
The conclusion implied by these critiques seems plausible.  If an 
integrated agency could field a unified inspection force, coordination 
problems would decrease and the inefficiencies of overlapping jurisdiction 
would diminish.  A unified command structure might more easily marshal 
the efforts of inspectors, epidemiologists, physicians, and other 
professionals involved in food safety regulation. 
Yet there is no guarantee that a consolidated structure would be more 
effective than the current dispersed structure.  In the short term at least, the 
organization would rely on the same personnel who now staff the disparate 
agencies.  The organization would face the challenge of managing a huge 
bureaucracy made up of employees drawn from several agencies with 
diverse histories and organizational cultures.  Indeed, consolidation might 
impede efficiency.  Secretary of Agriculture Glickman made his doubts 
emphatic: “To totally reorganize our food safety system and move to a 
single agency right now would wreak havoc.”456 
 
 453 FOOD SAFETY COUNCIL NAS ASSESSMENT, supra note 316, at  14. 
 454 Malcolm D. MacArthur, Single Food Safety Agency is Debated But Unlikely to Pass, 
PAPER, FILM & FOIL CONVERTER, Aug. 1, 1998, at 20. 
 455 See CSPI SINGLE AGENCY POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 426.  The CSPI states: 
Lettuce has caused a number of outbreaks from the hazardous strain of E. 
coli bacteria normally associated with hamburgers.  Although we have 
USDA inspectors who visit farms, they don’t inspect the crops for safety.  
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independent Food Safety Administration could better address known hazards 
in the food supply. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 456 See Rick Weiss, Food Safety Council Set; Panel is to Coordinate Federal Role, 
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Consolidation could also sacrifice the benefits of competition among 
agencies.  The NFPA’s Kelly Johnston has argued, “by consolidating food 
safety under a single, presumably politically appointed individual, we 
eliminate the current checks and balances of the current system . . . .”457  
The Food Safety Council has asserted that in some areas interagency 
competition can be beneficial: 
[R]esearch and programs for food safety often do not operate as 
separate activities within the agencies, but rather draw significant 
strength from one another.  While some projects are entirely focused on 
food safety, the food safety research portfolio includes many other 
projects in such areas as animal health and animal genetics.458 
The Council has gone even further, contending that some problems 
can only be solved by distinct organizations, saying  “[m]any food safety 
issues would be difficult to resolve by a reorganization.  For example, some 
issues like bovine spongiform encephalopathy [mad cow disease] are both 
animal health issues and human health issues.  Foodborne disease problems 
may also be waterborne disease problems.”459  Thus, unless a new structure 
were to encompass the USDA’s animal health programs and the EPA’s 
water quality programs, assuring safety would remain a multi-agency 
responsibility. 
3.  Misallocation of Resources 
Several critics of the current structure, including the NAS panel and 
the GAO, have faulted the distribution of resources among the federal food 
safety agencies. The GAO, for example, recently questioned the cost-
effectiveness of FSIS’ meat and poultry inspection regime, comparing it 
with FDA’s inspection of most other foods: 
More than one-fourth of the over $1 billion federal budget for food 
safety–about $271 million–could be used more effectively if most of 
these funds were congressionally redirected from the Food Safety and 
Inspection Service’s organoleptic (seeing smelling, and touching), 
carcass-by-carcass slaughter inspections to a number of other food 
safety activities that need attention.460 
Noting that the FSIS inspection budget—driven by the MIA and the 
PPIA mandates of carcass-by-carcass inspection—dwarfs the FDA’s 
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inspection budget, the GAO argues that this allocation erroneously implies 
that non-meat foods represent significantly lower risks. 
Shrinking from controversy, the NAS panel did not call attention to 
the resource disparity between the FSIS and the FDA, but it did criticize 
the distribution of resources between the FDA and other agencies.  “FDA’s 
lack of resources to maintain adequate inspection and monitoring of 
commercial food facilities and of fresh fruits and vegetables, both domestic 
and imported, using statute-driven methods of monitoring and enforcement, 
increases the threat of foodborne disease and related hazards in the food 
supply.”461  The panel went on to observe that, in the face of increasing 
responsibilities, “FDA’s shrunken inspection force is seriously over-
extended, and FDA appears to have insufficient resources to meet its 
statutory obligations.”462 
In 1999 Senate testimony, the CSPI’s DeWaal charged flatly that the  
FDA’s food safety resources are inadequate.  She presented data indicating 
that over three times as many outbreaks of foodborne illness have been 
traced to FDA-regulated foods as to USDA-regulated foods.463  Yet, she 
observed, the FDA’s food safety budget is approximately one-third that of 
the USDA, even though the latter is responsible for less than half of the 
food consumed by Americans.464  “In essence, the FDA regulates more 
food with less money.”465  Narrowing her focus, DeWaal also complained 
that FDA food safety programs commanded less than 30% of that agency’s 
total budget while, in her view, they represent more than half of the 
agency’s responsibilities.466  Speaking more generically, the NAS panel 
concluded that “resources currently identified for research and surveillance 
are inadequate to support a science-based program.”467 
Advocates of reform predict that programmatic consolidation would 
permit existing resources to stretch further.  Carol Tucker Foreman has stated 
that “[r]esources now are not used efficiently.”  The new system she 
advocated would “rely on HACCP, and the government . . . [would] not have 
to have as many people inspecting.”468  Without other statutory changes, 
however, organizational consolidation might not affect the relative 
distribution of resources among food safety programs.  The largest 
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components of federal food safety expenditures are driven by the MIA and 
PPIA mandates for continuous carcass-by-carcass inspection.469  The NAS 
panel recognized this obstacle to rebudgeting: 
Statutory revision is essential to the development and implementation 
of an effective and efficient science-based food safety system . . . .  The 
meat and poultry inspection laws mandate a form of compliance 
monitoring that is largely unrelated to the magnitude or the types of 
risks that are now posed by those foods.  This diverts efforts and 
perhaps resources from actual risks and other hazards.470 
Thus, without amendment of the MIA and the PPIA, or a 
reinterpretation of these requirements to discover greater flexibility, it 
seems doubtful that organizational consolidation alone would lead to a 
major reallocation of resources.471 
Even so, consolidation could cause program budgets to shift at the 
margins.  With just one agency seeking funding, competition among 
programs for funds might prove easier to control.472 While external 
constituencies would still lobby for increased (or reduced) funding for 
specific functions, a centralized process might yie ld a unified budget473 that 
permitted allocation of resources in accordance with estimated risks. 
 
 469 See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
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4.  Statutory Deficiencies 
Advocates of food safety reform have criticized existing statutory 
standards and agency enforcement powers as insufficiently protective of 
public health.  Notably, the NAS and the GAO have questioned the 
appropriateness of the FSIS’ inspection methods for meat and poultry.474  
The NAS panel concluded: 
The sensory evaluation inspection methods used in FSIS inspections 
were appropriate when adopted 70 years ago, when major concerns 
included gross contamination, evidence of animal disease, and other 
problems that are no longer acute concerns.  Those methods are not 
appropriate or adequate to detect the major microbial and chemical 
hazards of current concern.475 
President Clinton expressed his own skepticism about the FSIS’s 
approach:  
I was literally stunned when I came here to find out that we were 
inspecting meat in the United States in the same way we had inspected 
it since 1910—and in the same way that dogs inspect it today, by 
smelling it and touching it.  We’re doing a little better now.476 
Carol Tucker Foreman has contended that the FDA’s regulation of 
fruits and vegetables is likewise deficient.  Citing CSPI data indicating that 
these products are among the most likely to be linked to foodborne illness 
outbreaks, Foreman testified, “Raw fruits and vegetables are terribly 
susceptible to bacterial contamination.  They are subject to the most 
cursory inspection.  The FDA has issued a ‘guidance’ for these products.  
There are no regulations, no HACCP, no performance standards for limited 
bacterial contamination.”477  Ms. Foreman’s criticism implies a failure of 
regulators to take real threats seriously, a recurrent theme among critics of 
federal food safety efforts. 
The critics also contend that agency officials, even when appropriately 
inspired, lack legal authority to correct known deficiencies.  It is a matter of 
debate, however, whether apparent statutory limits on agency authority are 
as firmly anchored, and thus difficult to escape, as officials contend.478   
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Supreme Court decisions have made clear that administrators have broad 
discretion to interpret, and where appropriate revise their interpretations of, 
their statutory authority.479  We have not studied the text or history of the 
various statutory provisions that are often claimed to be impediments to 
effective regulation.  We accept such claims as sufficient to establish that 
substantive statutory reforms may be necessary to place regulation on a 
sound footing.  Accordingly, we assume that any serious reform initiative 
will require congressional approval of substantive as well as organizational 
changes in current law. 
Some complaints about statutory inflexibility clearly seem well-
grounded.  In the last year alone legislators have introduced several 
proposals to modernize the FDA’s and the USDA’s inspection and 
enforcement authority, where it was clear that the FDCA, the MIA, or the 
PPIA needed to be amended to provide the missing instrument.  For 
example, legislators have proposed an amendment to the FDCA that would 
give the FDA two powers currently held by the USDA: foreign equivalency 
authority and the power to destroy adulterated imports.480  Bills have also 
been introduced to provide the USDA with recall authority, in addition to 
its current ability to withdraw continuous inspection.481  Legislators have 
further proposed mandatory quarterly inspections by the FDA (a version of 
the continuous inspection required of the USDA), annual registration of  
FDA-regulated food producers, and statutory recall authority.482 
We should not overlook the controversies over the standards that 
 
 479 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(holding that a court must defer to an administrative agency’s reasonable interpretation of an 
ambiguous statute).  See also Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448 (1998) (applying 
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U.S. 83 (1990) (applying Chevron analysis to HHS interpretation of Social Security Act); 
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Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 
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 480 See Imported Food Safety Improvement Act, S. 1123, 106th Cong. (1999) (providing 
for FDA equivalency authority, authority to destroy adulterated imports, and authority to 
prohibit port shopping). 
 481 See Safe and Fair Enforcement and Recall for Meat and Poultry Act, S. 48, 106th 
Cong. (1999); H.R. 983 (providing for USDA meat and poultry recall authority). 
 482 See Consumer Food Safety Act of 1999, S. 908, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1612, 
106th Cong. (1999)  (providing for FDA recall authority, annual registration of FDA-
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agencies are to apply in deciding whether a practice, a food, or a food-use 
chemical, is safe.  For example, debate continues over the standard the 
FDA is to apply in deciding whether to approve new food additives, and 
particularly over the notorious Delaney Clause, which purports to forbid 
approval of any additive that has been shown to cause cancer in animals.483  
Congress narrowed the reach of that provision in the 1996 Food Quality 
Protection Act, which established a new standard for approving pesticide 
residues in food.  The Act also opened a new debate by mandating that the 
EPA take special measures to protect children against even small risks.484 
In other contexts, critics contend, current law permits the use of 
substances in food that increase risk to consumers.  Debate persists over the 
approval of macro-additives and substances derived through genetic 
engineering.  The EU and the United States are still engaged in economic 
warfare over the issue of hormone-treated beef,485 and the exploding 
controversy over genetically modified food crops may yet provoke 
fundamental changes in the statutory standards for testing, approval, and 
label disclosure of new food technologies.486 
These examples have not dominated the current debate over federal 
food safety regulation or its bureaucratic organization.  The revival of 
demands for consolidation has been fueled largely by concerns about 
pathogenic organisms in food and the apparent failure of governmental 
efforts to prevent them.487  But if, as seems clear, organizational 
consolidation would require congressional action, and if consolidation 
without substantive statutory reform would represent only a partial victory 
for its proponents, we must contemplate a much larger arena of policy 
debate.  Proponents of consolidation must not only entertain the possibility 
of statutory reforms that they might oppose, they must also reckon with the 
 
 483 See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER,  BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE (placing the Delaney 
Clause in a class of statutes that if applied literally, may be unreasonably and pointlessly 
strict); Richard A. Merrill, FDA’s Implementation of the Delaney Clause: Repudiation of 
Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Progress?, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 1 
(1988); Edward Dunkelberger & Richard A. Merrill, The Delaney Paradox Reexamined: 
Regulating Pesticides in Processed Foods, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 411 (1993); Lars Noah & 
Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch? Reinventing the Food Additive Approval 
Process, 78 B.U. L. REV. 329, 395-401 (1998). 
 484 See Kenneth Weinstein et al., The Food Quality Protection Act: A New Way of 
Looking at Pesticides, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,555 (1998). 
 485 See David Aboulafia, Pushing RBST: How the Law and the Political Process Were 
Used to Sell Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin to America, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 603 
(1998). 
 486 See supra Part I.A.4. 
 487 See, e.g., Burros, supra note 429 (“Following an outbreak of the hepatitis A virus 
from contaminated strawberries, an increasing number of food safety experts are 
questioning whether it is time to retire the federal government’s fragmented system of 
regulation and start all over again.”). 
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likelihood that obstacles to agreement on an expanded policy agenda will 
ultimately doom any chance for consolidation.  Achieving agreement on 
consolidation might facilitate the consideration of substantive changes in 
safety standards and enforcement authority.  It is equally possible, 
however, that substantive reforms would prove even more difficult.  After 
the heroic investments of political capital that would be necessary to 
achieve organizational consolidation, it is quite conceivable that neither the 
President nor members of Congress would retain any zest for food safety 
reform. 
V.  THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:  
A PRECEDENT FOR CONSOLIDATION? 
In an effort to broaden our assessment of the possible gains from, and 
likely impediments to, consolidating federal food safety functions, we 
searched for historical parallels.  The closest recent example that we found 
was the creation of the EPA by President Nixon’s Reorganization Plan of 
1970.488  Nixon assembled in the EPA the environmental protection functions 
of ten separate programs previously based in the Departments of the Interior, 
HEW, and Agriculture, as well as the Atomic Energy Commission.489  This 
was a genuine confederation of existing activities and the bureaucracies 
that performed them.  As Mark Landy and his co-authors have emphasized, 
the “new” EPA was largely staffed with personnel who brought with them 
the “concepts, attitudes, and skills that had served their former agencies.”490  
More importantly, these personnel, though covered by a new letterhead and 
on a new payroll, continued to operate under their original statutory 
charters.491 
Since its creation, the EPA’s programs have undoubtedly improved 
environmental quality.  Even after thirty years, however, the agency still 
has not fully integrated its constituent parts and it continues to administer a 
series of separate media -specific statutes.  These characteristics have 
hampered, though not defeated, the EPA’s ability to regulate environmental 
risks in a consistent and coordinated manner—which was one of the 
primary goals of its creation.  This does not mean that consolidation was a 
mistake, only that full integration remains a long-term and elusive goal. 
 
 488 See Reorganization Plan No. 3, supra note 156. 
 489 See id. 
 490 M ARK K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY : ASKING THE 
WRONG QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 34 (1994) (“For example, the pesticide group 
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 491 See Reorganization Plan No. 3, supra note 156, at § 2 (noting the transfer to EPA of 
statutory responsibility for enforcing portions of at least fourteen statutes, including the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Atomic Energy Act, FIFRA, and the FDCA). 
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A.  Rationale For the EPA’s Creation 
The history of the EPA’s creation illustrates the political sensitivities, 
and consequent difficulties, exposed by any effort to assemble a new 
federal agency out of existing bureaucratic units.  Following the publication 
of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, public awareness of environmental 
pollution grew rapidly through the 1960s.492  Facing the prospect of a 1972 
reelection battle against the likely Democratic nominee, Senator Edmund 
Muskie, a prominent spokesman for environmental regulation, President 
Nixon felt pressure to act.493  A presidential task force had already 
recommended the establishment of a Department of Environment and 
Natural Resources (DENR) that would be the fifth largest cabinet 
department after Defense, HEW, Agriculture, and the new Department of 
Transportation.494  This proposed department would have combined almost 
all of the current responsibilities of the EPA with other functions that 
remain in the Departments of Energy and the Interior.495 
In 1969, Nixon asked the Ash Council, a group he had appointed to 
study governmental reorganization, to design a plan to implement the 
DENR concept.496  However, after study the Ash Council members resisted 
the massive consolidation that creation of the DENR would have required.  
Notably, they feared not only that Congress would not accept the resulting 
disruption of legislative committee arrangements, but also that the new 
Department would not be sufficiently integrated to permit effective 
management.  The Council also objected to combining resource 
development activities and environmental protection functions in the same 
agency,497 echoing the long debate over the FDA’s location within the 
USDA.  After the incumbent Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture, and 
HEW also refused to endorse the proposal to create the DENR, President 
Nixon backed a more modest plan, embodied in the modern EPA.498  
Accordingly, the EPA was inspired by the anticipated impact of 
 
 492 See JOHN C. WHITAKER, STRIKING A BALANCE  8-15, 24 (1976) (citing polling data on 
awareness of environmental issues and the impact of SILENT SPRING). 
 493 See LANDY ET AL., supra note 490, at 28-30 . 
 494 See id. at 30-31; ALFRED A. MARCUS, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE : CHOOSING AND 
IMPLEMENTING AN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 40 (1980). 
 495 See M ARCUS, supra note 494, at 39. 
 496 See LANDY ET AL., supra note 490, at 31. 
 497 See id. 
 498 See id. at 32.  President Nixon created the EPA by Reorganization Plan No. 3, 
authorized by 5 U.S.C. § 901(a)(1), which obligated the Executive “to promote the better 
execution of laws, the more effective management of the executive branch and of its 
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Reorganization Plan No. 3, supra note 156 (reproducing the President’s Message to 
Congress).  Nixon also cited the Executive’s obligation under section 901(a)(3) “to increase 
the efficiency of the operations of the Government to the fullest extent practicable.” Id. 
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environmental issues on the 1972 election but structured to take account of 
perceived political and bureaucratic obstacles. 
In the planned reorganization, the President collected the primary 
federal water quality, air quality, solid waste, pesticide, and radioactive 
waste protection programs.499  Specifically, his plan transferred to the EPA 
the following agencies: (1) from the Interior Department, the Federal Water 
Quality Administration; (2) from HEW, the National Air Pollution Control 
Administration, the Bureaus of Solid Waste Management, Water Hygiene, 
and Radiological Health of the Environmental Control Administration and 
the FDA’s Office of Pesticides Research; and (3) from the USDA, the Plant 
Protection Division and the Pesticides Regulation Division of the ARS.500  
In addition, the EPA absorbed the Federal Radiation Council and the 
Division of [Radiation] Protection Standards of the Atomic Energy 
Commission.501  In all, the EPA aggregated programs whose 1971 budgets 
totaled over $1.1 billion and which employed 5,176 civil servants.502  
Today, the agency employs over 11,000 people and has a budget of over $2 
billion.503 
President Nixon’s message to Congress proclaimed that combining 
these diverse programs would enable the new EPA to launch a 
“coordinated attack” on pollution.504  He specifically found that the existing 
multi-agency response to interrelated problems of environmental 
degradation was inadequate: 
[T]he present governmental structure for dealing with environmental 
pollution often defies effective and concerted action.  Despite its 
complexity, for pollution control purposes the environment must be 
perceived as a single, interrelated system.  Present assignments of 
departmental responsibilities do not reflect this interrelatedness.  Many 
agency missions, for example, are designed primarily along media 
lines–air, water, and land.  Yet the sources of air, water, and land 
pollution are interrelated and often interchangeable.505 
Nixon’s assessment of the fragmentation of federal environmental 
regulation in 1970 parallels contemporary criticisms of federal food safety 
programs. 
The solution to the problem of divided regulatory responsibility was 
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the creation of “a strong, independent agency.”506  Nixon’s conception of 
an “independent” agency was a body that would be outside of the existing 
cabinet structure but still very much under the authority of the President.  
The EPA was to study, monitor, and regulate pollutants “irrespective of the 
media in which they appear.”507  Moreover, the new agency would set 
“consistent standards covering the full range of . . . waste disposal 
problems.”508  Thus, perhaps the most significant programmatic goal of the 
EPA’s creation was to facilitate integration of research, standard-setting, 
and enforcement across the assertedly artificial boundaries of air, water, 
and land.509 
B.  Assessments of the EPA’s Performance 
Despite the difficulties inherent in its formation and the enormity of 
the challenges that it faces, the EPA has made important progress in 
reducing environmental pollution.  The GAO recently concluded: 
Substantial progress has been made in addressing the nation’s 
environmental problems since the [EPA] was created in 1970.  Among 
other improvements, some of our most serious air and water quality 
problems have been alleviated, dangerous pesticides have been banned, 
and health threats posed by lead in gasoline and paint have been 
reduced.510 
One crude measure of the EPA’s achievement is the amount by which 
industrial waste has been reduced since 1970.  By this measure, the EPA 
has made gains in cleansing each of the media that it regulates. 
Air pollution has declined significantly since 1970.  By 1991, the 
regulatory strategies of the Clean Air Act—controlling outdoor sources 
such as smokestacks and curbing combustion by-products from mobile 
sources—had substantially reduced concentrations of five of the six 
pollutants for which the EPA has established National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards.511  Since then, the number of metropolitan areas out of 
 
 506 Id. 
 507 Id. 
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 509 In fact, Douglas Costle, director of President Nixon’s EPA transition task force, 
envisioned an EPA organization that would eventually discard media-based divisions (e.g., 
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 511 See COMM. ON ADVANCES IN ASSESSING HUMAN EXPOSURE TO AIRBORNE 
POLLUTANTS,  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,  HUMAN EXPOSURE ASSESSMENT FOR AIRBORNE 
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compliance with air quality standards has dropped from 199 to fewer than 
70.512  Since 1970, emissions of airborne particulate matter have decreased 
by 78% and emissions of lead have declined by 98%—leading to a 75% 
reduction in the average blood-lead levels in children since 1978.513  Total 
emissions of smog-causing nitrogen oxides, however, have increased by 
14% since 1970, due primarily to automobile usage and the operation of 
coal-powered energy plants.514 
The same period has also seen significant improvements in surface 
water quality.  Finding the vast majority of publicly-owned wastewater 
treatment plants to be in compliance with the Clean Water Act, a NAS 
panel in 1993 reported that “[w]here they were once elevated, 
concentrations of lead, DDT, and PCBs in coastal fish, shellfish, and 
sediments are decreasing.”515  Regulations that require industrial 
dischargers to pretreat waste before releasing into local sewers have 
reduced toxic discharges by an estimated 75%.516  Improved sewage 
treatment reduced discharge of oxygen-consuming wastes by 36% between 
1970 and 1992.517  Despite these gains, however, some 40% of the nation’s 
lakes, rivers, and streams remain too dirty for fishing and swimming.518   
The EPA has also been able to report major decreases in the release of 
hundreds of toxic pollutants.  Between 1988 and 1993, the volume of 
chemicals on the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory released into the 
environment dropped by 43%.519  Releases of seventeen of the EPA’s high 
priority toxins decreased by more than 46% from 1988 to 1994.520 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to know to what extent these gains in pollution 
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reduction are attributable to Nixon’s 1970 decision to consolidate previously 
dispersed programs.  The creation of the EPA was not primarily an effort to 
improve the management of long-established programs that already enjoyed 
broad political support.  Rather, it marked the first in a series of dramatic steps 
by which the federal government elevated environmental protection to a high 
place on the nation’s agenda.  Many more important steps were to follow, of 
which the most significant were the successive legislative revisions of the 
Clean Air Act in 1970,521 1977,522 and 1990,523 and of the Water Pollution 
Control Act in 1972, 1977, and 1990.524  In addition, Congress substantially 
broadened the reach of the EPA’s regulatory authority through the enactment 
of new laws such as the Toxic Substances Control Act, the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,525 and a series of strengthening 
amendments to the pesticide laws.526 
Thus, the regulatory tools available to the modern EPA look very 
different from those President Nixon was able to assign to the agency in 1970.  
Moreover, the budgets for the various programs for which the EPA was given 
responsibility also grew dramatically during the 1970s and 1980s, even as 
successive administrations began to lose enthusiasm for environmental 
protection.  For example, in 1970 the Federal Water Quality Administration 
had a budget of $1 billion;527 the EPA’s spending on state assistance for clean 
water programs alone is now about $2 billion.528  Budgets in other program 
areas have at least doubled.529  EPA spending on food safety activities—
nearly all of which relates to pesticide regulation—has quadrupled.530 
It would be naïve to attribute the EPA’s successes solely to the decision 
to consolidate environmental programs in 1970.  Yet it would also be wrong 
to conclude that that decision was not important.  That decision surely 
facilitated, and may even have inspired, some of the dramatic legislative 
reforms that appear more critical today.  It is also quite possible that the 
EPA’s visibility, coupled with its comprehensive jurisdiction, attracted more 
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funds for environmental protection than could have been assembled by its 
various component programs had they remained separate.  To the extent that 
reducing the risks associated with food consumption depends on increased 
appropriations for existing programs, assembling them in the same agency 
may attract aggregate funding at levels they could not independently expect. 
C.  Lessons for Food Safety 
The mere possibility of increased funding for food safety regulation, 
however, would not justify consolidation if it would not also improve 
efficiency, reduce duplication, and bridge gaps in the structure.  Accordingly, 
it is also useful to explore the impact of the EPA’s creation in these areas. 
While EPA efforts have reduced emissions in many media, the agency 
has not achieved integrated control of pollution across the land, sea, and air.  
The EPA has never found it possible to escape the media -based structure that 
it inherited when its constituent programs were assembled.531  Most of the 
statutes that the agency administers, including the Clean Air Act,532 the Clean 
Water Act,533 the RCRA Superfund,534 are still media-based.535  Some 
authorities claim that the lack of an integrated law obstructs efforts to evaluate 
and regulate pollutants in a coordinated, rational fashion.536  Former EPA 
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Deputy Administrator Robert Sussman has observed: 
Taken as a whole, the laws EPA implements do not communicate clear 
environmental goals or provide effective tools for measuring progress.  
They lack rational mechanisms for allocating resources to the greatest 
environmental challenges.  They establish differing and often 
conflicting decision-making criteria from one law to another.  And they 
discourage multimedia strategies that integrate and streamline 
requirements across programs.537 
The “integrating statute” that Sussman calls for would not replace 
existing media-specific statutes.538  Rather, it would provide an overarching 
legal framework within which the agency could prioritize competing goals, 
allocate resources according to the seriousness of environmental risks, and 
promote multi-media solutions to environmental pollution.539 
While the EPA budget and staffing levels have risen markedly since 
1970, the increases have not always produced coherent regulation.  As Alfred 
Marcus has argued, much of the EPA remains “a coalition of small fiefdoms” 
divided by distinct statutory programs, regional offices, and staffs: 
[F]or the first twenty years of EPA’s existence, [its environmental] 
goals remained unattainable as the narrow perspectives of bureaucrats 
worked against achieving such broad principles.  Program managers 
were tied to specific laws, functions, and appropriations that 
perpetuated longstanding pollution control distinctions.  Regional 
administrators had local connections and enough independence not to 
act in concert with Washington.540 
Thus, in addition to the statutory boundaries that define its programs, 
bureaucratic divisions within the EPA—some regional and some 
programmatic—continue to present obstacles to cohesive, multidisciplinary 
regulation of environmental pollution. 
For us, the relevant question remains whether the EPA experience could 
serve as an instructive model for possible consolidation of federal food safety 
functions.  The similarities between the announced goals of the Nixon 
Administration and those of current advocates of food safety consolidation are 
striking.  Nixon claimed to be seeking a structure that could enlist the federal 
government’s disparate environmental programs in a “coordinated attack” on 
pollution.541  Proponents of food safety reform seek a resource-enriched, 
politically visible agency to coordinate the federal government’s efforts to 
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combat foodborne illness through a “farm-to-table” strategy.542  They lament 
that disaggregated regulators separately administer a collection of statutes that 
address different products, prescribe different modes of enforcement, and set 
different standards of performance.543 
There are, however, important contextual differences that weaken the 
predictive value of the EPA experience.  First, the political constituencies that 
supported the EPA are quite different from those that now endorse food safety 
consolidation.  The creation of the EPA was driven by a popular movement 
sparked by Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and embraced by a President who 
feared a strong election opponent.544  Environmental organizations remain 
vocal and politically influential.  Concerns about food safety, however, have 
not yet catalyzed a vigorous political movement.  The constituency for “food 
safety” may be populous, but its voice is weak.  Although Agriculture 
Secretary Dan Glickman argued that the 1993 E. coli outbreak that killed four 
children and sickened thousands started a “tidal wave of public interest,”545 
this supposed interest has thus far failed to propel the cause of regulatory 
consolidation or produce stronger tools for either the USDA or the FDA. 
In 1970, the Nixon Administration argued that a major benefit of 
consolidating environmental regulation would be the ability to determine the 
total environmental exposure to pollutants regardless of media  and minimize 
aggregate exposure to the most serious risks.546  Thus, the goal of managing 
multi-media risks through total exposure estimates drove the scientific 
community’s support of an effort to consolidate media-specific programs.  No 
similar technology-based rationale has yet been advanced to support the 
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106th Cong. 92, 94 (1999) (statement of Nancy Donley) (“Consolidating food safety 
activities into a single independent agency would elevate food safety, prevent duplication 
and fill in gaps that currently exist in our multiple agency system.”) [hereinafter 1999 
Donley Testimony]. 
 543 See, e.g., DYCKMAN, supra note 18, at 1, 3.  The author noted: 
Twelve different agencies administer as many as 35 laws that make up the 
federal food safety system . . . .  Programs emerged piecemeal, typically in 
response to particular health threats or economic crises.  The laws not only 
assigned specific food commodities to particular agencies but also provided 
the agencies with different authorities and responsibilities, reflecting 
significantly different regulatory approaches. 
Id. 
 544 See discussion supra note 473 and accompanying text.. 
 545 See Glickman, supra note 5 (arguing that the 1993 outbreak caused “[a] tidal wave of 
public interest [that] tips the political scales—uniting industry, . . . consumers, government 
and public health officials behind a food safety revolution”). 
 546 See Reorganization Plan No. 3, supra note 156 (reproducing the President’s Message 
to Congress) (outlining a “more effective approach to pollution control” that would assess 
all pollutants and regulate by total exposure including multi-media interactions). 
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consolidation of federal food safety functions.  Despite frequent calls for 
“farm-to-table” food safety regulation and the need for improved risk 
assessment, reform advocates have not yet been able to portray a new system 
that could model total foodborne risk and calibrate regulatory requirements 
accordingly. 
Other salient differences make the EPA experience a weak predictor of 
the effects of consolidating food safety functions.  Most of the programs that 
President Nixon combined to form the EPA were relatively new federal 
initiatives.  With the exceptions of pesticide regulation and radiation control, 
an original task of the Atomic Energy Commission, regulation of 
environmental pollution had been viewed as a federal responsibility for little 
over a decade.547  Few of the relocated units had long histories, deeply rooted 
traditions, or strong institutional coherence.  By contrast, the two primary 
components of a consolidated food safety agency, the FDA and the FSIS, 
have been in business for nearly a century and responsible for administering 
statutes that in key respects look much as they appeared at the beginning of 
World War II.548  Their established practices and institutional memories could 
present durable impediments to program integration and unified management. 
VI.  CONSTRUCTING A PLAN FOR FOOD SAFETY CONSOLIDATION 
However one assesses the success of the EPA “experiment,” this 
example of consolidation is both a reminder of the challenges facing such 
organizational initiatives and evidence that integration of previously 
dispersed programs is a long-term project.  It also demonstrates the need 
for a kind of concrete analysis and advance planning that few proponents of 
consolidating food safety functions have so far shown.  No proponent of 
consolidation has offered a detailed description of the organization she 
envisions.  None identifies all of the current government functions they 
would assemble or examines the formal steps that would be required to 
achieve the goal.549  The advocates of consolidation do, however, share two 
 
 547 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 106-11 (2d ed. 1996) 
(indicating that most significant federal environmental legislation was not enacted until the 
1970s). 
 548 See discussion supra Part II. 
 549 The most concrete proposal is outlined in the Safe Food Act, supra note 19.  The bill 
calls for the creation of an independent establishment as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 104 (a non-
cabinet department) to be known as the Food Safety Administration (FSA).  See id.  The 
FSA would implement the food safety provisions of the FDCA, PPIA, MIA, Egg Products 
Inspection Act, and “such other laws and portions of laws regarding food safety, labeling, 
and inspection as the President may designate by Executive order . . . .”  Id.  The FSA would 
assume the food safety budget and responsibilities “as determined by the President” of the 
FSIS, CFSAN, CVM, NMFS, and “such other offices, services, or agencies as the President 
may designate by Executive order . . . .”  Id.  Thus, the President at the time of the adoption 
of the Safe Food Act would have quite a bit of discretion to pick and choose agencies and 
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assumptions and most express firm (albeit differing) views about where in 
the federal bureaucracy the combined entity should be located. 
Consolidation proponents obviously believe that regulatory 
performance will improve if the appropriate program elements are clustered 
in one organization, whether in a new or existing entity.  They see other 
gains as well, possibly in aggregate resources for food safety, and more 
certainly in public visibility and political accountability.  But the core of 
their case is a belief that unitary management can bridge gaps, avoid 
duplication, and deploy existing resources more effectively than the 
currently splintered programs now do—even when they agree to 
cooperate.550 
Proponents also appear to assume that Congress would have to 
approve any consolidation plan by passing new legislation.  The lapse of 
statutory reorganization authority means that currently no President could 
bring about even a partial consolidation by Executive Order.551  Generally, 
however, they do not explore the implications of this assumption, either for 
the likelihood of success or for more practical issues, such as the timetable 
for achieving the elusive goal.  Many proponents appear to believe that the 
self-evident benefits of consolidation will inspire members of Congress 
from both parties to join in supporting the essential legislation. 
Finally, though some advocates of consolidation (including the 1998 
NAS panel) appear agnostic on the matter of bureaucratic location, most 
express a clear preference about which part of the existing structure should 
house the combined programs.  The Hoover Commission recommended 
 
statutes for the FSA to encompass. 
 550 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 551 During much of the period since World War II, Congress had established a mechanism 
for sharing reorganization duties with the President.  See 5 U.S.C.A. § 901(d) (West Supp. 
1999) (“The President shall from time to time examine the organization of all agencies and 
shall determine what changes are necessary . . . .”); id. § 906 (mandating House and Senate 
approval of reorganization plans submitted by the President under authority of 5 U.S.C. § 
901).  In 1949, Congress passed the Reorganization Act, ch. 226, § 2, 63 Stat. 203, to 
implement the recommendations of the Hoover Commission.  This statute was later 
reauthorized and codified in the Reorganization Acts of 1966. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 
394 (1966).  The Reorganization Acts permitted the President to develop and submit 
reorganization plans to both houses of Congress.  See 5 U.S.C.A. § 903(b) (West Supp. 
1999).  Congress was required to approve or disapprove the President’s plan without 
amendment within ninety days of its transmission.  See id. § 906(a).  Each of the successive 
versions of reorganization authority carried an expiration date or sunset.  Congress extended 
the expiration date five times between 1966 and  1984, and ignored the expiration altogether 
in 1995, but then allowed the authority to lapse.  See 5 U.S.C.A. § 905(b) (West Supp. 1999) 
(“A provision contained in a reorganization plan may take effect only if the plan is 
transmitted to Congress . . . on or before December 31, 1984.”) (emphasis added).  There 
appears to be no immediate prospect of renewal.  Accordingly, any plan to consolidate some 
or all of the federal government’s current food safety functions would require legislative 
approval. 
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returning the FDA to the USDA, and dismissed concerns that combining 
regulatory and promotional functions would compromise the former.552  
More recent advocates of consolidation have been skeptical of such an 
arrangement for the very reasons that the Hoover Commission dismissed.553  
Their caution may not demonstrate that the risk of conflict has risen.  
Rather it may simply reflect heightened sensitivity to the practical 
pressures that regulators are believed to face.  In any event, those who 
favor extracting the USDA’s food safety programs and combining them 
with the FDA’s programs—either within HHS or outside it—may now 
reflect the dominant view.554 
Beyond these generalizations, it is surprising how little attention 
proponents have given to the specifics of consolidation.  We believe that 
one cannot realistically assess the merits of consolidation, much less its 
political prospects, without greater attention to specifics.  In this part, we 
explore a series of questions that anyone who seriously entertains the idea 
of consolidation should want addressed.  These questions are not mere 
matters of detail; their analysis reveals the complexity of translating an 
appealing concept into an organizational reality.  Their resolution will 
affect the magnitude of the challenge and perhaps determine the prospects 
of success. 
A.  Identifying Programs To Be Consolidated 
In discussions about consolidation of food safety programs, the 
obvious leading candidates are the FSIS’ meat and poultry inspection 
programs, and the food sanitation activities of the FDA’s CFSAN.  The 
working assumption is that the combination would include both 
headquarters officials and the field inspection forces of the two agencies.  
FSIS inspectors comprise a highly specialized force devoted exclusively to 
meat and poultry inspection, whose oversight probably could be shifted 
 
 552 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
 553 See, e.g., U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB.  NO. GAO/T-RCED-94-223, 
FOOD SAFETY—A UNIFIED, RISK-BASED FOOD SAFETY SYSTEM NEEDED 4-5 (1994) 
(statement of John W. Harmon).  Mr. Harmon stated:  
We also still believe, as we testified in 1972, that it is important for the food 
safety mission to be housed in an agency that is not charged with 
responsibilities that might conflict, or appear to conflict, with its willingness 
to aggressively administer its public health protection responsibilities . . . .  
While there are a number of proposals to reorganize USDA to separate its 
food safety and agriculture promotion responsibilities, they would still be 
housed under a department with conflicting roles. 
Id. 
 554 But see Allison Beers, Senators Say USDA Should Be the Single Food Safety Agency, 
FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Aug. 9, 1999 (noting that two congressional supporters of a single food 
safety agency advocate consolidation within USDA). 
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without disrupting field operations.555  Most of the FDA’s smaller corps of 
inspectors, however, are not narrowly specialized and many visit facilities 
that span the agency’s regulatory responsibilities.556  Their service is 
budgeted by case or project, for example, the inspection of food 
warehouses.  Each FDA center has a claim on a portion of the total 
inspection time that the agency has been given resources to support.  While 
it may be possible to identify some FDA inspectors whose regular work is 
exclusively food safety-related, most display the versatility of street 
policemen, responsible both for investigating gang violence and issuing 
speeding tickets. 
The FDA’s multipurpose inspection force would not be a significant 
impediment to consolidation of those FSIS and CFSAN activities devoted 
to the production of major food products, but other agency programs would 
need to be considered.  A notable example is the FDA’s program for 
regulating chemicals used in food production—food ingredients (either 
food additives or GRAS substances), coloring agents, and packaging 
materials (so-called indirect additives)—or found to contaminate food.557  
These activities rest in the CFSAN’s Office of Premarket Approval.  They 
could be moved, along with the rest of the Center, to a new agency, but this 
would leave behind another food safety-related program housed within the 
FDA, the Center for Veterinary Medicine, which is responsible for 
approving and policing the use of veterinary drugs.  The rationale for this 
unit rests on the same scientific foundation that underpins the CFSAN’s 
premarket approval program.  Indeed, the two programs share certain 
facilities, as well as research and analytical methods.  If it makes sense to 
combine programs that target foodborne pathogens with programs aimed at 
chemicals in food, it would be difficult to justify omitting the CVM’s drug 
residue program. 
This logic, however, leads to a larger question: What about the EPA’s 
pesticide program, one of whose main functions is to set limits on pesticide 
residues on food—limits that the FDA or the USDA then enforces?558  This 
activity was once housed within the FDA because it was governed by 
provisions of the FDCA, which also governed the agency’s regulation of 
other food-use chemicals.  We do not challenge the 1970 decision to make 
the EPA responsible for both tolerance setting and premarket review of 
 
 555 See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
 556 See DESCRIPTION OF FIELD ACTIVITIES, supra note 320 (“With a highly trained staff 
versed in all of FDA’s product responsibilities, the Agency can respond rapidly to various 
types of emergencies, and can also redirect field efforts from time to time during the year 
among FDA’s different programs as inspection and product testing needs change.”). 
 557 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 558 See discussion supra Part III.D. 
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pesticides, for the same toxicological data underlie both types of decisions.  
But the present arrangement is surely open to question if the goal now 
would be to combine the major food safety  programs in a single 
organization. 
A moment’s reflection will reveal that some of the relocations 
suggested by the foregoing discussion would sever other programmatic 
linkages, some of which reflect an independent logic.  For example, if one 
were to shift the CVM’s drug residue program from the FDA, would it 
make sense to leave the reminder of the Center’s veterinary drug approval 
program behind?  After all, many of the same scientists who evaluate the 
safety of possible residues for human consumers are involved in 
determining whether a drug will be safe for animals.  It might in theory 
seem feasible to separate responsibilities for drugs used on animals 
produced for human food from those for drugs for use on companion 
animals, but the same therapeutic agents are often useful in both.  Does this 
suggest that the CVM’s entire operation accompany the CFSAN in any 
reorganization?559 
So far we have focused on programs whose primary functions or 
organizational location make them logical candidates for inclusion in a 
single food safety agency, but the possibilities do not stop there.  Other 
federal agencies perform functions that contribute to the national 
government’s efforts to keep food safe.  A prime example is the CDC.  
Proponents of consolidation must confront the question whether personnel 
at the CDC who are now involved in monitoring and investigating 
outbreaks of foodborne disease should be moved into the new organization.  
And if they should not, they must explain how these still-separate functions 
are to be coordinated. 
Similar decisions would also have to be made about the Department 
of Commerce’s remaining seafood safety activities, the Customs Service’s 
port-of-entry monitoring of food imports, and the Department of Justice’s 
responsibility for  court enforcement activities initiated by the FSIS or the 
CFSAN.  The Department of Commerce’s claim to a continuing role in this 
area strains credulity.  Accordingly, the Clinton Administration’s plan to 
relocate its seafood safety functions in the FDA seems logical.  By contrast, 
it would seem foolish to consider separating Customs’ responsibility for 
food imports from its oversight of all other imports, or to make 
reorganization of food safety programs the occasion for renewing the 
debate over the Department of Justice’s monopoly over federal court 
litigation. 
 
 559 This question is made more difficult by the FDA’s recent decision to regulate 
genetically engineered animals as animal drugs.  See Rebecca Osvath, FDA to Regulate 
Genetically Engineered Animals as Animal Drugs, FOOD CHEM. NEWS, Aug. 7, 2000. 
 2000]  ORGANIZING FOOD SAFETY  153 
There is a more important point lurking here, however.  Any 
consolidation plan will inevitably exclude some federal programs that must 
work cooperatively with officials whose primary responsibility is food 
safety.  Moreover, no plausible consolidation plan could encompass the 
numerous state agencies that play critical roles at the retail and local levels.  
No one has seriously suggested that food safety regulation should be 
entirely federalized.  Hence, success in controlling foodborne risks will 
always depend on collaboration among several federal agencies as well as 
across multiple levels of government.  The “seamless” structure that 
advocates of consolidation envision is a mirage. 
B.  Federal Regulation of Food Extends Beyond Safety 
So far we have mentioned only programs that contribute to making 
food safe.  Even with this narrow focus, we have shown that it would be 
impossible to avoid difficult decisions about which federal functions to 
include and which to leave untouched.  But yet more difficult choices are 
presented by the current responsibilities of the two agencies that would 
comprise the core of the new structure—the FSIS and the CFSAN. 
We take the CFSAN as illustrative.  The Center’s activities are 
focused on food safety—even more intensely in recent years because of the 
heightened concerns about foodborne pathogens—but they also include 
other important programs that have no obvious relationship to the safety of 
food as that concept is conventionally understood.  One of these programs 
is concerned with food labels (and other food “labeling” in the vernacular 
of the FDCA).  Since the FDCA’s passage, FDA personnel have devoted 
major efforts to prescribing and enforcing requirements for food labels.  
Before its recent attempt to regulate tobacco, the agency’s two most 
ambitious rulemakings involved attempts to improve and standardize the 
information provided on the labels of food.  The more recent attempt, a 
rulemaking to implement the requirements of the Nutrition Labeling and 
Education Act of 1990,560 took  eighty-five full-time-equivalent employees 
over two years just to establish the ground rules.561  More recently, and as a 
sequel to this effort, the CFSAN has developed major resources for 
establishing and defending regulations governing the labeling of dietary 
supplements.562 
 
 560 Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (1990). 
 561 See M. Elizabeth Magill, Congressional Control Over Agency Rulemaking: The 
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act’s Hammer Provisions, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 149, 
178 (1995) (detailing CFSAN resources dedicated to promulgating the NLEA final rule). 
 562 See FDA Works on Strategy for Regulating Dietary Supplements , CHEM.  MARKET 
REP., June 14, 1999, at 1 (noting that dietary supplement regulation is on CFSAN’s “A” list 
of priorities). 
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Many of the CFSAN’s food labeling activities may appear to have 
little to do with the safety of food, but this distinction is not always clear.  
For many years after the enactment of the FDCA, for example, the FDA 
used its authority to dictate the contents of so-called standardized foods as 
a means of assuring the safety of new food ingredients.563  The agency 
continues to view food labels as a way of warning allergic consumers about 
the risks posed by some food ingredients.564  Indeed, the FDCA’s 
requirement that all ingredients be listed on the label of food has been 
justified as safety-related.565 
CFSAN officials have always seen a close connection between the 
content of food labels and the nutritional quality of the food supply.  As 
research has elucidated the relationship between dietary choices and the 
risk of chronic diseases, such as cancer and heart disease, the line between 
economic regulation and safety regulation has become blurred.566  The 
FDA’s approval of so-called disease prevention claims for foods whose 
long-term consumption has been shown to reduce health risk demonstrates 
the futility of sharp distinctions in this area.567  This example is also a 
reminder of the CFSAN’s third main activity, which involves research into, 
and regulation of, contents to protect the nutritional quality of food. 
In the most recent fiscal year, the CFSAN allocated over $19 million 
(19% of the Center’s budget) to nutrition-related and food labeling 
activities.568  Even if one concluded that their functional connection with 
food safety efforts was not close, it would be odd to exclude them from any 
relocation of the CFSAN’s programs, leaving them a dangling appendage 
to an FDA then almost exclusively concerned with medical products.  
Understandably, the advocates of consolidation appear to assume that all of  
 
 
 563 See HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 96-117. 
 564 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 172.804(d) (1999) (establishing specialized labeling for food 
products containing aspartame). 
 565 See 21 U.S.C. § 343(q)(2)(A) (1994) (permitting FDA to require by regulation that 
certain nutrients be included on food labeling to “assist consumers in maintaining healthy 
dietary practices”). 
 566 See, e.g., Levi et al., supra note 40 (discussing relationship between diet and cancer 
risk); 21 U.S.C. § 343(r) (1994) (providing standards for the regulation of health claims 
made in food marketing and labeling). 
 567 See 21 C.F.R. § 101.72—88 (1999) (establishing approved health claims for food 
labeling including, inter alia, the relationship between intake of fruits and vegetables and 
cancer and the relationship between dietary fat and cancer). 
 568 See U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES—PROGRAM LEVEL 
(BA + USER FEES), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/net162-3.htm (last 
modified May 21, 1999) (detailing FDA nutrition and labeling budget); U.S. FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMIN., ALL PURPOSE TABLE—TOTAL PROGRAM LEVEL, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/ofm/budget/netapt25.htm (last modified May 21, 1999) (detailing 
CFSAN budget). 
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the CFSAN’s functions would be included in or shifted to the new 
structure. 
They appear to make the same assumption about the FSIS’ major 
program for regulating the labels on meat and poultry products.  In the last 
decade, the FSIS has devoted efforts, often in tandem with the FDA, to 
reforming the content of meat and poultry labels.  Its main labeling 
responsibility is a product of a long-standing interpretation of the MIA and 
the PPIA.569  Before any new meat or poultry product may be marketed, the 
FSIS must approve its label, and changes to the label of any marketed 
product must likewise be approved.570  One result of this prior approval 
regime is that, unlike the FDA, the FSIS need not spend significant 
resources monitoring labels in use.  Correspondingly, however, it supports 
a label approval program that requires significant resources. 
The USDA has sometimes defended its label approval requirement as 
a means of protecting the safety of meat and poultry products because it 
assures that no ingredient that has not been approved will be used.571  This 
activity and the FSIS’s inspectional activities are not so closely integrated, 
however, that they could not be separated.  But such a separation would 
disrupt established work patterns and probably disturb long-established 
relationships between the agency and the industry. 
In sum, the implicit logic of the proponents of consolidation is that all 
current functions of the FSIS and the CFSAN should be combined within 
the new organization.  As to what other programs might be included with 
them, the proponents have been silent.572 
C.  Bureaucratic Location 
Many proponents of consolidation have expressed clear views about 
the appropriate location within the federal government of a unified food 
safety agency.573  This is not surprising, since both members of Congress 
and executive officials have always viewed the issue of location as 
important.574  The enactment in 1906 of separate statutes governing meat 
production and commerce in other foods suggests that the original 
Congress saw the domains as distinct.  The decision to lodge both functions 
 
 569 See discussion supra Part III.C.2. 
 570 See generally Frank & Johnson, supra note 254 (summarizing FSIS food labeling 
activities). 
 571 See FSIS Begins Generic Labeling Audit; Considers Additional Safety Information on 
Labels, FOOD CHEM.  NEWS, Dec. 23, 1998 (describing safety rationale for FSIS labeling 
audit and possible food preparation directions on labels). 
 572 See, e.g., Safe Food Act, supra note 19. 
 573 See, e.g., supra notes 553-554 and accompanying text. 
 574 See discussion supra Part II. 
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within the USDA, however, does not negate this conclusion because the 
existing federal apparatus did not offer many other options.  No other 
cabinet department would have seemed plausible, and the first 
“independent” agency—the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)—was 
still a unique organizational experiment.575  Several decades later, however, 
Franklin Roosevelt’s removal of the FDA from the USDA apparently 
reflected some concern that the agency’s law enforcement activities were in 
tension, if not incompatible, with the Department’s overriding task of 
reviving American agriculture.576  It may also have reflected a judgment 
that the FDA would be more effectively administered if it were outside the 
USDA. 
As one considers the possible locations for a consolidated food safety 
program in 2000, the options are more numerous than in 1906.  For many 
proponents, however, the choice is apparently binary: Either merge the 
FSIS (and any other appropriate USDA activities) into the FDA, or merge 
the CFSAN into the FSIS.577  Advocates for the latter option appear in the 
minority, perhaps because of concerns about compatibility with the 
promotional responsibilities of the USDA.578  There is stronger support 
among reformers for consolidating food safety functions within the FDA, 
an agency with a more robust consumer protection reputation.579 
The case for making the FDA home to all federal food safety 
functions has serious weaknesses.  To be sure, the CFSAN’s key programs 
can be described as designed to reduce the risk posed by foreign materials, 
including pathogens, in food while preserving the nutritional quality of 
American diets.580  But one should simultaneously ask whether the CFSAN 
fits comfortably within the FDA—a diminished part of an agency whose 
prominent functions are now focused on technologies marketed for use in 
 
 575 See M ARVER H. BERNSTEIN,  REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 
17-19 (1955) (recounting the establishment of the ICC in 1887 and summarizing the further 
development of independent commissions starting with the FTC in 1914). 
 576 See Roosevelt, supra note 127. 
 577 See, e.g., GORE , supra note 384, at 101 (calling for consolidation of USDA’s food 
safety responsibilities into FDA). 
 578 See, e.g., HARMON, supra note 553; 1999 Carol Tucker Foreman Testimony, supra 
note 425, at 87 (“The Department of Agriculture was established to protect and assist food 
producers, and its institutional bias remains true to that goal . . . .  The Department’s food 
safety programs are overseen by the congressional agriculture committees, whose members’ 
first concern is not food safety.”) (emphasis in original). 
 579 See HARMON, supra note 553; GORE , supra note 384, at 101; 1999 Carol Tucker 
Foreman Testimony, supra note 425, at 87 (“The FDA benefits from being within the 
human health bureaucracy . . . . ”). 
 580 See ENSURING SAFE FOOD, supra note 6, at 26 (“FDA’s Center for Food Safety and 
Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) seeks to ensure that . . . [non-meat, non-poultry] foods are safe, 
sanitary, nutritious, wholesome, and honestly and adequately labeled.”). 
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the delivery of medical care.581  One measure, cruder to be sure, of the 
importance FDA leaders attach to food safety is the number of agency 
press releases issued on the subject.  Since 1994, fewer than one-third of 
the agency’s press releases have discussed food-related issues, and only 
some of these dealt with “safety” as conventionally defined.582 
In selecting a location, one should consider more than the 
compatibility of program responsibilities.  Another factor to be weighed, 
surely, is the prominence of the resulting organization.  Following a recent 
departmental reorganization, food safety enjoys greater prominence within 
the USDA than it might within the FDA, or within the FDA’s parent 
department, HHS.  The creation of the office of Under Secretary for Food 
Safety provides some assurance that food safety issues get attention at the 
USDA’s highest levels.583  The CFSAN, in contrast, is one of five product-
focused centers within the FDA, whose head (customarily a physician) 
ranks two levels below the Secretary of HHS.584 
If prominence is a prime criterion, of course, neither of the obvious 
options is ideal.  Consolidation advocates should want a new arrangement 
that would assure that the organization’s important work attracted the 
attention and the resources they believe it deserves.  The possibilities are 
 
 581 See discussion supra Part III.B.4.  See also 1999 Carol Tucker Foreman Testimony, 
supra note 425, at 87 (“Food safety is often the poor stepsister at FDA, with most of the 
attention and resources devoted to concerns over drugs and medical devices.”). 
 582 See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Press Releases—1999, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/po/indexes/99news.html (last modified Jan. 5, 2000) (listing all FDA 
press releases from January 1 – October 14, 1999 and indicating that ten out of twenty-four 
were related to food safety); U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Press Releases—
1998, available at http://www.fda.gov/po/indexes/98news.html (last modified Jan. 5, 2000) 
(listing all FDA press releases for the year and indicating that twenty out of sixty-one were 
related to food safety); U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Press Releases—1997, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/po/indexes/97news.html (last modified  Oct. 26, 2000) 
(listing all FDA press releases for the year and indicating that sixteen out of sixty-two were 
related to food safety); U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Press Releases—1996, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/po/indexes/96news.html (last modified Oct. 26, 2000) 
(listing all FDA press releases for the year and indicating that six out of twenty-six were 
related to food safety); U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Press Releases—1995, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/po/indexes/95news.html (last modified Oct. 26, 2000) 
(listing all FDA press releases for the year and indicating that seven out of seventeen were 
related to food safety); U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA Press Releases—1994, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/po/indexes/94news.html (last modified Oct. 26, 2000) 
(listing all FDA press releases for the year and indicating that eight out of thirty-one were 
related to food safety). 
 583 See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text. 
 584 See HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 15-17 (describing FDA’s organizational 
structure and positioning within HHS).  The FDA’s positioning within HHS (and before that 
HEW) has been a source of contention for decades, as noted by the Ribicoff Committee in 
1977.  See STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 16, at 144-45 (“We believe it is 
time to upgrade the status and independence of the FDA within HEW.”). 
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numerous, though perhaps not unlimited.  There do not appear to be any 
constitutional limits on the structure Congress could prescribe for a new 
agency, or the prominence assigned it, so long as it adhered to the few 
conditions embodied in Articles I and II of the Constitution.585  Thus 
Congress could create a new “Department of Food Safety” and provide for 
a presidentially-appointed “Secretary” or other titled official to head it.  
Another option, perhaps differing only cosmetically, would be to create a 
new “executive agency,” similar to the EPA, standing outside of, but 
perhaps on a par with, existing cabinet departments, whose head could be 
given the title of “Administrator” or any other that Congress chose.586 
So far, such formal distinctions have not attracted attention from the 
proponents of consolidation, but they do stress the importance of 
operational independence.  Several have suggested that food safety 
functions should be consolidated in a new “independent agency,” though 
they generally have left the implications of this term unexplored.587  To 
anyone schooled in American administrative law, the label “independent 
agency” conjures up two often overlapping images.  One is of an agency, 
often titled a “commission,” or occasionally a “board,” which is presided 
over by a tribunal of three or more members, each of whom has a vote on 
 
 585 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (providing broad legislative powers to Congress); U.S. 
CONST. art. II (providing the President with the “executive Power” and the obligation to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 
(1819) (reading the Necessary and Proper Clause broadly and declaring, “Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, 
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter 
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional”).  See also JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. 
M ERRILL, & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 
4-28, 169 (4th ed. 1998) (illustrating Congress’ broad powers to create diverse forms of 
administrative agencies). 
 586 See M ASHAW ET AL., supra note 585, at 24-25 (describing EPA’s creation as an 
executive agency outside of the departmental structure).  This is the organizational structure 
preferred in the Safe Food Act.  See Safe Food Act, supra note 19, at § 4(a) (defining the 
proposed Food Safety Administration as an “independent establishment” as specified in 5 
U.S.C. § 104: “an establishment in the executive branch (other than the United States Postal 
Service or the Postal Rate Commission) which is not an Executive department, military 
department, Government corporation, or part thereof, or part of an independent 
establishment . . . ”). 
 587 See, e.g., 1999 Donley Testimony, supra note 541, at 94 (“Consolidating food safety 
activities into a single independent agency would elevate food safety, prevent duplication 
and fill in gaps that currently exist in our multiple agency system.”); Caroline Smith 
DeWaal, Time to Create a Single, Federal Food Safety Agency, HOUS.  CHRON., Aug. 27, 
1999, at 35 (“A single food safety agency would . . . have the power and the flexibility to 
enforce food safety regulations from farm to table.”); Burros, supra note 429 (“Following an 
outbreak of the hepatitis A virus from contaminated strawberries, an increasing number of 
food safety experts are questioning whether it is time to retire the federal government’s 
fragmented system of regulation and start all over again.”). 
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major policies and decisions.588  The other image is that of an agency head 
or heads who are appointed by the President but serve not at the President’s 
pleasure, but for a term of years.589  In the U.S. government there are 
several examples of each model, most of them illustrations of both 
simultaneously.590 
We find it hard to believe that advocates of an “independent food 
safety agency” have either model in mind.  The challenges that currently 
confront food safety regulators rarely precipitate the kind of formal 
proceedings that the New Deal commissions were established to adjudicate.  
Furthermore, the history of most multi-member commissions does not 
suggest that this structure facilitates the kind of nimble, vigorous regulation 
that proponents of consolidation claim is now lacking.591  The notion that a 
Food Safety Administrator should enjoy political independence is not 
unthinkable, but presidential interference, or even indifference, has not 
been among the central criticisms of the government’s performance in this 
area.592  Even if either had been, it is doubtful that Congress could create an 
office to perform the paradigmatic executive functions required of the head 
 
 588 See ROGER G. NOLL,  REFORMING REGULATION 5 (1971) (describing independent 
commissions: “In charge of the agency is a tribunal of essentially co-equal commissioners, 
responsible for establishing agency policies, making final decisions in specific cases coming 
before the agency, and managing the activities of the staff . . . ”). 
 589 See STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 16, at 35 (“The traditional 
independent regulatory agency is a commission of multiple members, nominated by the 
president and confirmed by the Senate, who are appointed for set terms which expire at 
staggered intervals.”). 
 590 See id.  at 35-36 (finding at least eleven independent federal regulatory commissions 
in 1977 including, inter alia: the Federal Reserve, Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Federal Communications 
Commission, Federal Trade Commission, the ICC, and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission). 
 591 See, e.g., THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 138, at 431-39 
(“Administration by a plural executive is universally regarded as inefficient.  This has 
proved to be true in connection with these commissions.”); M ARVER H. BERNSTEIN, 
REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 293 (1955) (“Commissions have 
shown little understanding of the need for promotion of voluntary compliance with, and for 
vigorous enforcement of, their regulations.”); THE PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON 
EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK : REPORT ON SELECTED 
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 3-7 (1971) (summarizing findings critical of the 
independent regulatory agencies, including, inter alia: “Inherent deficiencies in the 
commission form of organization prevent the commissions from responding effectively to 
changes in industry structure, technology, economic trends, and public needs”)  [hereinafter 
THE ASH COUNCIL REPORT].  But see STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 16, at 80 
(concluding that “the independent status of the regulatory commissions should be 
continued”); NOLL, supra note 588, at 12-14 (critiquing the analysis of the Ash Council 
Report). 
 592 Recent outbreaks of foodborne disease have focused the President’s attention on food 
safety.  See, e.g., FOOD SAFETY FROM FARM TO TABLE, supra note 310 (outlining federal efforts 
to address food safety problems at the request of President Clinton). 
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of a food safety agency, and at the same time constitutionally shelter its 
occupants from close presidential oversight or removal.593  Moreover, if 
lack of political accountability is a defect of the current arrangements, an 
“independent” agency would hardly be a cure.594 
The advocates of independence have not explained their reasoning in 
any detail, but we assume their objective is to create an agency that is not 
subordinate to, or anchored in, any existing department or program.  If we 
are correct, an “independent” food safety agency would be one that 
combined the existing functions of the FSIS and the CFSAN (and perhaps 
other functions as well) in an organization outside both the USDA and 
HHS.  The modern EPA would thus appear to be a better model than any of 
the multi-member agencies to which the label “independent” has 
commonly been applied. 
D.  Agency Leadership 
The previous discussion has touched on another issue that any 
concrete proposal for consolidation would have to address: Who should 
head the new organization?  We reject the option of a multi-member 
commission, though not because proponents of consolidation have ruled it 
out.  As far as we can tell, few of them have thought about the issue.  Once 
one settles on an organization headed by a single, presidentially-appointed 
(and removable) officer, the choice of title would appear to be largely a 
matter of taste.  Whether that official was titled “Secretary” of a new 
department or “Administrator” of a non-cabinet executive agency could 
have implications for the occupant’s social calendar, but probably would 
not affect her influence with the President or with Congress.  In these 
critical arenas, two other factors, neither subject to the control of statutory 
architects, would matter a great deal more. 
 
 593 See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding that the Federal 
Trade Commission Act limits the power of the President to remove members of the FTC 
and that any “executive” power that is exercised by the FTC is done in furtherance of its 
“quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers.”  But cf. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 
(1926) (holding that the President may remove all “purely executive” officers of the United 
States); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689-90 (1988) (limiting the importance of the 
categorization in Humphrey’s Ex’r of “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” Commission 
powers in the context of the Independent Counsel).  The Morrison Court held: 
[t]he analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid 
categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the 
President, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the President’s 
exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed duty to 
‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed under Article II. 
Id.  
 594 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 591, at 293 (“The commissions’ record of political 
responsibility is unsatisfactory . . . .  [T]heir political accountability is seriously deficient.”). 
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One would be the personal standing (and certainly the political skill) 
of the individual appointed to head the organization.595  The visibility of the 
job and the resources allocated to it would surely reflect and affect 
congressional views of the agency’s importance.  Different heads of the 
same agency, however, have enjoyed widely varying influence with 
Congress, based on résumé or personality.596  Congress, through the Senate 
confirmation process, can make it more or less difficult for Presidents to 
appoint influential agency heads, but it cannot assure that effective 
candidates will be nominated.597 
The President and his staff have greater influence over the quality of 
the candidates who get considered for the kind of job we imagine.  The 
President can significantly influence the power of successful nominees not 
only by his original selection but also by his willingness to support their 
decisions and to accord them personal access, rather than forcing them to 
deal through subordinates.598  Some EPA Administrators and many cabinet 
secretaries rarely met with the Presidents whom they served, while others 
had close ties to, and thus often ready backing from, the White House.599 
E.  Geographic Dispersal 
The foregoing discussion highlights many of the major issues of 
organizational design that any serious plan to consolidate food safety 
functions would have to resolve.  There are additional issues as well.  
While perhaps not as fundamental, they are nonetheless potentially 
 
 595 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY  217 (1989).  Mr. Wilson states:  
A few gifted political executives are able to fuse the maintenance of their 
own position with that of their organizations.  Because of their exceptional 
talents combined with their good fortune in holding office at a time when 
their political environment is unusually malleable, these individuals manage 
to make that environment so supportive that in effect it becomes a universal 
constituency. 
Id. 
 596 See id. at 205 (“Reputation—for influence, style, and access—is a key part of the 
relationship between executive and constituency.”).  See also CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, 
JR. ,  SIGNALS FROM THE HILL 94-97 (1988) (describing the political give and take of the 
congressional appropriations process and noting that “[s]ometimes by necessity, 
opportunistic extended bargaining and mutual adjustment take place”). 
 597 See id. at 77-82 (describing the often unexpected results of the “bargaining, second-
guessing, and delay” in the Senate confirmation process). 
 598 See, e.g., ROBERT B. REICH ,  LOCKED IN THE CABINET 301 (1997) (recounting the 
experience of former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich wandering the corridors of the West 
Wing “like an itinerant peddler” trying to sell his ideas to people who saw the President 
more than the Secretary did). 
 599 See, e.g., Michael Riley et al., “Silent Sam” Speaks Up, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 24 
(describing the relationship of former Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Samuel 
Pierce with President Reagan who once famously failed to recognize Pierce at a reception). 
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significant practical impediments. 
One of these—already an obstacle to effective coordination—is 
geography.  FDA units are already dispersed among some three dozen 
buildings in the greater Washington, D.C. area.  The CFSAN is less 
splintered than other centers, as it currently occupies fewer than half a 
dozen buildings in the Washington area, with its two major operations at 
200 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., and Beltsville, Maryland.600  Even 
this division makes hands-on supervision by the Center Director (not to 
mention the Commissioner’s office—located elsewhere, in Rockville, 
Maryland) difficult.601  The USDA’s food safety functions are 
headquartered in just three buildings in the nation’s capital but over 75% of 
its workforce, made up of the resident inspectors of meat and poultry 
processing facilities, is based at several thousand facilities around the 
country.602 
The dispersal of FSIS, and to a lesser extent FDA, personnel is 
inescapable so long as continuous and immediate access to food processing 
and storage facilities is an essential part of effective regulation.  
Consolidation of the FSIS and the CFSAN might not exacerbate already 
challenging problems of vertical coordination, but the different inspection 
duties and philosophies of the two agencies would present a separate 
organizational challenge.  Increasing the number of Washington-based 
facilities that are subject to the direction of a single administrator would not 
be an additional challenge. 
Our main purpose in this part has not been to show that consolidation 
could not work.  On that point we remain agnostic, albeit skeptical.  Rather, 
our aim is to identify key issues of organizational design and program 
management that any consolidation plan would have to address before it 
could be taken seriously.  Few contemporary advocates of consolidation 
have acknowledged these issues, and none has outlined a concrete plan that 
purports to resolve them. 
 
 600 See Interview with Michael R. Taylor, who heads the Center for Risk Management, at 
Resources for the Future in Washington, D.C. (October 23, 2000). 
 601 See id. 
 602 See id. 
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VII.  THE POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO CONSOLIDATION 
Protecting the safety of the food supply is an enormous and 
increasingly complex challenge notwithstanding the plausible claim that 
Americans enjoy food that is as safe as any in the world.603  We have not 
attempted here to resolve how the individual agencies that now share 
responsibility for food safety must modernize their methods and improve 
their performance.  Our central focus has been the recurrent suggestion that 
these programs should be combined in a single organization.  In Part VI we 
explored the major programmatic implications of that suggestion.  In this 
part we take up questions about its practical and political feasibility. 
A.  Consolidation as an Ideal 
We are persuaded that if one could now organize federal food safety 
functions without reference to history, and unconstrained by existing 
structures, there would be advantages in combining many of these 
functions in one organization directed by a single presidentially-appointed 
head.  Such a structure would promote political accountability by linking 
the President with the agency’s duties and identifying the administration 
with the official responsible for their performance.  That official could be 
the government’s spokesperson on food safety, responsible for explaining 
its response to inevitable crises and for marshalling public support for new 
regulatory initiatives and self-protection measures.  If Congress were able 
to begin with a clean slate, it could allow a unified agency greater 
discretion in its choice of methods to identify, prevent, and respond to 
foodborne hazards than either the FSIS or the FDA enjoys.  It could also 
authorize the reprogramming of appropriated funds in response to shifting 
public health priorities.  Moreover, if all relevant personnel worked for the 
same agency, administrative directives could replace delicate negotiation as 
the chief means of enlisting the cooperation of entities scattered around the 
country. 
In short, we are willing to stipulate that a unified agency headed by a 
single administrator would have assets that the current balkanized structure 
lacks.  But this is not an ideal world, and it is unrealistic to expect members 
of Congress or executive branch architects to view the existing structure as 
irrelevant or to ignore its evolution. 
 
 603 See Clinton, supra note 5, at 375 (“The Vice President has told you about some 
things our administration has done to modernize food safety, to keep our food supply the 
safest in the world.”). 
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B.  Historical and Political Impediments 
Even if the proponents could convince program managers and 
external constituents that the gains from combining the government’s major 
food safety functions would outweigh the costs, we suspect they would 
have difficulty persuading the political actors whose support is 
indispensable.  At least this is the teaching of history.  The idea of 
consolidation is hardly new.  Since the Hoover Commission’s report to 
President Truman, the concept has received repeated endorsements.604  Yet 
no concrete proposal to combine the FDA’s food programs with the FSIS’s 
activities has ever reached first base in the political arena.  Despite the 
concept’s distinguished pedigree, no consolidation plan has gained the 
endorsement of any President or come to a vote in either House of 
Congress. 
The Hoover Commission’s plan to consolidate food safety regulation 
failed for at least two reasons.  First, the Commission’s other 
recommendations addressed to the USDA called for controversial closings 
of many local field offices serving farmers, thus ensuring the opposition of 
representatives from agricultural districts and states.605  Second, and 
perhaps more importantly, there was never a true consensus within the 
Commission in favor of its final recommendation to consolidate regulation 
in the USDA.606  The Commission’s Agriculture Task Force recommended 
that all food safety responsibilities rest in the USDA, but its Medical 
Services Committee and a contemporaneous Brookings Institution study 
advocated that the FDA remain in a public welfare agency.607  The 
Commission’s report led to the passage of the Reorganization Act of 1949, 
which enhanced the President’s ability to shuffle programs with 
congressional consent.608  But, when President Eisenhower eventually 
addressed the location of the FDA, he placed it within the new Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare.609 
Later endorsements also failed to elicit strong political support.  Even 
with a Democratically-controlled Congress, President Carter made no effort 
to pursue Senator Ribicoff’s recommendation that the FDA take over 
responsibility for all food safety functions.  Instead, Carter devoted his 
 
 604 See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
 605 See RONALD C. MOE, THE HOOVER COMMISSION REVISITED 43 (1982). 
 606 See BRADLEY D. NASH & CORNELIUS LYNDE, A HOOK IN LEVIATHAN: A CRITICAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT 186-87 (1950). 
 607 See id. 
 608 See M OE, supra note 605, at 56-57;  see also supra note 551 (describing features of 
the Reorganization Act). 
 609 See HUTT & MERRILL, supra note 4, at 5; M OE, supra note 605, at 58 (describing the 
creation of the HEW). 
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energy in the regulatory arena to reforms designed to minimize the cost of 
regulation and exert White House oversight of administrative 
rulemaking.610 
More recently, congressional reaction to the Clinton Administration’s 
NPR proposal to consolidate food safety responsibilities in the FDA 
revealed the slim prospects for implementation.  Within one week of the 
final NPR report, the Democratic Speaker of the House, and the House 
Agriculture Committee chair endorsed consolidation—but within the 
USDA.611  Senator Dale Bumpers, then chair of the Senate Agriculture 
Appropriations subcommittee, betrayed his skepticism when he stated, “I 
don’t know that the FDA’s track record on food inspection is all that 
hot.”612  Congressman Richard Durbin, who as Senator later introduced 
legislation to combine functions in the FDA, predicted that the USDA 
would retain its turf because “Agriculture has its friends from different 
regions of the country.”613 
Nor do the early reactions to the NAS panel’s report (which 
conspicuously avoided addressing where, much less how, food safety 
functions should be centralized) provide evidence that the prospects for 
consolidation have improved.  Scattered bills to make a single agency 
responsible for federal efforts have been introduced, but only one has been 
the subject of committee hearings.  No bill has won the support of any 
committee, much less made its way to the floor of either house.  Notably, 
moreover, President Clinton’s Food Safety Council expressly refrained 
from endorsing what without doubt was the centerpiece of the NAS 
report.614 
An examination of Congress’ committee structure, coupled with an 
appreciation of its customary mode of operation, reveals why the prospects 
for consolidation are bleak.  The several agencies with food safety 
functions are currently overseen by an even larger number of congressional 
committees, which could be expected to protect their alliances in any 
exploration of reorganization.  The USDA, FDA, and EPA pesticide 
programs, and Commerce’s NMFS fall under the jurisdiction of more than 
a dozen authorizing and appropriation committees and subcommittees in 
the House and Senate.  The two lead agencies, the USDA and the FDA, 
 
 610 See Regulation; Carter Starts to Turn a Supertanker , ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 1979, at 
14; Timothy B. Clark, New Approaches to Regulatory Reform—Letting the Market Do the 
Job, 11 NAT’L L.J. 1,316 (both describing President Carter’s approaches to regulatory 
reform). 
 611 See Cooper, supra note 388, at A19. 
 612 Id. 
 613 Id. 
 614 See Food Safety Council NAS Assessment, supra note 316 and accompanying text. 
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answer to four different authorizing committees and two appropria ting 
subcommittees in the House and Senate.  The USDA reports to the 
Agriculture Committees in the House and in the Senate.615  The FDA is 
authorized and chiefly overseen by the House Commerce Committee and 
the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions.616  The 
FDA budget, however, is approved by the Agriculture Appropriations 
Subcommittees in the two chambers.  Agricultural interests thus have an 
opportunity to exert influence over the FDA through the members of these 
committees.617  The EPA, which is chiefly responsible for pesticide 
regulation, is authorized by the House Commerce and House Science 
Committees, and the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee.618  
The EPA’s budget, however, is approved by the House and Senate 
Veterans Administration, HUD, and Independent Agencies Appropriations 
Subcommittees.619  Finally, proposals for executive branch reorganization 
must come before the Senate Government Affairs Committee and the 
House Government Reform and Oversight Committee, as well as before the 
committees overseeing the programs whose status and location are under 
consideration.620 
In short, the dispersal of food safety responsibilities within the 
executive branch mirrors an even more complex distribution of 
congressional committee jurisdiction.  Any proposal to consolidate federal 
 
 615 See CHARLES W. JOHNSON, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S M ANUAL AND RULES OF THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC.  NO. 104-272, at 375-76 
(1997) (describing the jurisdiction of the House Agriculture Committee) [hereinafter HOUSE 
RULES M ANUAL]; LANA R. SLACK , SENATE M ANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 104-1, at 24-25 (1995) 
(describing the jurisdiction of the Senate Agriculture Committee) [hereinafter SENATE 
M ANUAL]. 
 616 See HOUSE RULES M ANUAL, supra note 615, at 386-88 (describing the jurisdiction of 
the House Commerce Committee); SENATE M ANUAL, supra note 615, at 32-33 (describing 
the jurisdiction of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee); U.S. Senate, 
Jurisdiction, at http://www.senate.gov/~labor/juris/body_juris.htm (last modified Jan. 29, 
1999) (showing the jurisdiction of the renamed Senate Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions Committee). 
 617 See FOREMAN, supra note 596, at 99-101 (noting the concern for farmers shown in 
FDA appropriations reports by the House and Senate Agriculture Appropriations 
Subcommittees). 
 618 See HOUSE RULES M ANUAL, supra note 615, at 386-87 (describing the jurisdiction of 
the House Commerce Committee); id. at 412-13 (describing the jurisdiction of the House 
Science Committee); SENATE M ANUAL, supra note, 615 at 28-29 (describing the jurisdiction 
of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee). 
 619 See FOREMAN, supra note 596, at 104-08 (assessing the EPA appropriations processes 
by the House and Senate appropriations subcommittees on Housing and Urban 
Development and Independent Agencies). 
 620 See SENATE M ANUAL, supra note 615, at 31 (describing the jurisdiction of the Senate 
Government Affairs Committee); HOUSE RULES M ANUAL, supra note 615, at 392-93 
(describing the jurisdiction of the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee). 
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food safety functions would have to gain the support of the respective 
chairs (and ranking members) of the above-named committees.  As James 
Q. Wilson has written: 
Congress is exceptionally sensitive to the implications of any 
reorganization for its own internal allocation of power.  Taking a 
bureau out of one department and putting it into another often means 
shifting oversight responsibility for that bureau from one committee (or 
subcommittee) to another.  A willingness to surrender turf is as rare 
among members of Congress as it is among cabinet secretaries.621 
Professor Wilson’s observation should chasten advocates for 
consolidation of federal food safety functions.  And this is to say nothing 
about the difficulty of persuading current Republican majorities in the 
House and Senate of the merits of a plan whose goal would be to make 
regulation more effective. 
We do not assert that the campaign cannot be won, but the obstacles 
are surely formidable.  Not only would the responsible leaders of the House 
and Senate majorities have to agree on the merits of reorganization, they 
would also have to negotiate a new set of legislative arrangements for 
overseeing and funding the new organization.  If either house simply 
retained its current jurisdictional assignments—requiring the combined 
agency and its single head to seek funding and statutory authorization from 
the several committees that now exercise authority—many of the potential 
benefits of consolidation would never accrue. 
C.  The EPA “Model” 
Given this picture of congressional control, readers may find it 
astonishing that President Nixon’s creation of the EPA was successful.  
There are several features of the EPA story that in our view make it a poor 
predictor of the political fate of proposals to reorganize food safety 
functions. 
One is an accident of timing.  Even though President Nixon faced 
Democratic majorities in both the House and Senate in 1970, partisan 
animosities were not yet the obstacle to agreement that they have since 
become.  In addition, President Nixon’s initiative promised to strengthen 
federal environmental controls, a goal likely to have greater appeal for the 
President’s congressional adversaries than for many of his Republican 
allies.  Furthermore, and this is by no means a trivial distinction, President 
Nixon was able to invoke previously conferred reorganization authority and 
thus force the issue of consolidation onto the legislative agenda.  That 
authority lapsed during President Carter’s term and has not been renewed. 
 
 621 WILSON, supra note 595, at 268. 
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Probably the most significant distinction between the creation of the 
EPA and current proposals to reorganize food safety functions lies in the 
age and history of the programs involved.  It would be wrong to suggest 
that the several pollution control programs that President Nixon collected 
from HEW, Agriculture, and Interior were not appreciated by their parent 
departments, but, with the possible exception of the USDA’s pesticide 
registration program, they were not prized.  None was very large, either in 
personnel or budget, and none was yet a major source of grant funding for 
local government or private organizations.  Furthermore, none could claim 
a history comparable to that of the FSIS or the FDA—spanning a century 
during which each has accumulated constituencies outside Washington and 
defenders among members of both parties of Congress.  Proposals to 
combine their functions at the very least create uncertainty about the 
continuity of long-established regulatory patterns and even worse may 
threaten alliances that date back to before World War II. 
D.  Costs of Consolidation 
Even if a political consensus in favor of consolidation could be 
achieved, we should ask what costs might accompany success.  The USDA 
Secretary Glickman recently left no doubt about his view, when he 
declared that any effort to combine the FSIS and the FDA would “wreak 
havoc.”622  We can imagine reasons for his skepticism.  In the short term, 
formal consolidation of organizationally dispersed programs would disrupt 
current work and decision-making patterns and possibly weaken employee 
morale.  The experience of private firms in the wake of a merger suggests 
that these effects are real and often harmful, even when they prove 
transitory.623  We would expect a transition to take longer within 
government, partly because loyalties and work arrangements are more 
deeply entrenched and partly because most civil servants do not operate in 
a world where organizational transformation is expected or common.624 
 
 622 See Weiss, supra note 456, and accompanying text (quoting Glickman). 
 623 See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Collaborative Advantage: The Art of Alliances, HARV. 
BUS.  REV., Jul.-Aug. 1994, at 96, 108.  Professor Kanter discusses the hazards of private 
sector collaborative relationships and notes: 
The potential value of the relationship must be weighed against the value of 
all the other company activities, which also make demands on its resources—
including the time and energy of executives.  Even when relationships have 
high value, an organization can handle only so many before demands begin 
to conflict and invest requirements (management time, partner-specific 
learning, capital, and the like) outweigh perceived benefits. 
Id. 
 624 See Peter Szanton, So You Want to Reorganize Government?, in FEDERAL 
REORGANIZATION—WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED 1, 9 (Peter Szanton ed., 1981).  Mr. Szanton 
observed: 
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In this regard, the EPA experience may again be instructive.  While 
the EPA may appear to be reasonably unified in 2000, it has taken three 
decades to accomplish this feat.  Those who are familiar with the agency’s 
internal operations attest to the continuing influence of old loyalties, 
abandoned policies, and long-established alliances with congressional 
staff.625  The EPA undoubtedly possesses assets that its several parts could 
not separately have acquired, but in many respects it remains a collection of 
parts, a confederation.  Furthermore, the designers of the EPA had one 
advantage that architects of food safety consolidation might not have: In 
the creation of the EPA no constituent program was an obvious “loser.”  
Most of the programs assembled to create the EPA were not integral parts 
of their departments, and their relocation did not imply the superiority of 
any one component.  The return of the FDA’s food programs to the USDA, 
however, would imply failure in their present location or, at the very least, 
the belated correction of a New Deal mistake.  The removal of the FSIS 
from the USDA after over ninety years would represent an even greater 
failure. 
Indeed, any consolidation plan, even one that contemplated the 
creation of a new agency, would imply that existing food safety programs 
and their managers had failed.  In 1970, the challenge presented by 
environmental pollution was new, or at least recently discovered.  While 
environmental advocates shared a conviction that existing institutions were 
inadequate, the main target of criticism was Congress and the legal tools 
that it provided to federal officials.  The enactment of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, the creation of the EPA, and the passage of the 
Clean Air Act within a single year represented a new public commitment to 
attack a new set of problems.  Except for the USDA’s pesticide program, 
criticism of official performance was muted. 
By contrast, the challenge of keeping food safe is ancient and 
recognition that the federal government has a critical role to play in 
meeting this challenge is a century old.626  The responsible institutions have 
been in business for nearly as long and today employ thousands of workers 
and collectively spend over a billion dollars on the task.  The very notion 
 
Reorganization has traditionally focused on structural change, whose 
dominating principle is that related programs should be placed cheek by jowl 
within the same institution.  But the issues government now addresses . . . 
cause widely separated programs to be related, and each with different sets of 
others, depending on the issue.  Structural change is far too difficult and 
slow-moving to manage such shifting and multiple relations.  Processes of 
coordination, far more flexible, are the only devices that can serve. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 625 See discussion supra V.C; see also Interview with Jon Cannon, supra note 164. 
 626 See Hutt, supra note 1. 
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that their functions should be reorganized represents a judgment that, in 
fundamental ways, they have not been doing their job.  Accordingly, we 
would expect employee resentments over relocation of food safety 
programs to be deeper and last longer than those that must have 
accompanied the creation of the EPA. 
In addition, for any of the consolidated programs, relocation would 
threaten linkages with external constituencies that are not only the source 
of professional friendships but often the lubricant of effective government.  
It is not surprising that all of the major associations of food producers—
groups such as the National Food Processors Association and the Grocery 
Manufacturers Association—have opposed the concept.627  One can be 
skeptical of their motives (imagining worries that once-friendly officials 
might no longer be in a position to act on their sympathies) but effective 
regulation often depends upon good personal relationships between 
officials and those whose conduct they seek to influence.  In any 
reorganization, such relationships could be threatened or destroyed. 
We do not mean to exaggerate the institutional costs of consolidation.  
While disruption and uncertainty would be inevitable, the gains from 
reorganization might eventually offset them.  Yet in the current discussions 
of the benefits of consolidation, however, such costs have largely been 
ignored. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Although we are likely to witness some modest reorganization of food 
safety functions, such as the Commerce Department’s surrender of seafood 
jurisdiction to the FDA, we are skeptical that any move to combine the 
FSIS with the CFSAN, either within an existing department or in a new 
organization, will ultimately appeal to the political decision-makers.  Thus, 
we expect the major federal food safety functions to remain 
organizationally dispersed, though perhaps more effectively coordinated.  
Even if a centralized organization replaces the present balkanized structure 
at the federal level, however, protecting food safety will inevitably remain 
a multi-agency activity.  Food is grown and processed locally and since 
many of the hazards that most concern public health authorities emerge at 
 
 627 See, e.g., Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Restructuring and the Dist. 
of Columbia, Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 124, 129 (1999) 
(statement of Stacey Zawel, Ph.D., Vice President, Scientific and Regulatory Policy, 
Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc.) (“America’s food safety system needs the right 
focus, not a new structure.”); Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov’t Mgmt., Restructuring 
and the Dist. of Columbia, Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 119, 123 
(1999) (statement of Rhona Applebaum, Executive Vice President for Scientific and 
Regulatory Affairs, National Food Processors Association) (“The architecture of the 
nation’s food safety system is not so flawed that the building needs to be gutted.”). 
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this stage, critical responsibilities will continue to rest with state and local 
officials.628  This is not simply a statement of political reality, it is a 
description of sensible management.  There are good reasons for federal 
authorities to deal with, support, and rely upon local partners, and equally 
sound reasons for states and localities to retain their independence.  
Similarly, the internationalization of the U.S. food supply will make 
American consumers and domestic regulators increasingly dependent on 
the performance of foreign authorities.629 
Because a unitary “farm-to-table” system of food regulation is not 
realistically achievable, there will continue to be “seams” between 
partic ipants in a multi-agency collaboration.  The question that advocates 
of consolidation, as well as legislators, must address is whether the long-
term gains from consolidation of functions at one level of this complicated 
structure would justify the immediate struggle and the short-term costs.  
We do not believe that the EPA example provides a clear answer.  If one 
considers the EPA’s performance to have been largely successful, as we do, 
it is possible to conclude that the example proves that consolidation will 
not make matters worse and could make them better.  But the struggles that 
EPA managers face in their efforts to regulate comprehensively, foster 
internal cooperation, assure cross-agency consistency, and design 
integrated pollution control programs should make consolidation advocates 
cautious in their predictions. 
We have sketched a pessimistic picture of the prospects for 
organizational consolidation of the federal food safety programs.  
Moreover, we have suggested that such consolidation would not solve, and 
might not even address, some of the most serious challenges to the safety 
of the U.S. food supply.  It is a fair question, then, whether there are other 
intermediate measures that could improve regulatory performance. 
President Clinton’s Council on Food Safety represents an effort to 
enhance coordination and improve cooperation among the primary federal 
food safety agencies.630  The establishment of high-level coordinating 
groups is a familiar presidential response to bureaucratic turf battles.631  Yet 
orchestrated and encouraged coordination can yield benefits at a relatively 
low cost.  For example, the Food Safety Council may aid in creating 
coordinated budget proposals and identifying areas of redundancy or gaps 
in regulatory efforts.  In 1997, at the urging of the White House, 
 
 628 See discussion supra Part III.F.2. 
 629 See discussion supra Part III.G. 
 630 See discussion supra Part IV.A.5. 
 631 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,631, 53 Fed. Reg. 9,421 (1988) (establishing during the 
Reagan Administration the Working Group on Financial Markets to address jurisdictional 
deficiencies found after the stock market crash of 1988). 
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representatives of the CDC, the FDA, the EPA, and the FSIS, as well as 
state and local food safety agencies, formed the Foodborne Outbreak 
Response Coordinating Group (FORC-G) to strengthen interagency 
coordination during food-related emergencies.632  Co-chaired by the 
USDA’s Under Secretary for Food Safety and HHS’ Assistant Secretary 
for Health,633  FORC-G has a three-part role: enhance coordination and 
communication among the cooperating agencies; assist resource allocation 
during food-related emergencies; and improve preparation for new 
foodborne threats.634  These efforts may lay the groundwork for better 
future coordination of routine operations.  Given the political obstacles to 
real organizational reform, this may be the most feasible means of stitching 
the “seams” in the regulatory apparatus. 
Coordinating bodies such as the Food Safety Council should be 
recognized for what they are: Palliative care, not reconstructive surgery.  
By their nature, such instruments are weak.  They are usually grounded in 
Executive Orders rather than statutes.  Moreover, they must work within 
the limits of existing statutes and abide by statutorily-driven resource 
allocations.  Furthermore, the Food Safety Council specifically lacks clear 
leadership.  The group is chaired jointly by the Secretaries of Agriculture 
and HHS and the Assistant to the President for Science and 
Technology/Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, all of 
whom have other, arguably higher, responsibilities and none of whom has 
authority to resolve disagreements.635  The Council may improve the 
executive’s ability to bridge jurisdictional gaps and avoid overlaps, but it 
cannot assure political accountability or correct Congress’ allocation of 
resources. 
As with most vexing problems, there are no easy solutions to the 
problems created by the organization of federal food safety regulation.  
Neither reorganization nor orchestrated coordination among agency leaders 
is likely to assure political accountability, reallocate resources or bridge 
jurisdictional gaps while preventing overlaps.  Moreover, even if a unified 
federal food safety system could improve regulatory effectiveness, policy 
 
 632 See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FACT 
SHEET: FORC-G—FOODBORNE OUTBREAK RESPONSE COORDINATING GROUP, at 
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/tpforc-g.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2000) (listing the 
agencies and responsibilities of FORC-G). 
 633 Other members of FORC-G include representatives of the CDC, FDA, FSIS, EPA, 
Association of Food and Drug Officials, National Association of City and County Health 
Officials, Association of State and Territorial Public Health Laboratory Directors, Council 
of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, and the National Association of State Departments 
of Agriculture.  See id. 
 634 See id. 
 635 See Food Safety Council Executive Order, supra note 407. 
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makers must balance the benefits against the physical, bureaucratic, and 
political costs of consolidation today.  Congress should not be fooled into 
believing that statutory reorganization alone can meet the challenge of 
managing the risks of a diverse and dispersed food supply. 
 
